I am an orthodox Christian, ask me a question!

[Jon Paul]

Now - my main problem with your arguments now, to sum it up...is that my problem is definitely with this notion of subjective views=all views are equal.

I have already addressed subjectivism and why it is self-defeating and incoherent. I will reiterate the quite extensive posts I've already written about it.

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EvidenceVsFaith,

What happened with the earlier posts in this thread, about TAG (as cited at the bottom of this post), was that I got you to admit that the epistemic structure of atheism allows no objective truth to exist, and then you tried to argue that you could simply use "subjective truth" and "subjective evidence" as sufficient for rationality. This post, and the many other posts (notably the post on page 16) about this "subjectivism" you are forced into, show why it ultimately leads to incoherence and why it shows exactly that, the epistemic structure of atheism is not sane. There are other reasons why subjectivism (that the truth is subjective) is self-refuting, notably the paradox that if truth is subjective, then it is subjective whether truth is subjective, and then truth is only subjectively subjective, but then it is also subjective whether truth is subjectively subjective, and therefore truth is subjectively subjectively subjective, et cetera ad infinitum. This infinite regress shows how the idea, in all it's absurdity, refutes it's own foundation, just like the epistemic structure of atheism.

So I wonder what on earth this 'epistemic struture of atheism' you speak of is? Could you define it precisely?

The expression 'epistemic structure' refers to the integral set of epistemic implications for the interpretation of reality, that result from the nature of the implicit affirmations and nonaffirmations within a worldview, and their epistemic relations to each other and to other epistemes and epistemic attitudes in the worldview of the person.

How exactly does atheism have an epistemic structure?

Any worldview has an epistemic structure, whether the worldview be atheistic or Christian. To say that atheistic worldviews are exempt from having an epistemic structure, would literally equal saying that atheists do not interpret reality without God (a - theistically), and if their interpretation of reality is not without God, that is two negatives (not... without) and one positive, twisting the whole thing to the self-contradiction that atheists do interpret reality with God, which would mean they are not atheists.

No, I did not exclude any options because I hadn't conceived of them, but because the nature of the matter itself mandates an option which lives up to particular criteria which subjective minds do not live up to.

Okay then. So you're not claiming absolute proof there right?

That depends what you mean with absolute proof. But I am claiming exactly what I said, namely that subjective minds don't live up to the criteria that the nature of the matter mandate for a such thing as "objective truth" to exist, for if there are only subjective minds, then any such notion and attempt at justification of an "objective truth" would still originate in that subjective mind and ultimately be subjective. Atheism refutes even the possibility of it's own objective truth. And then it is only left with the option of being subjectively true, and then I can say that Christianity is subjectively true as well, because there would be no difference between the two claims, except that one subject defines something else than the other subject. There would be no difference in degree of truth since there would be no outside truth apart from what is thought to be true, making the contradiction of them just as true insofar as it is thought to be.

Though of course I don't accept this subjectivism, just to support that Christianity is true. I do the opposite. For if one does not integrally affirm the ontological, objective reality of logical truth in one's epistemic structure, which exactly neccesitates the affirmation of the origin of this in an objective mind, rather than originating in a subjective mind, reducing itself to subjectivism again, then one has already denied the truth of the very denial of the ontological, objective reality of logical truth, for then an objective truth no longer exists to begin with, and the law of noncontradiction no longer applies, and then one has contradicted the very presuppositions necessary for one's own sentences.

If it's subjective that doesn't mean all is equal.

It means there is no objective standard with which to contradistinguish truth from falsity in diverse subjective views. And that does mean that all subjective views are equal, because you cannot appeal to anything but a subjectively originated notion of truth to justify truth, and another subjective person can do the same with another subjective notion of what is true without any epistemic difference.

Now, because it's all subjective; the nutcase could think the scientist was the nutty one and that he was in fact the genius, and he couldn't be proven wrong - I just don't think many people world agree, with good reason. By what we mean by the words "Nutcase" and "Genius" I'd argue that the logical and intelligent scientist was the smarter one and not the guy in the nuthouse who did not demonstrate such genius.

In my example, it was the scientist who argued that 2+2=5.

In any case, what you are doing is simply arguing ad hominem, and appealing to an arbitrary and subjective selection of who is right or wrong. You have not escaped the subjectivism.

[...]so it's not just me, the "big bad" theist who is talking nonsense.

For the record I certaintly didn't call you as such and certaintly have never intended to imply such a thing. I don't see it that way at all.

I'm not anti-theist, I'm only anti-theism. The difference? I hate the beliefs and the belief system cos I'd rather they weren't around, but I don't hate the theists because I pretty much hate no one and blame no one, regardless of their "beliefs".

