I am an orthodox Christian, ask me a question!

[Ryft]

Since that amount [of time] goes on forever and ever and ever, what actual difference does it make?

Both an infinite amount of time and an amount that goes on forever and ever express the same thing. So you are simply asking the same question all over again. Yet it was already answered, ironically by the very question itself.

An "infinite amount of time" or temporal series (i.e., goes on forever and ever) can obtain only where a temporal dimension is the case. By definition. Conversely, "outside of time" is by definition where a temporal dimension is not the case, or atemporal (which renders "infinite amount of time" meaningless, for you cannot have an infinite amount of something that is not there). The difference is in the very definitions, Mike—temporal on the one hand, and atemporal on the other.

You say God isn't made of many parts and, therefore, is not complex. But to be omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, omnibenevolent, etc.—you can't just say he's made up of one part.

It sounds like you're saying that God has to be composed of parts because he has all these attributes. This is the informal fallacy of argument from personal incredulity and is not a meaningful response, such that your incredulity toward one scenario does not support the truth of the alternative scenario. Listing the attributes of God does not somehow prove that he is composed of parts, for divine simplicity accounts for his attributes as being identical with himself. For example, "God is good" is not a moral valuation (God has goodness) but an ontological statement (God is goodness); i.e., the being of God is identical to the attributes of God. (As a point of interest, divine simplicity proves the bifurcation fallacy of the Euthyphro dilemma.)

He's complex because he is unlikely to arise from chance alone, or just be there from the beginning, or before the beginning, without explanation.

First, objections involving notions of temporal finitude can be ignored as mere Straw Man, since God by definition as Creator is not part of our space-time manifold. Second, the likelihood of something is not determined by whether or not you have received an explanation. You may not believe something until then, but that is quite a different matter altogether. Third, complex in this context has nothing to do with "hard to understand" (and even if it did, it would commit the personal incredulity fallacy to base the likelihood of God on that). As I said, complex is defined theologically and in contemporary dictionaries as composed of, or characterized by, an arrangement of parts. That God is not composed of parts has nothing to do with the likelihood of his existing eternally.

[God] is an absolutely extraordinary claim and he requires absolutely extraordinary evidence.

This reflects your personal epistemic criteria, which is relevant only if your belief is required. And it's not, for the truth of something is not proved by whether or not Mike believes it (according to the rules of logic).

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The second law of thermodynamics is descriptive and can be written, "Heat generally cannot flow spontaneously from a material at lower temperature to a material at higher temperature."

Ignoring the significant problem that plagues such a statement (deriving a prescriptive from a descriptive on a basis other than sheer fiat), it is irrelevant at any rate to the point I had made—viz. that the law of non-contradiction is an a priori normative statement. It is not a descriptive statement, for nothing a posteriori produces it. I offer you the same challenge I gave theVOID: Describe an a posteriori (empirical) test of the law of non-contradiction. Just by trying to conceive of such a test, it will soon become evident that this prescriptive cannot be written as a descriptive.