I am an orthodox Christian, ask me a question!

[Jon Paul]

however JP has for 30 pages unsuccessfully attempted to explain his a posteriori argument, using language not used outside of advanced theology.

The words are used outside of theology all the time, and their origination is certainly not in theology. And I have not been unable to explain my argument. You have been unwilling to accept my explanation, and unwilling to tell me what exactly your problem is with understanding it so that we could actually have a discussion about it.

Any challenges have been met with "You don't understand" and links to catholic definitions of terms - one of which was about 3 pages of denifition for two words - actuality & potentiality.

Again, I say the argument is set up as untestable and unobservable, and as such deserves no further attention

Note, that you have said the terms "are set up to reach a pre-defined conclusion", which would imply question begging. To support that claim, you will have to show me where either my argument or these two terms in any way beg the question. If you don't point this out, then the fallacy lies in your dismissal of my argument, which is begging the question that my argument is wrong, not in my argument.

The two words I can explain easily, again, if that is what you want.

Actuality, from the Merriam-Webster dictionary:

* Main Entry: ac·tu·al·i·ty
* Pronunciation: \ˌak-chə-ˈwa-lə-tē, ˌak-shə-\
* Function: noun
* Inflected Form(s): plural ac·tu·al·i·ties
* Date: 1618

1 : the quality or state of being actual
2 : something that is actual : fact, reality <possible risks which have been seized upon as actualities — T. S. Eliot>
— in actuality : in actual fact

Potentiality, from the Merriam-Webster dictionary:

* Main Entry: po·ten·ti·al·i·ty
* Pronunciation: \pə-ˌten(t)-shē-ˈa-lə-tē\
* Function: noun
* Inflected Form(s): plural po·ten·ti·al·i·ties
* Date: 1625

1 : the ability to develop or come into existence
2 : potential 1

More elaborate definitions:

Potentiality:

Initially from Aristotle: dÚnami$(dynamis): capability of existing or acting, potentiality, power,
faculty, capacity.

Translated to Latin as potentia, from potere/posse (be powerful, be able).

· Common usage:

§ Capable of being but not yet in existence, latent.
§ Having possibility, capability, or power.
§ Possessing the capacity for growth, development.
§ Synonyms: dispositional, virtual, possible, unrealized, unexpressed, latent, potency,
conceivability.

· Philosophical usage:

§ Aptitude to change, to act or to be acted upon, to give or to receive some new determination
(capable of determination).
§ Potentia = determinable being.

Actuality:

· Initially from Aristotle: ™neršgia (energeia): activity, operation, performance, full reality, act,
functioning, actualization.

· Also from Greek: ™ntelšceia (entelecheia): full, complete reality; state of completion or perfection;
the form that is actualized, actuality, perfection.

· Translated to Latin as actus (act, motion, action), from agere (act, do).

· Also from Latin: actualis (what exists in reality, effective, active), actualitas (reality, effectiveness).

· Common usage:

§ Existing and not merely potential or possible.
§ Synonyms: real, occurrent, existent, realization, entelechy, substantiality, determination.

· Philosophical usage:

§ The fulfillment of the capacity to change, to act, or to give or receive some new
determination.
§ Actus = determined being.

Now, these terms are widely used in language, and in all areas of science, not because they represent a philosophy per se, but because they represent a philosophy of language which makes it much easier to state things clearly, and distinguish between that which is only possible/potent (potentiality) and that which is not only possible but really actual (actuality). Potentiality, in this context, can be used as a synonym for possibility, or potency. These terms have enjoyed an extensive use in physics. The only way to really dispute them is to dispute that there are actual things, and potential things, and that these two kinds of things are not the same, which would be nonsense.

Heisenberg on potentiality versus actuality:

“The transition from the ‘possible’ to the ‘actual’ takes place during the act of observation.”

