RE: The Brain=Mind Fallacy
June 3, 2012 at 4:57 pm
(This post was last modified: June 3, 2012 at 5:19 pm by Angrboda.)
(June 3, 2012 at 11:20 am)ChadWooters Wrote:(June 2, 2012 at 4:29 pm)LastPoet Wrote: ...We can map and see different emotions, reactions, mind statuses, with devices capable of measuring electrical currents on the brain, or chemical coumpound presence..We have many documented brain injuries with dire effects on who the individual is, and we are able to pinpoint what those injuries in that specific point of the brain do...We are able to drastically change people personalities and behaviour by adding a chemical (AKA Drugs). The same with electroshocksI do not deny that physical changes to the brain can alter how we experience reality. Physical changes to the brain like trauma and drug use effect our ability to have certain feelings and thoughts.That does not bridge the generalgap between physical process and the experence of it. The distinction I make is between the abilities, described in terms of physics, and subjective experiences, described in qualitative terms. Functions, behaviors and observable facts are not feelings. Functions describe the operations of a physical process not the phenomenal content of the physical process. These are two very clear and distinct forms of knowledge.The felt quality of experience cannot be deduced from any physical or functional description of it. You can know all the physical and functional facts about a certain type of experience and still not “know what it's like” to have it.
For example, you can know everything physical about vinegar, from its chemical composition to the exact electro-chemical changes is causes in the brain, and still not know what vinegar smells like. The smell of vinegar cannot be predicted or described physically unless it has already been experienced. Another example, you have never tasted a pineapple. You know everything about pineapples, its chemical compositions, how others describe its taste, and you observed the MRIs of people eating them. You can know all this and still not know what a pineapple tastes like. There is a clear distinction between physical events and the experiencial content of those events.
"There is a difference between knowing the path, and walking the path." ~ Morpheus
This is indeed an interesting question, most often phrased in the form of the thought experiment of . However, at best, it points to an inability to know things in certain modes, via other modes (abstraction), and at bottom is mere assertion based on incredulity. Do we know what Mary would know if she knew all about the color red? No. Can we know all the kinds of knowing as conceptual knowledge, including knowing qualia? Probably not, as knowing qualia is a mode of knowing which likely can't be duplicated with unrelated ways of knowing, such as "knowing that". Let's suppose that I've never ridden a bicycle, but I've spent my entire life studying human physiology, sport, and bicycle riding. Do I know how to ride a bicycle? Again, until we actually perform the experiment, it's impossible to know, but our intuition tells us no. It seems intuitively obvious that "knowing about" bicycle riding doesn't give us "knowing how" to ride a bicycle. Does this mean there is anything mystical about knowing how to ride a bicycle? Of course not. It simply shows that there are different modes of knowing employed by minds and brains. If I teach you everything there is to know about poker and poker players, will that make you a master poker player? Of course not. If I understand language and teach an animal a rudimentary language, does that mean they understand in the same way I do? Does that mean that I understand how they understand? No, and no. Having conceptual knowledge probably will not allow us to intuit experiential knowledge; this doesn't tell us that experiential knowledge is special or magical, only that it is different.
But here's something for you to consider given your (presumed) Christian beliefs. If knowing everything "about" something cannot tell us what it feels like to experience something (qualia), then God is probably an ignorant bastard. He may know everything "about" the color red, or everything "about" what it is like to be human, or to have sinned, but by your argument, all His knowledge is hollow; empty of the experiential knowledge; blinded by ignorance he cannot overcome. Or are you suggesting that God has in fact sinned?
So here's the challenge for you. Give up the notion that there is something special and privileged about there being a difference between knowing about and knowing by actually experiencing something, or give up your belief that your God is in any position to judge us. (Presuming I've presumed your belief in a god correctly.)
Moreover, I see potential for some very weird theory here. If you, knowing about murder and being pissed off can only analogize what my experience is like, or guess — picking bits and pieces from your own, on what basis do you judge my behavior? You can't possibly know how impossible it was for me not to stab her 16 times, or how I know that it was perfectly moral, though you, in your limited knowledge (obviously) can't see it. Who are you to judge me. You see, when you separate the mind from the brain, you not only separate it from materialism, you separate it from all occurrences of itself, because if it isn't physical, we have no way of determining that your non-material mental is of the same stuff as my non-material mental, or Joe's, or the milkman's. How do I know your non-material mental stuff isn't that of a demon, or a cat, or a god? How do you know that though I bear a mortal body, I am not an avatar of the Goddess Lakshmi? If I tell you to worship me as a god, would you? How would you know not to do so?. There may be only one kind, attached to human brains, two kinds, six, or twenty-thousand. And how can you know? And how can you know that cows don't have the same mental phenomenon as we do? They can't talk, but that may only be because the brain and physical apparatus are different, and incapable. Perhaps if cows had man brains, they'd discuss Augustine and Plato, too? And if you assert some version of panpsychism or monism here, note that in doing so, you are accepting the burden of proof here, and the shoe is on the other hand now, isn't it, Kramer? (An Airplane the Movie joke)
Anyway, I get the impression you've got me on ignore, so we may not hear your answer to these questions. Quelle d'homage.
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