(August 1, 2019 at 8:08 am)Gae Bolga Wrote: You’re arguing with me over shit you have to google. That outta be your first alarm bell.
Yes, I tend to google terms i’m not that familiar with duh. Unsurprisingly almost nothing pulled up, but I stand corrected there was 1 hit:
“ As an alternative, we are offered Hume’s hypothesis that moral propositions such as “X is good or bad, right or wrong” have no cognitive content and only serve to describe our feelings. If, for example, I say that premeditated murder is wrong, this proposition renders neither a natural fact of the empirical world nor a metaphysical fact of an invisible world, but merely describes my internal experience. It describes a sense of revulsion or outrage that I feel in the face of premeditated murder. Our moral language, then, leads us into a constant deception. It pretends to describe real properties, but only our emotions are real. That is why this position is called emotivism. As these feelings are described by moral propositions, we can also call this emotivism descriptive emotivism. And because emotions are normally regarded as subjective, we can also talk about a descriptive moral subjectivism.”
But since you and I both agree that x is bad, expresses an objective truth, and not an expression of feelings, it doesn’t seem to apply.