The claim that is being made (at least by EvF) is that science has shown that there is nothing beyond the physical, in other words that what we call mental states ARE in fact physical states. Although I philosophically speaking am a proponent of the stance that the mental is a product of the physical, a view in which I expect to differ with theists like Fro, the japanese wheelchair example has shown nothing that comes close to that claim. And I am flatly against the claim that science has sufficient evidence for this. The japanese wheelchair recognizes EEG patterns that are trained by the subjects in advance. EEG-patterns are not equal to mental states. Moving electrons are not by definition equal to first-person mental states. Why is the wheelchair example insufficient? For one thing it isn't sufficient evidence to distinguish between the following working hypotheses: a) mental states trigger neuronal states and b) neuronal states trigger mental states. Indeed the japanese wheelchair prima facie indeed seems to favour the stance that the mental triggers the physical than vice versa. Secondly with the wheelchair experiment there is no falsifiable claim made by science HOW the physical constitutes first-person mental states. Making the distinction between philosophical suggestions and scientific evidence is essential here. Not all gaps in our knowledge are closed by science yet, and it is not clear whether this ever will be the case. Another essential aspect that is as of yet unexplained by science is how mental concepts seem to supervene the phyiscal. Concepts like 'left' or 'right' seem independent of specific material configurations (the multiple realizability argument). Added to that all is the problem that the idea of qualia (the qualitive character of first-person experience) poses. There is a fundamental inability to establish reliability of third-person account of first-person experience, which can be demonstrated with a red-blue inversion thought experiment. Ask yourself the following question: how do I know for certain that what I call red is the same what other persons experience when they see red (I am not referring to colour blindness here!)? Is it possible that where I see red another person sees blue? The answer is that you have no way of knowing, you cannot experience first-person qualities from a third-person perspective.
All this shows that we are far off from claiming evidence for the fact that the physical is the mental in some way. It is a philosophical stance (and a quite reasonable one really) but it has no sufficient scientific evidence to distinguish it from the claim that the mental has features that evade current understanding of the physical.
All this shows that we are far off from claiming evidence for the fact that the physical is the mental in some way. It is a philosophical stance (and a quite reasonable one really) but it has no sufficient scientific evidence to distinguish it from the claim that the mental has features that evade current understanding of the physical.
"I'm like a rabbit suddenly trapped, in the blinding headlights of vacuous crap" - Tim Minchin in "Storm"
Christianity is perfect bullshit, christians are not - Purple Rabbit, honouring CS Lewis
Faith is illogical - fr0d0
Christianity is perfect bullshit, christians are not - Purple Rabbit, honouring CS Lewis
Faith is illogical - fr0d0