Subjective Morality?

[The Grand Nudger]

And moral systems, in my opinion, don't take feelings "into account."  They are the verbal representation of feelings.  I don't think you can find a single more which is not at its essence just a verbalization of something that makes people feel bad.

-Recall the above........

There are plenty of things I take to be wrong that I don't feel bad about.  I'm sure there are plenty of other things taken to be wrong that are..more or less, just things that make this or that person feel icky.  Those would not be "the preferred set" of moral justifications..to a realist.

I'd like an example of something which is immoral which nobody has negative feelings about.

The contention was that every single more was just a verbalization of something that makes people feel bad.  Regardless of whether we're talking about mores...or morals...I don't think that's the case.  There are things we all take to be wrong in our moral systems, that don't make us feel bad...and there are customs and habits that we get up to.... that we get up to, not because if we didn't we or someone else would feel bad...and often enough for no reason at all, or no reason immediately accessible to the modern observer (driving on the left or right side of the road is a fucking more, lol).  

It's a very strong contention...and it needs to be pointed out.. that a person cannot maintain it to be true and be a subjectivist -or- a realist...because it's a noncog objection.  The notion that moral statements are not, in fact..beliefs about something that we take to be true or which could be true or false (which you agreed to earlier, btw, Benny)..but instead reduce to something more like..."yuck".  It also contradicts those earlier comments about morality being a mediation between x y and z.  

This is why Vulcan posted that flow chart in the first place.  People are getting their streams mixed up when they object to particular moral theories..their objections are coming from contradictory ideological camps.  They can't -all- be valid objections simultaneously and concurrently, and an objection that contradicts ones own stated positions can always be answered with...

-"then we are both wrong"

 ...in this case, because it's coming from a place that contradicts earlier stated positions...it can be followed up with "but why do you think that only one of us is wrong when the objection would implicate us both?" If morality (or mores) were just a bunch of expressivist statements about how we're feeling...then it's not about beliefs, contentions taken to be true, facts specific to the subject, mind independent variables..or a mediation between feelings, ideas, and environment..it's just "yuck!" and "yum". Even more fundamentally, can you provide some explanation for why any other statement that presents itself as purporting to report a fact is any different? Why is "I have a brown dog"..not, more accurately, "yuck", or "yum"?

If you take the above objection to be coming from a place of truth (and hey...how come that's not yuck or yum...while we're at it?), obviously I disagree....but you'll need to contain your conjectures and objections going forward to what is consistent with a non-cognitivist position or else I won't be able to cogently respond..and you wouldn't be able to cogently object or question. A cornell realist, moral non naturalist, moral subjectivist, and error theorist all answer the objection above the same way. That answer -won't- demonstrate objectivity.

I want you to know that I think it's a great conversation - but it would be nice to know if you're looking for an explanation of moral cognitivism, or moral mind independent variables. Are you trying to figure out why realists think that our moral judgements express states of belief, why they think they purport to report facts..........or are you more concerned with the deep subjectivity of the human creature as a moral agent?

@Rob
OFC, in some sense, if there were moral facts..things would be exactly as they are now.  Moral facts, if there are moral facts..derive at least in part from some observation of the way things are.  This is a requirement of objectivity - not a problem for objectivity..or a demonstration of it's lack of practical effect.

If there are scientific facts, things would -also- appear exactly as they are now.   The facts are derived from how things are (or seem to be) in the first place.Does that mean that there is no practical difference between a world with or without scientific facts? Would it matter if there were no practical difference..does that somehow speak to the existence of moral or scientific facts? I'd be willing to wager that, if you were being consistent, you would realize that it doesn't..as well as conclude that the existence of scientific facts has at least -some- practical difference to us juxtaposed against a world in which there were none..and grant the same to hypothetical moral facts..if there were any.

Even a subjectivist considers -their- moral facts important because they have an upstream relationship with so much in our life. From government policy down to deeply personal interactions and decisions. Any change to those things, at all, and the nature of those things.....is profoundly consequential.