The probability function….contains statements about … possibilities or better tendencies (“potentia” in Aristotelian philosophy), and these statements are completely objective… (p.53)

It should be emphasized, however, that the probability function does not in itself represent a course of events in the course of time. It represents a tendency [potentia] for events and our knowledge of events. The probability function can be connected with reality only if one essential condition is fulfilled: if a new measurement is made to determine a certain property of the system. Only then does the probability function determine the probable result of the new measurement. The result of the measurement will again be stated in terms of classical physics. … It is only in the third step that we change again over from the “possible” to the “actual.” (Heisenberg, 1958, p.46)

The observation, on the other hand, enforces the description in space and time but breaks the determined continuity of the probability function by changing our knowledge of the system. (p. 50)

A real difficulty in the understanding of this interpretation arises, however, when one asks the famous question: But what happens “really” in an atomic event?
(p. 50)

… the probability function does not allow a description of what happens between two observations. … the term “happens” is restricted to the observation. (p.52)

“The probability function combines objective and subjective elements. It contains statements about possibilities or better tendencies (“potentia” in Aristotelian philosophy) and these are completely objective,…and it contains statements about our knowledge of the system, which of course are subjective in so far as they may be different for different observers.” (P&P,p.53)

“The observation itself changes the probability function discontinuously; it selects of all possible events the actual one that has taken place. Since through the observation our knowledge of the system has changed discontinuously, its mathematical representation has also undergone the discontinuous change and we may speak of a ‘quantum jump’ ” (P&P, p.54)

This is one out of several applications. In any case, there is no excuse for not knowing what these terms mean now, or for calling them theological preconceptions when they are clearly not.

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The Cosmological Argument. Correct? Or are you speaking of something else entirely?

You could call it in the category of cosmological arguments if you wanted to. But I don't think that it would help you in explaining the substance of the argument, since it says nothing about how it is a cosmological argument, or that is, from what premises it argues and to what conclusions, in regard to the cosmos.

Something like the Kalam Cosmological argument would be a far more "clean" and non-ambigiuous cosmological argument.

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Whether stuff is subjective or not. We know from obvious sane experience that either something exists or it doesn't.

But you are only proving my point. The transcendence of conceptual realities beyond our minds and beyond subjective construction is an intuition and idea which is based on the fundamental knowledge we have through our sense experience of the world and the objects in it.

That's going by 'objective has to be absolute' again. These are two different things. If everything is ultimately subjective then objectivity is 'merely' stuff like, strong scientifc consensus, etc.

The problem is that you are positing truth to be merely a matter of convention and construction. It is an absolute subjectivist view of truth, that you propose, that it is only true because we think it is true, only true because of our consensus, and that is ultimately what you are claiming if we analyse your position.

Whereas, I don't advocate the position of us having or being the absolute truth as subjective individuals. I advocate the position that it exactly exists independently of us, and that we can approach it and contain objective truths in our subjective viewpoints by affirming conceptual realities that exist objectively, and that the degree of truth in our subjective views is determined by how near it is to the objective truth, which in my epistemic structure, exists independently of what we think about it, unlike in yours, where truth is what we think it is, since you can only ever logically proceed from subjective notion of objective truth->subjective notion of objective truth, and an actual objective truth requires transcendence and self-existence, as being a conceptual reality already conceived of by an objective intelligence rather than being contingent upon subject convention.

The law of noncontradiction/the excluded middle again. I've dealt with this in the very above post.

Yes, you are saying that if 'everything is subjective' then there is no objectivity so nothing is really true. But I am not arguing that, I am arguing that stuff either does or doesn't exist, but we all subjectivivly understand that with experience. We could believe that the above doesn't apply and either nothing exists or something can both exist and not exist, etc, etc. But that doesn't stop me from rationally believing it's insane.

You are only really proving my point, by positing the truth of the logical absolute known as the law of contradiction, as something which is fundamentally warranted by our sense experience of the world and the objects in it. In other words, our subjective minds have grasped a conceptual reality which exists indepedependently of us grasping it, which is a viewpoint you are unable to take because your epistemic structure reduces it to a subjective convention which is only true because it is thought to be true, just like it (in this subjectivism) would be true that the Earth was flat if we thought it to be - which is obviously not true, yet it would be true given the belief that it was true, in atheism, and that fact proves that the epistemic structure of atheism is logically incoherent and out of accord with reality.

I have learnt from experience like everyone else has. We can't transcend our own minds, we only know what we know. How could we do otherwise? So what? We understand and experience subjectivly, yes. So what?

