Subjective Morality?

[The Grand Nudger]

If a realist cannot see that abstract ideas and the perception of cats are a different category, then they have a pretty poor understanding of the experience of mind.  In addition to moral ideas, you might as well add that God and invisible pink unicorns are no more or no less real than cats-- cuz, you know, they're all just facts.  Right?

............................as I've told you many times..saying "they're abstract ideas" doesn't threaten realism.  Moral non naturalism is a realist position.  It just so happens that I, unlike the dualists and idealists who might hold to that position..think that my abstract ideas are referent to things in the natural world.   Here again, repeating something that's been said multiple times - it's unclear how moral realism is different from realism in general. Either you think our ideas refer to something, or you don't....and that's really all there is to that. Even a subjectivist believes that moral ideas and moral facts are referent........

There's no polite way to say this..but you have absolutely no purchase into any position with your objection here - you're just blurting things out and repeating yourself regardless of what response you get. All cognitivist positions on morality agree that moral propositions express ideas. Our beliefs. You've already agreed to cognitivism, and so has a moral realist.

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Who's conflating anything?  A realist is simply telling you that the facts which comprise their moral positions are exactly like cat facts.  Their oughts, are like everyone else's oughts.

Facts, combined with an evaluative premise.  

............?

Do we both agree that cats and harm exist?  Do we both agree that cats and harm are mind independent?  You can object to my use of harm as (at least one of) my evaluative premises...but if you're objecting to the existence of harm and harmful things...then there really can't be any productive discussion between us.  If you think that cats are mind independent in some way that harm isn't..then what you require.... is an argument to -that- effect.

If we both agree that cats and harm both exist and that this existence is a mind independent fact (iow, it doesn't actually matter whether I, personally, believe it) and you would instead object to my use of harm as a valid evaluative metric or premise..then you need an argument for that.  

You'll have to explain why, and how, harm isn't a valid metric for moral propositions.

(full disclosure, it would be an academic endeavour at best, since I'm also a moral pluralist and can derive my moral conclusions by working..instead of from the bottom as I have been..from the top by reference to consequence or utility..or even deontological values.  Like a biologist, for example...I don't think that any single moral fact provides a full description of morality anymore than any single biological fact provides a full description of biology.)

You are still conflating two kinds of "facts": those about something which you are considering morally, and those which are intrinsically moral in nature.  The former is meaningless since any objective state can be considered in a million different contexts, and the latter non-existent.

I'm still waiting for a description of your bridge between is/ought.  How do you go from "X is harm" to "we shouldn't do X"?

So, we don't both agree that cats and harm exist...or..what?  Why are you still waiting for something that you've already been presented with?  A realists ought is the same as anyone else's ought.  A fact in combination with an evaluative premise.  That's literally the only way to come up with a rational ought, lol....no matter what you might believe the status of moral ontology to be.

The reason that I have asked, again, if we agree that harm exists, is because that's the only concession I need from you to leave you in a position where you simply cannot argue with me as a realist on points of fact. If you can agree that harm exists..then even if you don't agree with my moral propositions (and even if you don't think that there's a natural world, and even if you think that most or all other moral propositions are meaningfully subjective)..it is not sensible to maintain that this is not objective. Harm really does exist, it is a mind independent fact, and because my moral proposition is based on a mind independent fact..it is an objective position, a realist position.

You see my facts, they are facts, you just don't like.....whatever.