From the abstract you linked:
Quote:“Neuropsychological research on the neural basis of behaviour generally posits that brain mechanisms will ultimately suffice to explain all psychologically described phenomena…It is only right and proper for any scientific investigation to look into the physical mechanisms involved in mental processes, as long as they do not overreach. In this case the researchers appear to be advocating a very restrictive physicalist philosophy of mind in which ‘brain=mind’. I find such an approach valuable but inadequate to address the issue of felt experience and assert that some form of panpsychicim is more likely.
Quote: Panpsychism is the doctrine that mind is a fundamental feature of the world which exists throughout the universe. Broadly speaking, there are, at bottom, only two positions…panpsychism and emergentism. If one believes that the most fundamental physical entities…are devoid of any mental attributes, and if one also believes that some systems of these entities, such as human brains, do possess mental attributes, one is espousing some kind of doctrine of the emergence of mind.” – Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panpsychism/)The abstract also includes the following statement:
Quote:… terms having intrinsic mentalistic and/or experiential content (e.g. ‘feeling’, ‘knowing’ and ‘effort’) are not included as primary causal factors…To my understanding effective cause only makes sense in temporal relationships above the quantum level. So it seems to me that the researchers have inappropriately carried over classical physic’s convenient fiction of ‘cause and effect’.
