RE: Is God a logical contradiction?
February 22, 2020 at 12:17 am
(This post was last modified: February 22, 2020 at 1:01 am by John 6IX Breezy.)
(February 20, 2020 at 2:48 am)The Grand Nudger Wrote: You have a philosophic objection to science which proceeds from ideological positions that consider consciousness to be irreducible.
You seem to think that viewing consciousness as irreducible goes against cognitive science. I want to make sure we’re clear that many cognitive scientists do view consciousness as irreducible:
“A reductive explanation of consciousness will explain this wholly on the basis of physical principles that do not themselves make any appeal to consciousness. A nonreductive solution is one on which consciousness (or principles involving consciousness) is admitted as a basic part of the explanation […] Conscious experience is not “postulated” to explain other phenomena in turn; rather, it is a phenomenon to be explained in its own right. And if it turns out that it cannot be explained in terms of more basic entities, then it must be taken as irreducible [...] Given that reductive explanation fails, nonreductive explanation is the natural choice.”
The following quote echoes what I said in my curtain analogy. This is how correlates can be assessed despite consciousness not being observable by those on the other side of the curtain:
”The task of a science of consciousness, as I see it, is to systematically integrate two key classes of data into a scientific framework: third-person data, or data about behavior and brain processes, and first-person data, or data about subjective experience. When a conscious system is observed from the third-person point of view, a range of specific behavioral and neural phenomena present themselves. When a conscious system is observed from the first-person point of view, a range of specific subjective phenomena present themselves. Both sorts of phenomena have the status of data for a science of consciousness.”
Reference: Chalmers, D. (2010). The character of consciousness. Oxford University Press: London.