What I meant was simply this: if your way of argument (simply repeating notions that are in direct contradiction with the epistemic structure of an atheistic worldview) actually worked and was valid, it would have been used by the atheists who have tried to refute TAG. But it has not.

It seems you are appealing to a transcendent factor. It seems you think that, "the truth is that 2+2=4 regardless of what any subjective minds think about it".

"2+2=4" is true by definition. '2 and 2' is the same as four when put together. Now, on the matter of the definitions, that's all subjective yes. These are just lables, it's all in the mind. So what? Mathmatics is a way of measuing things.

"2+2" doesn't actually exist outside the mind, in computers or down on paper, etc, etc...it's just a way of measuing what actually does exist, or rather - a way of us measuing what we percieve to exist.

2+2=4 and the truth of that proposition exactly cannot exist outside of the mind. That is why I posite the need for an objective mind for logical coherence. For if the truth of the proposition is grounded in mere subjective arbitrarity, then saying that 2+2=5 is equally true, because that is another subjective and arbitrary judgement. To say that 2+2=4 is true because of the nature of the logical proposition it states, you have to ultimately either reduce it again to a subjective and arbitrary notion which is merely convened, just as well as 2+2=5 is convened, or to an objective mind which makes it objectively true.

Your view has the same problem then mate.

It certainly does not.

True, and I'd pick the scientist to trust lol. I think I'd have to be a psychofreak myself to pick the psychofreak!

But you have no reason to do so, except subjective arbitrarity, and in that case it is equally mandated and true to pick the opposite proposition.

This is semantic though. Cos whether there's an oibjective mind in this world or not, in practice it's the same. Either way I'd personally, subjectively, think it's indeed more rational to believe when you add 'two and two together' you get four and not five.

You repeat this again and again. But it makes no difference how many times you repeat it.

Ok, let's take existence as an example.

By definition, something either exists or doesn't. So it is a fact whether 'X' (whatever it is to represent) exists or not. The evidence or lack thereof for 'X' is subjective.....but it's still an objective matter whether 'X' exists or not simply because the question is an objective one by definition. By definition 'X either exists or doesn't'. Whatever we mean when we say 'objective', that's an objective question in the sense, indeed, by definition 'X either exists or doesn't'.

Yes the evidence for X is ultimatately subjective, any strong body of evidencve for 'X' that is thought as 'objective', the whole consensus, is ultimately subjective, yes....but who cares? Why does that matter? At all? It seems gratutious semantics to me, untill there's actually any evidence for any "objective mind".

What you are doing is semantic, because you are positing it to be an objective question "by definition", and thus positing the 'objectivity' in the realm of mere subjective definition, rather than positing the objectivity of the question in an ontological reality of objective logical truth in affirming the existence of an objective mind in your epistemic structure, which embodies logical truth, as does a Christian. By your semantic argument, to the contrary, it only depends on what you choose to define. By that standard, I could equally as well define that X might both exist and not exist on the same time, because it is objectively possible 'by definition'.

What you are choosing to define here, is actually the law of noncontradiction.

The reason you do that is that even admitting that it is possible that a thing can literally contradict itself and both exist and not exist and both be true and false, ultimately leads to nonsense. For if a thing can both exist and not exist, or both be true and false, then it is also both true and false that a thing can both be true and false. And that is also both true and false, et cetera ad infinitum. And there logical coherence went in the garbage can. And that is the exact reason you so want to affirm the law of noncontradiction. But unfortunately your only means of doing it is mere arbitrary definition.

But the fact is that these "laws of logic" do not represent ontological realities in the epistemic structure of an atheistic worldview, but only subjective notions that embody no objective representation of reality, in and of themselves, but only do so insofar as they are thought to do so. Or don't do so insofar as they are not thought to do so.

For that reason, it is indeed possible in the epistemic structure of atheism, that X is both true and false, both exists and does not exist on the same time, and that this is both true and false on the same time, and that that is both true and false, and ad cetera ad inifinitum. In other words, atheism is led into the logical incoherency of Trivialism.

My sanity?

Exactly. And the epistemic structure of atheism forces you to abandon your sanity.

Untill there's any evidence for any so-called "objective minds", I consider the argument a semantic and gratuitous one.

