RE: Is God a logical contradiction?
February 18, 2020 at 2:59 pm
(This post was last modified: February 18, 2020 at 3:07 pm by John 6IX Breezy.)
First three websites respectively:
1. "The topic of animal consciousness is beset with a number of difficulties. It poses the problem of other minds in an especially severe form because animals, lacking the ability to use human language, cannot tell us about their experiences. Also, it is difficult to reason objectively about the question, because a denial that an animal is conscious is often taken to imply that it does not feel, its life has no value, and that harming it is not morally wrong.
2. "Many scientists and philosophers remain convinced that even if some questions about animal minds are empirically tractable, no amount of experimentation can provide access to phenomenal consciousness per se. This remains true even among those who are willing to invoke cognitive explanations of animal behavior that advert to internal representations."
3. "'We can trigger these kinds of states that if you measured in an animal, you would say the animal is feeling fear,''" LeDoux said. “'But if we can’t use that information to conclusively demonstrate that a human is feeling fear or experiencing that state, then we certainly can’t use it every time an animal looks like he may be feeling afraid."'
I specially enjoyed the last website; I'm a fan of Joseph LeDoux which is why I've said the same things myself, see comment #279.
1. "The topic of animal consciousness is beset with a number of difficulties. It poses the problem of other minds in an especially severe form because animals, lacking the ability to use human language, cannot tell us about their experiences. Also, it is difficult to reason objectively about the question, because a denial that an animal is conscious is often taken to imply that it does not feel, its life has no value, and that harming it is not morally wrong.
2. "Many scientists and philosophers remain convinced that even if some questions about animal minds are empirically tractable, no amount of experimentation can provide access to phenomenal consciousness per se. This remains true even among those who are willing to invoke cognitive explanations of animal behavior that advert to internal representations."
3. "'We can trigger these kinds of states that if you measured in an animal, you would say the animal is feeling fear,''" LeDoux said. “'But if we can’t use that information to conclusively demonstrate that a human is feeling fear or experiencing that state, then we certainly can’t use it every time an animal looks like he may be feeling afraid."'
I specially enjoyed the last website; I'm a fan of Joseph LeDoux which is why I've said the same things myself, see comment #279.
