What makes people irrational thinkers?

[polymath257]

Next installment of the Hart fiasco:

page 104-105:
"When thinking about the cause of some particular thing’s being—
as opposed to thinking about its physical origin—we must do so
with an eye to the absolutely conditional nature of that thing. If
one considers the terms of one’s own existence, for instance, one
sees that there is no sense in which one is ever self-existent; one
is dependent on an incalculable number of ever greater and ever
smaller finite conditions, some of which are temporal, and some
of which definitely are not, and all of which are themselves de-
pendent on yet further conditions."

Once again, we see that claim of 'absolute contingency', which seems to be very far from being well-defined,
let alone proven. As far as I can see, the 'reason' for something to exist is *precisely* the physical conditions for
its origin. By claiming there is an 'ontological causality' (see earlier in the book) without any definition or actual
proof, it begs the question of whether physical reality *can* be the 'source of existence'.

In other words, once again, Hart assumes his conclusion by excluding from consideration the most reasonable
alternative.

Going back a bit:

"The ultimate source of existence cannot be some item
or event that has long since passed away or concluded, like a ven-
erable ancestor or even the Big Bang itself—either of which is just
another contingent physical entity or occurrence—but must be a
constant wellspring of being, at work even now. The metaphor for
this sort of ontological dependency that all the great religious tra-
ditions seem to share is that of the relation of a candle’s or lamp’s
flame to the light it casts out into a room at night: should the
flame be extinguished, in that very instant the room would fall
dark. More recent philosophers have sometimes used the image of
an electric current that, if shut off at the source, ceases along all
power lines at once. Whatever simile takes one’s fancy, the cause
of being is not some mechanical first instance of physical eventu-
ality that, having discharged its part, may depart the stage; rather,
it is the unconditional reality underlying all conditioned things in
every instant."

there are several basic mistakes here. First, blowing out the candle
does NOT immediately make the room dark. The speed of light is
finite and it takes time for the room to darken as the light moves from
the candle to the walls and gets absorbed (or reflected). Similarly, shutting
off an electrical switch does NOT immediately stop the current throughout
the circuit: it takes time for the effect to propagate.

But this also goes further. The original argument in terms of contingency allowed for
'dependence' in the sense of physical causality, but not, all of a sudden, that isn't
what is being discussed. By shifting the goalposts, Hart manages to undermine his
argument yet again.

So even the notion of an 'ontological cause' seems to be questionable. But, in
addition, it is far from clear why such is required. Hart *claims* it is required, but
does not make any argument to back up that claim. And, given the questionable
existence of that sort of causality, that is a pretty big omission.

---

Too bad my library is packed away otherwise I would have liked to participate more fully on the book discussion. My question for the physicalists is this. Can a rational person not be a phyicalist? In your world are people in general, allowed to be wrong and have a different metaphysics from physicallism without attributing their beliefs to irrationality, delusion, or malice? And the follow-up to that is has that been the case, in particular, with Hart?

To quote from Hart (page 15):

"Just to make clear what my peculiar prejudices are, I
acknowledge up front that I do not regard true philosophical
atheism as an intellectually valid or even cogent position; in fact,
I see it as a fundamentally irrational view of reality, which can be
sustained only by a tragic absence of curiosity or a fervently reso-
lute will to believe the absurd."

To answer the question: I see it as possible for someone to be rational and not be a physicalist.
Hart does not manage to be so. I *don't* see it as possible to be a modern person and hold to
medieval scholasticism and be rational.

For one thing, it is clear that the denial of atomism is irrationally based. But that is essential for
the conclusion that there can only be a single fundamental source of existence. I see it as far
more likely that there are fundamental particles that owe their existence to nothing more fundamental
and yet have a variety of types and properties. And, that these form what we know of as 'physical existence'.

But, to go further, I think that the emphasis on metaphysics as a road to understanding the universe and
its properties is fundamentally mistaken. Metaphysics, like all of philosophy, is best when asking questions
and deriving conclusions from proposed premises. It is worst when attempting to say that things 'must be'
some particular way, usually aligning with the opinions of the author.