I have in numerous posts already explained the reason why the question of evidence is entirely irrelevant to this epistemological issue, because an epistemic structure and it's nature always precedes any evidentiality. Like the rules of logic precede any specific application of logical thinking. I will reiterate it just one last time, and I expect you to read this and either understand it or tell me where it's incomprehensibility lies. As far as I can see, your problem is that you equate the proposition "There is sufficient evidence for X's existence", with the proposition "X exists". The latter proposition is presupposed regardless of the evidence, the former is not. The latter proposition doesn't even address evidence, the former does. Now, I do claim there is evidence for Gods existence, independently from TAG, which in fact renders your objection meaningless wholly apart from the TAG, but I still understand that any already-existing evidence is wholly irrelevant to the TAG argument, because it strictly deals with the latter proposition and it's epistemic consequences and coherence, "X exists", not the pre-existing evidence in favour of or against it.

What you really need to understand is the bolded paragraph, which is the most simplistic way I have been able to put it so far.

Whether you "believe" in God or not, you need to presuppose logical standards and laws and rules, TRUTH, to evidence anything at all. If the rules of logic are not true, then evidentiality is not possible.

In other words, we need the right theory to fit the data, before we can make correct predictions about the data. We need logical coherence before we have logical evidentiality.

So what my argument does is analyse the grounds/foundation which exist before we have evaluated the evidence for something. It analyses the grounds/foundation which precede evidentiality; on which eventual evidentiality is built upon. That grounds/foundation is, the epistemic structures of already existing worldviews.

It is epistemological and analytic; it deals with epistemology, and logical coherence. Not logical justification, evidencing or other evidential matters, which already have epistemelogical presuppositions that my epistemological argument thus analyses.

By bringing the reasons or grounds on which people accepted a certain worldview into the analysis of the epistemic structure of the worldview, you are committing something like the genetic fallacy, since we are not dealing with an evidential question, but one of "which theory fits the data" - of logical coherence.

(..)

What my epistemological argument then concludes (upon the incoherence of the epistemic structure of atheistic worldviews), is that atheism is a theory which "does not fit the data" (in my metaphor), or in preciser words, a worldview with an incoherent epistemic structure which contradicts and refutes itself. So it does not pass the test of logical coherence, before the question of evidentiality/what is evident.

Additionally, I will quote again all the posts in which I dealt with this much earlier in the thread, the point of which you still haven't fully understood.

To have truth or evidence, first you need the presumption that truth even exists (in the metaphysical sense).

I would think, that to rationally believe there is absolute objective truth in the first place there has to be some indication - i.e. evidence - that there is objective truth. Would you not agree there?

But that has nothing to do with the epistemic structure of a worldview. A worldview does not need to be evidenced, for the epistemic structure of that worldview to be the epistemic structure of that worldview. That is simply an analytical fact which is agnostic with regards to truth and evidence. Worldviews are subjective, they are not themselves affirmative proof for or against that worldview. They are facts of peoples presuppositions, not objective facts. The worldview only needs to presupposed for the implicit epistemic structure to be the epistemic structure of that worldview. In other words, what evidence there is for the worldview has nothing to do with whether or not it is presuppossed. The only premise necessary for a worldview to be a worldview is that the worldview is presupposed, or taken to be true.

Whether there is evidence that there is an objective truth is a wholely other question which ignores the metaphysical precepts that are implicit in such a quest for evidence. Because there are some premises for whether or not there can be an objective truth, which objectively speaking, to be epistemologically correct, need to be assumed, for it to be even possible to believe that any evidence is possible which so establishes such an objective truth. The problem is that atheism simply does provide or grant the premises for this in its epistemic structure, and I have already given the reasons why. And so, no evidence can transcend the presuppositions which are already implicit in the epistemological presupposition an atheist worldview brings to the table, in the quest for objective truth. That means if an atheist claims an objective truth he simply is being incoherent with the epistemic structure of his own worldview, without knowing it. In other words, we have a self-contradiction.

This is an epistemological, analytical, rather than evidential paradox.

There needs to be evidence for something objective do you not think though, in order to rationally believe in it?

That depends what you mean.

It's very problematic if you are saying we need "objective proof" that there is a such thing as "objective truth".

Because it begs the question that there can be objective truth foundations, by demanding "objective proof" that such can be.

It presupposes that there already is a such thing as objectivity.

Any notion of objective truth merely means something which is dogamtically held to be objective epistemic foundation for a belief. So you are saying you want objective epistemic foundations for the contention that there is a such thing as objective epistemic foundations. That is simply not possible. Any argument or proof has to presuppose that there can be objective epistemic foundations if it wants to pretend to provide objective epistemic foundations for the possibility of objective epistemic foundations!

It is implicit already in the quest for evidence. Meaning that the question is one of presuppositions, not of evidence.

