Is God a logical contradiction?

[John 6IX Breezy]

Chalmers does not think that we can identify a correlate of consciousness until we can determine..first, that a thing is conscious.  He does not think that we can do that until we come up with a non-reductive possibly panpsychic new force.  He does not accept -human- consciousness by default, as a purveyor of p-zombie objections.  

I don't think anyone in the field thinks you can identify the correlates of consciousness without the thing being conscious. Moreover, Chalmers' thinks a nonreductive explanation is needed to understand consciousness, not that a new force is needed to determine when something is conscious. Chalmers clearly accepts that reportability is a sign of consciousness, as do most other researchers:

• "Because we do not measure consciousness directly, we have to make something of a leap of faith […] The first and by far the most prevalent is the principle of verbal report. When someone says, “Yes, I see that table now,” we infer that the subject is conscious of the table. When someone says, “Yes, I see red now,” we infer that the subject is having an experience of red. Of course, one might always say, “How do you know?”— a philosopher might suggest that we may be faced with a fully functioning zombie—but in fact most of us do not believe that the people around us are zombies, and in practice we are quite prepared to rely on this principle. As pre-experimental assumptions go, this one is relatively safe—it does not require a huge leap of faith—and it is very widely used […] The principle here is that when information is verbally reported, it is conscious" (Chalmers, 2010, p. 92).
  

  
So again, the only way you can say there is a stolen concept here, is if you believe correlations are reductions.

Reference: Chalmers, D. (2010). The character of consciousness. Oxford University Press: London