(June 7, 2024 at 1:55 pm)The Grand Nudger Wrote: Practically? Yeah. I don't run through complicated moral arguments in my head when I find a lost wallet. Dilemma is time sensitive and decency has a best-by date. Epistemologically? The same basis as or when I take any other seeming-thing to be true. Moral facts in metaethical objectivity are non-novel. To a metaethical objectivist, the statement "x is good" is just like the statement "nyx is a black cat".Just because you think that it is like the statement that “nyx is a black cat” doesn’t need to be justified for you to be rational in believing that and acting on it. I am trying to work out though why I should assume that that is correct rather than just accepting it though. My Christian friends say the same about their belief in a god; I just don’t accept that these days.
If I understand the rest of your argument correctly you are arguing that the difficulty in knowing something is not the same as that thing not being the case? So for each example of a different way of approaching the issue there just is a cat of a certain colour - if people don’t believe that for whatever reason then that is a problem with them. That is a useful analogy for how things would be if you are correct about moral values, but doesn’t seem (and might not be intended as ?) like an argument for the blackness of the cat itself, just that not knowing something doesn’t disprove it.
Do you see a principled distinction between your acceptance of mind-independent moral values and claims of deistic gods?