So to answer: can there be proof or evidence for the existence of objective truth, I will reply that that depends entirely on what your presupposition is. Whether I believe it? I believe it cannot be coherently proven by agnostic means, because any search for such proof already has presuppositions which are not agnostic. It can only be proven by working from already-existing presuppositions, namely that there is such a thing as objective epistemic foundation, or objective truth.

EvF, I am afraid that we are simply talking in two different directions. I had two parts of my foundations for transcendental monotheism: metaphysics built on empirical observations of reality, neccesitating Gods existence for the actuality of our reality, and, the epistemological necessity for transcendental monotheism.

Now, you are addressing the epistemological part, with an evidentialist approach. That is not going to work, because the epistemological part addresses the very nature of epistemic foundations, and thus the conditions necessary to say that anything can be taken as valid proof/evidence for an objective truth, or in other words, an objective epistemic foundation for a given contention. The only other option than to integrate this objectivity into your epistemic structure, is to claim that you will simply use subjective proof as a starting point, but then it is just that - subjective. Any other person can claim another subjective conclusion if there is no objective standard for objective epistemic foundations for logical truth to begin with. And then you have no way to say anything objectively about reality as an atheist, because no integral part of your epistemic structure transcends the abstractions of your own mind.

No, I'm saying there's evidence for reality in science for example - the consensus. Objective in the sense of existence;

What do you mean there is evidence for reality? Do you mean with "evidence", objective epistemic foundations for the belief that reality exists? If so, you are begging the question of an objective standard which transcends subjectivity, for epistemic foundations, and that is simply not consistent with a non-monotheistic epistemic structure, which provides no objective standard for logical truth, except abstractions of the brain chemistry, and then you are contradicting your own epistemic structure.

If you are not talking about objective epistemic foundations for the belief that reality exists, you are merely talking of subjective abstractions, which is not something which provides an objective epistemic foundation for the belief that reality exists - only subjective, in which case you cannot adscribe to it any truth that transcends your own mind. In either case, you are unable to propose anything objectively about reality as an atheist.

and I am wondering where the evidence is for any objective 'truth' as in absolute truth - that we can absolutely know

I've already shown you the error there lies in this question. You cannot provide objective epistemic foundations for the existence of objective epistemic foundations, without begging the question or presupposing it to exist. Either you commit the fallacy of begging the question, or you presuppose it to exist on grounds of proper basicality (that it is integral in your epistemic structure), but since that contradicts a non-monotheistic epistemic structure, you are then in fallacy again.

and (if you wish to know) I also - more specifically - need evidence to believe there are any morals or values whatsoever that are objective.

Read the first paragraph in this post if you want to understand why that question completely talks in another direction than what I meant with "objective epistemic foundations" for moral truth.

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What's wrong with subjectivity?

Nothing is wrong with subjectivity. Something is wrong with the epistemic structure of atheism.

I didn't say it because I "can't think of any other way".

And I didn't say you said it either. I said "if". I'm saying that you haven't given evidence that God is necessary for moral objecitivity. You've just explained that if he exists then he could do so (because he's God and he can trascend such minds) you haven't shown that there could be no other way.

it has not transcended the realm of subjective mind if there is not an objective mind.

As far as you can conceive you mean.

No, I did not exclude any options because I hadn't conceived of them, but because the nature of the matter itself mandates an option which lives up to particular criteria which subjective minds do not live up to.

But if there's no evidence for God or objective morality, so there's no objective moral mind that you call God, where's your argument? If you're just saying "There can be no objective morality without God!" So what? Neither exist! Where is this going? If it's an argument it's gratuitious!

Of course you say that neither exist, because you are an atheist. That is exactly what the argument says.

Whether you "believe" in God or not, you need to presuppose logical standards and laws and rules, TRUTH, to evidence anything at all. If the rules of logic are not true, then evidentiality is not possible.

In other words, we need the right theory to fit the data, before we can make correct predictions about the data. We need logical coherence before we have logical evidentiality.

So what my argument does is analyse the grounds/foundation which exist before we have evaluated the evidence for something. It analyses the grounds/foundation on which precede evidentiality; on which eventual evidentiality is built upon. That grounds/foundation is, the epistemic structures of already existing worldviews. It is epistemological and analytic; it deals with epistemology, and logical coherence. Not logical justification, evidencing or other evidential matters, which already have epistemelogical presuppositions that my epistemological argument thus analyses.

By bringing the reasons or grounds on which people accepted a certain worldview into the analysis of the epistemic structure of the worldview, you are committing something like the genetic fallacy, since we are not dealing with an evidential question, but one of "which theory fits the data" - of logical coherence.

