RE: Is Islam A Death Cult?
May 29, 2023 at 3:10 am
(This post was last modified: May 29, 2023 at 3:30 am by Niblo.)
Concerning the notion that Muslims are compelled to hold to dogmatic beliefs; and are unable to question these belief systems without fear of reprisal or punishment from the leader or other group members.
In answer to the question ‘Who is a Muslim?’ Tariq Ramadan writes:
‘The four traditional schools of law and jurisprudence do not agree on an answer. They do agree that once a woman or a man has uttered the attestation of faith – ‘I attest that there is no god but God and that Muhammad is the Messenger of God’ – in full knowledge of its meaning and with a sincere heart, she or he becomes a Muslim.’
He goes on:
‘(…) By definition, any person who has pronounced the attestation of faith with her or his whole mind and heart, and who feels Muslim, must be considered as such, whatever her or his practice, conduct, sins, errors or contradictions. No authority, institution or Muslim legal scholar has the authority to ‘excommunicate’ (takfīr) a person from Islam. It is certainly possible to judge speech, behaviour or actions and to deduce their compatibility or not with the prescriptions of Islam. But it is not possible to deny an individual’s status as a Muslim if she or he asserts it. For the ultimate judgement, the judgement of beings and of hearts, belongs to God alone.’ (‘Islam: The Essentials’).
In Islam, differences of opinion on religious matters (‘ikhtilāf’) are entirely permissible. It was the practice of ‘ikhtilāf’ that gave rise to the principal legal schools (madhāhib) of Islam – the Ḥanafī, Mālikī, Shāfi‘ī, Ḥanbalī, Ja‘farī, Zaydī, Ibāḍī, and Ismā‘īlī; and to the many extinct madhāhib, such as those of al-Tabari; al-Layth b. Sa‘d; Ibn Abī Laylā; al-Awzā‘ī; Sufyān al-Thawrī; and others.
Khaled M. Abou El Fadl writes:
‘A student commencing the study of the Islamic legal heritage is immediately struck by the complexity of doctrines,
diversity of opinions and enormous amounts of disputations over a wide range of issues.
‘(…) Even in one school, such as the Ḥanafī school, there can be several trends, such as the positions of Zafar, Abū Yūsuf, and al-Shaybānī. Often, a student is taught that classical Muslim jurists frequently maintained that there is a long-established tradition of disputation, debate and disagreement that started from the age of the Companions of the Prophet and continued therefrom. Furthermore, the student is taught that a major contributing factor to the diversity of Islamic legal schools is the acceptance and reverence given to the idea of ikhtilāf (disagreement and diversity).’ (‘Speaking in God's Name’).
The notion that Muslims are required to hold to dogmatic beliefs; and are unable to question these belief systems without fear of reprisal or punishment from the leader or other group members is false.
Not only is disagreement to be expected, but it is actually a positive reality to be embraced and encouraged.
Khaled M. Abou El Fadl reminds us that when al-Mansūr – the Abbasid Caliph – offered to adopt the ‘al-Muwaṭṭa’ of -Imām Mālik as the uniform law of the Caliphate, Mālik refused. He did so:
‘…. arguing that there were many established juristic practices in different areas of the Muslim world and there was no legitimate reason to impose legal uniformity upon the various territories. Reportedly, Mālik argued that no one jurist or juristic tradition may have an exclusive claim over the divine truth, and hence, the caliph may not legitimately support one school to the exclusion of the others.’ (‘Speaking in God's Name’).
It is a matter of conscience. People are expected to learn all they can about a particular matter – evidence for and against – and then to follow their conscience (even if it conflicts with the religious verdict of a respected scholar) until new learning, new understanding, creates honest doubt. When this happens one must: ‘Leave what makes you doubt for what does not make you doubt. Verily, truth brings peace of mind and falsehood sows doubt.’ (Sunan al-Tirmidhī : 2518).
Continued:
In answer to the question ‘Who is a Muslim?’ Tariq Ramadan writes:
‘The four traditional schools of law and jurisprudence do not agree on an answer. They do agree that once a woman or a man has uttered the attestation of faith – ‘I attest that there is no god but God and that Muhammad is the Messenger of God’ – in full knowledge of its meaning and with a sincere heart, she or he becomes a Muslim.’
He goes on:
‘(…) By definition, any person who has pronounced the attestation of faith with her or his whole mind and heart, and who feels Muslim, must be considered as such, whatever her or his practice, conduct, sins, errors or contradictions. No authority, institution or Muslim legal scholar has the authority to ‘excommunicate’ (takfīr) a person from Islam. It is certainly possible to judge speech, behaviour or actions and to deduce their compatibility or not with the prescriptions of Islam. But it is not possible to deny an individual’s status as a Muslim if she or he asserts it. For the ultimate judgement, the judgement of beings and of hearts, belongs to God alone.’ (‘Islam: The Essentials’).
In Islam, differences of opinion on religious matters (‘ikhtilāf’) are entirely permissible. It was the practice of ‘ikhtilāf’ that gave rise to the principal legal schools (madhāhib) of Islam – the Ḥanafī, Mālikī, Shāfi‘ī, Ḥanbalī, Ja‘farī, Zaydī, Ibāḍī, and Ismā‘īlī; and to the many extinct madhāhib, such as those of al-Tabari; al-Layth b. Sa‘d; Ibn Abī Laylā; al-Awzā‘ī; Sufyān al-Thawrī; and others.
Khaled M. Abou El Fadl writes:
‘A student commencing the study of the Islamic legal heritage is immediately struck by the complexity of doctrines,
diversity of opinions and enormous amounts of disputations over a wide range of issues.
‘(…) Even in one school, such as the Ḥanafī school, there can be several trends, such as the positions of Zafar, Abū Yūsuf, and al-Shaybānī. Often, a student is taught that classical Muslim jurists frequently maintained that there is a long-established tradition of disputation, debate and disagreement that started from the age of the Companions of the Prophet and continued therefrom. Furthermore, the student is taught that a major contributing factor to the diversity of Islamic legal schools is the acceptance and reverence given to the idea of ikhtilāf (disagreement and diversity).’ (‘Speaking in God's Name’).
The notion that Muslims are required to hold to dogmatic beliefs; and are unable to question these belief systems without fear of reprisal or punishment from the leader or other group members is false.
Not only is disagreement to be expected, but it is actually a positive reality to be embraced and encouraged.
Khaled M. Abou El Fadl reminds us that when al-Mansūr – the Abbasid Caliph – offered to adopt the ‘al-Muwaṭṭa’ of -Imām Mālik as the uniform law of the Caliphate, Mālik refused. He did so:
‘…. arguing that there were many established juristic practices in different areas of the Muslim world and there was no legitimate reason to impose legal uniformity upon the various territories. Reportedly, Mālik argued that no one jurist or juristic tradition may have an exclusive claim over the divine truth, and hence, the caliph may not legitimately support one school to the exclusion of the others.’ (‘Speaking in God's Name’).
It is a matter of conscience. People are expected to learn all they can about a particular matter – evidence for and against – and then to follow their conscience (even if it conflicts with the religious verdict of a respected scholar) until new learning, new understanding, creates honest doubt. When this happens one must: ‘Leave what makes you doubt for what does not make you doubt. Verily, truth brings peace of mind and falsehood sows doubt.’ (Sunan al-Tirmidhī : 2518).
Continued:
'Sometimes, silence is the best answer for a fool.'(Alī ibn Abī Tālib)
