RE: Conversion
September 4, 2009 at 4:32 am
(This post was last modified: September 4, 2009 at 4:36 am by Ryft.)
My apologies for my extended absence. This evening I noticed that one of the threads, in which I wanted to respond to Adrian and EvF, was shut down at some point between then and now so I have missed that opportunity. I got absolutely swamped at work, pulling back-to-back double shifts for a week and a half. When things slowed down enough that I could pay attention to my online affairs, my email inbox and my web site had a ton of messages and issues that needing dealing with. Plus I had fallen way behind on updating the Pete Dominick web site. I have gotten caught up on everything now, but I do apologize for the giant hole my absence left in those conversations.
All right, I see where your argument is coming from. However, this is faulty reasoning. Just because the TAG presupposes the God who creates, it does not follow from this that God also created morality. Not everything is a product of God's creative power; some things are a product of his divine nature, such as moral order. The idea that moral order is a product of God's creative power is what the Divine Command Theory (DCT) argues for, which is a rather different beast. The TAG argues for the Christian position that moral order is grounded in the very nature of God and expressed prescriptively in his commands. If moral order is grounded in the very nature of God, then it is eternal in as much as God is—not a contingent thing God created at some point, such as found in the DCT.
Additionally, the DCT is fatally crippled by one of the horns of the Euthyphro dilemma, which Bertrand Russell quite powerfully demonstrated ("If it [morality] is due to God's fiat, then for God himself there is no difference between right and wrong"). The TAG, however, is not only unscathed by it but actually fatally cripples the Euthyphro dilemma itself (by proving it as committing the bifurcation fallacy), which most people neglect to see coming.
First, the phrase "baseless assumption" here is a redundancy trying to act like a pejorative. The fact of the matter is, at this level of discourse assumptions are baseless by definition, in virtue of being axioms; i.e., they form a comprehensive foundational perspective or starting point in terms of which everything else is interpreted and evaluated. In the final analysis, all arguments are ultimately baseless in this sense, for they all begin with assumptions that by their very nature cannot be proven.
Second, just because a structure is built upon assumptions that cannot be proven that does not, in itself, cut the rug out from underneath it; otherwise every structure built upon assumptions of this nature must be discarded—lest one commits the Special Pleading fallacy. And before anyone is too quick to find that agreeable, remember that a structure known as 'science' is itself founded upon a number of assumptions that cannot be proven (e.g., that the world is real, that the laws of nature are uniform, that inductive inference works, etc.). As Josh Witten at ScientificBlogging.com succinctly framed the matter, "The scientific method is a form of logical argument [formalized system of inquiry]. All logical arguments are based upon assumptions. The argument proceeding from those assumptions cannot be used to prove those assumptions."
Third, the reason we do not discard science and its unprovable assumptions is because those assumptions work, with no substantive violations. And it provides for the intelligibility of our experience of natural phenomenon. That is where it derives its strength from. The same principle applies to the Christian theory of metaethics and its TAG: it works, supplying the preconditions necessary for the intelligibility of our experience of morality, and suffers from no substantive violations. Moreover, it is the only one that does, for every other theory proposed ends up failing, either intrinsically or extrinsically (fails to produce a morality consistent with our experience). That is where it derives its strength from.
I know, I know—you do not agree, nor does basically anyone else here. But it can be verified from numerous points throughout this message board that no one here has any substantial experience with the TAG, evidenced most clearly by the crude caricatures or outright misrepresentations of it. So it is hardly surprising that people will not agree with an argument they are fundamentally unfamiliar with.
And this is not any kind of slight against people here, by the way. Most atheistic scholars have not even attempted to confront the TAG, even though it has been around for over half a century (c. 1940s). I have read countless books from a range of atheistic scholars and, where they confront arguments for the existence of God, not once is the TAG ever addressed by any of them. The only attempt by an atheist scholar I am aware of is that by Michael Martin (Harvard University), and his argument has yet to recover from the holes punched in it by John Frame (Princeton, Yale, Westminster Theological Seminary). So given that people here probably read atheist publications (assuming those that read philosophical books), the deafening silence in the literature about the TAG would lead inexorably to their fundamental ignorance about it. And, again, it is no surprise that people will not agree with an argument they are fundamentally unfamiliar with.
So what you are saying is: (1) Theory X fails as an explanation by the mere existence of a competing Theory Y; (2) Any argument that is based on mere assumptions is not proof of anything. I have to wonder if you are aware of the extraordinary ramifications that such a stance produces, far beyond its self-stultifying consequences. Given the level of intellect you routinely exhibit at this site and your blog, I have to believe you are aware and that this was just a sloppy response to Jon Paul.
Well, yes, making a claim is very easy to do. But then comes that bit about a claim having to withstand critical scrutiny. I do not suppose that grounding logic or moral order in Richard Dawkins—or perhaps cauliflower even, if you like—would last very long at all. But the claim is very easy to make, yes.