I understand you maybe either simply can't comprehend this, or maybe you are just not willing to accept it. Which either it is, the discussion is not going to progress until you actually understand the significance of this difference for the argument. I will again, repeat, that there are atheists who have understood this difference, so it's not just me, the "big bad" theist who is talking nonsense.

That's quite obviously complete utter and total nonsense. Because - you are saying without an objective mind there is no objectivity, and without objectivty 1+1 could=5. That's utterly ridiculous. Whether there's a God in this universe or not 2+2 is still 4! And killing babies is still considered wrong by those who aren't baby killers! Either way!

It seems you are appealing to a transcendent factor. It seems you think that, "the truth is that 2+2=4 regardless of what any subjective minds think about it".

It's not all equal to "favourite colour" - that's like saying 'A totally doolally, deluded, insane, delirious psychofreak's opinion is equal to a top scientist on scientific matters, the fact the scientist is a scientist and is not totally insane, is irrelevant - because it's all subjective you see!' That's just plain ridiculous.

Indeed it is, and it's exactly the kind of epistemological problem the epistemic structure of an atheist worldview gives. Because you have only subjective minds. Between the scientist and the psychofreak, you don't have a nr. 3, transcendent objective factor to appeal to, "the objective truth regardless of what subjective minds think of it". You don't have anything outside of the two subjective minds in question to appeal to, except other subjective minds.

The problem is that, if there are only subjective minds, then the "truth" is not "regardless" of what subjective minds think about it. Then, indeed, the truth is only the truth insofar as it is thought to be so by subjective minds. And then the subjective convention that 2+2=5 is just as true insofar as it is thought to be so, as 2+2=4 is true insofar as it is thought to be so. And truth is only true insofar as it is thought to be so if it is not true because of a transcending, objective factor, wholly independent of what is thought about the truth.

Say, subject 1 ("Scientist") thinks that 2+2=5. According to his notion of truth, this is true. Subject 2 (say, "Psychofreak") thinks that 2+2=4. Vice versa. If there are only subjective minds, no objective truth existing apart from subjective minds, then what factor do you appeal to in order to decide who is right and who is wrong? Who has the truth and who has not? Since there are only subjective minds, you can only appeal to another subjective factor, another subjective notion of truth, originating in another subjective mind. But you have not, thereby, epistemologically achieved anything more than subject 1 (Scientist) who thought that 2+2=5.

That is the problem, and it is just one of many incoherencies the epistemic structure of atheism necessarily leads to.

What my epistemological argument then concludes, is that atheism is a theory which "does not fit the data" (in my metaphor), or in preciser words, a worldview with an incoherent epistemic structure which contradicts and refutes itself. So it does not pass the test of logical coherence, before the question of evidentiality/what is evident.

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Objective truth still exists on the outside, in the real world

It exactly does not, since that very sentence and the meaning behind exists only in a subjective mind. With no intelligence outside subjective minds, there can be no objective truth outside objective minds either, as the truth of a proposition itself and the contradistinction between that and falsehood is originated, embodied and comprehensible only to intelligence. If intelligent mind, then, is not the origin of reality either, then that logical order is so much less an integral part of reality, and so much more the result of brain chemistry.

..stuff either is or isn't, things either do or don't exist....

The law of noncontradiction/the excluded middle again. I've dealt with this in the very above post.

There are degrees of 'objectivity'

There can only be degrees of objectivity, if there is an outside actual objective standard of truth, it self distinguished from subjective viewpoints (since contradistinguishing subjective viewpoints with a subjective viewpoint does not lead to any degree of objectivity) with which to contradistinguish different subjective viewpoints to compare the degree of that objectivity present in them. I've already dealt with this and given many examples of what I mean in the above posts.

So this 'strong conseusus' is ultimately subjective because no one is perfect, and even the best science around can still be wrong.

No, he cannot go wrong if there is not an objective truth which which to contradistinguish going wrong from going right. If it is just subjective, then he can never go wrong, since that would depend strictly on him subjectively defining himself to be wrong, and if that was the case, he would no longer maintain that position. So long as there is no outside truth, independent from what is thought to be so by subjective minds, then there is only the inside truth.

You also fail to see that subjectively defining subjective truth as the consensus of all subjective minds would imply the truth of many things you obviously consider falsities, like the flatness of the earth, or that something else than atheism is true, that some God is real. So you would of course, subjectively define this subjective consensus subjectively selectively, as some limited circle of subjects (scientists, most likely), and then we have another subjective limitation on what subjective minds get to define subjective truth for you, and it is still only true insofar as you have defined it to be so, like someone defining 2+2=5 to be true, not true because it is actually true independently of what you define.