Exactly. We don't "transcend our minds" in and of ourselves. We understand and experience subjectively. Which is why, if there is not an objective conceptual reality of logical absolutes, exisiting independently of subjective minds, in an objective intelligence that can conceive and therefore underbuilds this conceptual reality, then there will never be a conceptual reality of the truth which does transcend our minds, that we can subjectively approach and by this come nearer to the real truth about things, rather than simply constructing truth as a convention, the only possibility in subjectivism.

To believe that stuff either does or doesn't exist, objectively is one thing.

To simply assert the law of contradiction and construct it is not even approaching reality, so long as your epistemic structure does not mandate it's conceptual reality. And since the only option you are left with is exactly subjective convention and reassertion, I say that your sense experience and knowledge of conceptual reality oif the law of contradiction contradicts your atheistic epistemic structure in failure to affirm the existence of an objective, intelligent mind with the power of conception that underbuilds conceptual realities that are a manifest in space, time and matter, and transcends them, since the conceptual reality is not itself space, time, or matter.

There can only be degrees of objectivity, if there is an outside actual objective standard of truth, it self distinguished from subjective viewpoints (since contradistinguishing subjective viewpoints with a subjective viewpoint does not lead to any degree of objectivity) with which to contradistinguish different subjective viewpoints to compare the degree of that objectivity present in them. I've already dealt with this and given many examples of what I mean in the above posts.

I don't see how the argument makes any sense. It seems entirely semantical.

It's not semantic. It's the most important thing to understand for the entire argument.

The issue is that you construct the truth to be the consensus of some people; not because it's just simply the truth regardless of what anyone thinks about it; not because it's a conceptual reality which we confirm through our experience. Not because we, as subjects, are approaching something greater than a subjective consensus, through our intelligent understanding of reality: namely an objective truth which is a conceptual reality wholly independent of what we think about it, or to which extent our consensus affirms it; but exactly only because of your construction.

In so far as we merely construct truth to be a matter of consensus and convention, we are constructing it after our own subjective wishes, not after the reality which is really what is important.

And if we do that, then we are bound to be right, because then we cannot go wrong. We cannot fail, if we are the judges of truth, if there is no truth apart from our construction of what the truth is.

That means that, you might construct the truth to be atheism, under this subjectivism, but I might construct it to be Christianity. In either case, we are equally right, so long as we are constructing the truth without addressing the truth as it is independently of what we construct; the conceptual reality of objective truth which atheistic epistemic structures cannot affirm.

People have different beliefs. So beliefs are a subjective matter. Some believe in objective truth, others don't. I believe that it is logical to believe that something, indeed, objectively - does or doesn't exist! And I require evidence to believe it does.

But you are only contradicting your own epistemic structure, because you don't have justification for any objective belief which doesn't itself originate in a subjective conception, since objective truth simply does not exist in your epistemic structure. Only subjective notions of truth based sheerly on convention.

So where does subjectiity fall? You can say 'my view is no more valid than any one else's subjective viewpoint'...but wait, what does that even mean or imply? I beg to differ with my viewpoint

It seems you haven't grasped the example I gave with the objective indifference between any two views. It means that you haven't achieved anymore epistemic justification of your belief, than any other subjective viewpoint. Since there are (as I claim) some subjective viewpoints more objectively true than others, this is necessarily false, and hence, the atheistic epistemic structure is incoherent and unable to conform to reality.

I don't see what your point even is. How does any of it apply to reality? Obviously my experience is subjective, it can't be otherwise. So my belief in whether truth is objective or subjective stems from that. There's no alternative to subjective because I am me.

Of course we are subjective, and that has been my point all along. We are still subjective in my epistemic structure; but we, as subjective minds, approach something that exists independently of subjective minds: the conceptual reality of objective truth. My argument exactly states that no one subjective individual defines that conceptual reality, no amount of subjective consensus defines absolute truth because absolute truth exists in itself independent of subjective definitions, but we can actually contain objective truth in our beliefs, because such a thing exists, unlike in the epistemic structure of atheism, where subjective individuals exactly get to define objective truth for themselves, by convention or consensus, since there is no objective truth existing as a subsistent reality independent of subjective convention, in an objective (e.g. omniscient) intelligence with the power of conception.