RE: Moral Obligations toward Possible Worlds
May 7, 2021 at 7:00 pm
(This post was last modified: May 7, 2021 at 7:34 pm by The Grand Nudger.)
Absolutely. I think that those fringe cases are as difficult as they would be in any objective appraisal which respects differences, but also that they rationally inform the misapprehensions that a person with a commitment to forced birth must then have a commitment to environmental issues, or vv.
I like to think that I have a rational commitment to environmental issues and not to forced birth, even though I objectively see that I'm against abortions and for deference to existing moral agents. I'd like to think this because I can give any number of rational explanations for why I have those commitments, and how those commitments play out in practice in accordance to those statements. Even though any or all of those rational explanations could be wrong - factually speakin...and allowing that some if not all are, in fact.
For the other thing-
Two people might agree that babykilling is wrong as a moral fact of that matter.
Two people might disagree that abortion is babykilling - as a circumstantial fact of the matter.
Those two people would then be expected, especially if they employed reason.....to disagree on the matter of whether abortion were wrong. Is the disagreement a moral disagreement, or a circumstantial disagreement of moral import? Properly?
The answer to that question will probably map to positions about moral metaphysics. One person might think that we can't make objective statements about things up to an including colors, by some standard. They don't doubt moral truth. They doubt truth in toto. I thinks that's (somewhat) rationally defensible. I just don't think that doubting truth in toto is the same thing as doubting one category of truth, or that the argument for the one or any other, compelling as they or it may be, are equally compelling as arguments for those others with all of their own and disparate continencies.
Either we cant get it wrong or right, wrong and right are fundamentally meaningless. Or we can, and it's hard, and we get it wrong alot.
I can see how a rational person might believe any combinations of these assertions to moral fact. There's no criticism of those assertions to fact that wouldn't apply to [i0any[/i] assertion to fact.
I like to think that I have a rational commitment to environmental issues and not to forced birth, even though I objectively see that I'm against abortions and for deference to existing moral agents. I'd like to think this because I can give any number of rational explanations for why I have those commitments, and how those commitments play out in practice in accordance to those statements. Even though any or all of those rational explanations could be wrong - factually speakin...and allowing that some if not all are, in fact.
For the other thing-
Two people might agree that babykilling is wrong as a moral fact of that matter.
Two people might disagree that abortion is babykilling - as a circumstantial fact of the matter.
Those two people would then be expected, especially if they employed reason.....to disagree on the matter of whether abortion were wrong. Is the disagreement a moral disagreement, or a circumstantial disagreement of moral import? Properly?
The answer to that question will probably map to positions about moral metaphysics. One person might think that we can't make objective statements about things up to an including colors, by some standard. They don't doubt moral truth. They doubt truth in toto. I thinks that's (somewhat) rationally defensible. I just don't think that doubting truth in toto is the same thing as doubting one category of truth, or that the argument for the one or any other, compelling as they or it may be, are equally compelling as arguments for those others with all of their own and disparate continencies.
Either we cant get it wrong or right, wrong and right are fundamentally meaningless. Or we can, and it's hard, and we get it wrong alot.
I can see how a rational person might believe any combinations of these assertions to moral fact. There's no criticism of those assertions to fact that wouldn't apply to [i0any[/i] assertion to fact.
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