Subjective Morality?

[The Grand Nudger]

Irrational and/or confused would be that tribes name.  The positions describe baseward exclusions. 
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I have no idea what 'baseward' means.

So, the same example.  Moral non cognitivism excludes any moral proposition which expresses a state of belief.  This is it's defining and self circumscribing claim.  Moral propositions -do not- express states of belief.  The true state of any moral expression is the fundamental disagreement here.  Do they express beliefs?

Non cognitivists reject this.  If they exist, if some moral propositions do express states of belief....non cognitivism is wrong.  If they don't, QED..end of discussion, everyone else is wrong for the same reason.

The next question (if you answered in the affirmative and the discussion continued) is whether or not our beliefs are sometimes true.  

Error theorists reject this.  They state for reasons or no reasons we have it wrong.  Our beliefs..at least in this regard, aren't even sometimes true.

If they were, a person would be negotiating over which or how much of our beliefs are sometimes true, not objecting to the notion that they sometimes are.  If they aren't..then QED end of discussion.  Our moral propositions describe states of belief but our beliefs are hilariously wrong.  Everyone else is wrong for the same reason.

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If you think that our moral propositions express a state of belief,
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My question was about 'morality' not 'moral propositions'.  

Our answers to what moral propositions are and to what they refer describes our position on what morality is.  Assertions about them constrain our meta-ethical claims. If I think that moral propositions do describe states of belief, and sometimes our beliefs are true..then, as far as I've described my own positions and beliefs accurately, I am insisting that morality -is- an attempt to approach truth, and at least sometimes..it -is- an attempt that hits truth. I can't maintain emotivism (for example, a form of non cog) at this point (or use it in a valid objection) because what would have to be true about moral propositions for emotivism..as a position on what morality -is-, to be true... I've already declared to be false. I can't maintain error theory as a position on what morality -is-..either (or use it as a valid objection)..because just as above, I've already declared it to be false.

Next up in the meta ethical flow chart is what truth it hits, and this is where subjectivism and realism diverge.