Deconversion and some doubts

[vulcanlogician]

Not really, the ought is derived from a goal, a telos.

If I subscribe to some goal such as I ought not harm others. Then if x is harmful to others, it can be said that I ought not do x, as a result.

But if I had no such goal, there’s no ought to derive from x is harmful to others. It’s not based on x being harmful to others, that I ought not to do x,  it’s based on the goal being not to harm others.

The questions I’m asking are in relationship to the nature of these goals/rules.

The ought is derived from understanding an ideal... a better than/worse than thing... once you understand that there is "a good" the ought naturally follows from that.

When pushed, most atheist I’ve spoken to indicate as the previous poster did, that such goals/rules are rooted in unwritten social/culture agreements, we make with others in our society. Implying that it requires our agreement to be bound by them, and that such oughts are not applicable to those who don’t. It’s not clear to me if you agree with this view?

I reject this view. And I'm not like most atheists concerning my ethics. Nor am I "decided" on my ethics. I think moral realism is plausible for X, Y, and Z reasons. Most are found in Plato's Republic. I don't recall Plato ever arguing that morality has anything to do with any god in that book. In fact, he argues the opposite in Euthyphro. But I'm also aware that many Christian Platonists loved to shove their God into that book. That book had nothing to do with their God, Jesus, or "what was written on men's hearts." To Plato, morality is a matter of letting reason control the appetites. (EDIT: there is more to it than that... we can discuss if you are interested.)

Theist, including Plato, Aristotle, etc believe in a transcendent moral order.

Plato and Aristotle had a metaphysical ethics. Is that what you mean by "transcendent moral order"? G.E. Moore was an atheist and his ethics was metaphysical, too. I tend to like non-naturalist and metaphysical ethics... but you'll have to explain to me what metaphysical ethics have to do with gods. I don't think God's existence or nonexistence would have anything to do with morality. If something is morally wrong, it is morally wrong whether God exists or not.

So when you appeal to folks like Plato in defense of your moral view, it’s a bit odd. I believe you’ve expressed some pantheistic leanings previously, an affinity for folks like Spinoza, so it is possible you do subscribe to a teleological view of reality,  but I hope you can be clear here, so that we don’t talk past each other

I'm no pantheist, but I do love Spinoza's "pantheism" (if you want to call it that). Spinoza thinks that "reality is sacred." Interesting idea. There is no teleology with Spinoza's God: (Leibniz used Spinoza's basic deterministic model with a teleology duct taped on... which is where you may have gotten the idea that Spinoza is concerned with a 'telos'). Leibniz said all the stuff about this being "the best of all possible worlds" and all that. Spinoza said nothing like that. He said something like: shit is happening because it is necessary for it to happen. But there is a sort of guilt by association going on with Spinoza and Leibniz. Look it up on Stanford Encyclopedia. We don't need to get into it here.

Spinoza is a difficult case to put into a category, anyway. I've read philosophers claiming he is a moral nihilist, and others that saying he is a moral realist. That's a matter for debate. One thing that isn't up for debate, however, is that he saw most theists as a bunch of fearful, brutish thugs who more used their god as an excuse to abuse others than an inspiration to ever do any kind of good deed. He said that plainly, on multiple occasions, and didn't leave those particular statements open to interpretation like he did some of his others.

I don't want to get segwayed into Spinoza. I'd rather keep our conversation centered around Plato's Republic because that is where the meat and potatoes of my moral realism is found.