Um... just wow. No, that is not the TAG. It does not even qualify as a caricature thereof. Arcanus sticks by that? Puhleeze.
The TAG argues that logic, knowledge, and morality cannot be explained without God. Your rebuttal against the TAG is, "Yes they can." Well for crying out loud, if all it takes to refute an argument is to beg the question, critical thinkers have really been wasting their time, haven't they?
Either that, or proving the failure of the TAG requires more than begging the question.
Islam grounds moral order in the DCT which, as indicated earlier, is fatally crippled by the Euthyphro dilemma.
You are familiar with Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles, yes? If Deity X (DX) has all the attributes of the Christian God (CG), then DX is CG (q.v. if x and y have all the same properties, then x is identical to y). In order for DX to not be CG, it must have at least one attribute that is different from CG (q.v. a putative property which distinguishes them). Furthermore, as indicated earlier, making a claim is very easy to do. You can say moral order is grounded in noodly fields of spaghetti or whatever else tickles your fancy, but then comes the matter of whether or not it actually works.
Sorry, Eilonnwy, a contradiction is not proved by invoking such a basic fallacy—in this case, the Loaded Question fallacy. This rhetorical sophistry is used to limit the respondent's options so that he is forced to accept propositions he is not otherwise committed to, and would disavow if given a reasonable chance to do so (link). The common example used in Philosophy 101 texts is, "Have you stopped beating your spouse?" Both that question and the 'omnipotence paradox' question contain a question-begging presupposition. Consider the answers to the question:
(1) "Yes, God can create a rock which he cannot lift" — this entails that God cannot lift some rock (not omnipotent).
(2) "No, God cannot create a rock which he cannot lift" — entails that God cannot create some rock (not omnipotent).
Since either answer results in God being unable to do something, this reveals that the question is the informal fallacy of Loaded Question containing a presupposition that begs the question.
(August 11, 2009 at 1:40 pm)Tiberius Wrote: Wikipedia seems to think so [that God created morality] ... If TAG is arguing that God's absolute nature is the source of morals, and [if the TAG] has to presuppose the Christian worldview (which states quite clearly that God created the universe and everything in it), then TAG is equally clearly stating that God created morality.
(August 11, 2009 at 4:27 pm)Tiberius Wrote: Saying morality simply is because of God—or is part of God's nature—is the same thing as saying morality was created by God. They are both arguments which say that without God we would have no morality; ergo, for all [intents and] purposes God can be said to be the "creator" of morality in these arguments.
All right, I see where your argument is coming from. However, this is faulty reasoning. Just because the TAG presupposes the God who creates, it does not follow from this that God also created morality. Not everything is a product of God's creative power; some things are a product of his divine nature, such as moral order. The idea that moral order is a product of God's creative power is what the Divine Command Theory (DCT) argues for, which is a rather different beast. The TAG argues for the Christian position that moral order is grounded in the very nature of God and expressed prescriptively in his commands. If moral order is grounded in the very nature of God, then it is eternal in as much as God is—not a contingent thing God created at some point, such as found in the DCT.
Additionally, the DCT is fatally crippled by one of the horns of the Euthyphro dilemma, which Bertrand Russell quite powerfully demonstrated ("If it [morality] is due to God's fiat, then for God himself there is no difference between right and wrong"). The TAG, however, is not only unscathed by it but actually fatally cripples the Euthyphro dilemma itself (by proving it as committing the bifurcation fallacy), which most people neglect to see coming.
(August 11, 2009 at 4:27 pm)Tiberius Wrote: The fact still remains that this is a baseless assumption on which the argument rests. And since it is an assumption, it cannot possibly be said to be any kind of proof for the existence of God.
First, the phrase "baseless assumption" here is a redundancy trying to act like a pejorative. The fact of the matter is, at this level of discourse assumptions are baseless by definition, in virtue of being axioms; i.e., they form a comprehensive foundational perspective or starting point in terms of which everything else is interpreted and evaluated. In the final analysis, all arguments are ultimately baseless in this sense, for they all begin with assumptions that by their very nature cannot be proven.
Second, just because a structure is built upon assumptions that cannot be proven that does not, in itself, cut the rug out from underneath it; otherwise every structure built upon assumptions of this nature must be discarded—lest one commits the Special Pleading fallacy. And before anyone is too quick to find that agreeable, remember that a structure known as 'science' is itself founded upon a number of assumptions that cannot be proven (e.g., that the world is real, that the laws of nature are uniform, that inductive inference works, etc.). As Josh Witten at ScientificBlogging.com succinctly framed the matter, "The scientific method is a form of logical argument [formalized system of inquiry]. All logical arguments are based upon assumptions. The argument proceeding from those assumptions cannot be used to prove those assumptions."
Third, the reason we do not discard science and its unprovable assumptions is because those assumptions work, with no substantive violations. And it provides for the intelligibility of our experience of natural phenomenon. That is where it derives its strength from. The same principle applies to the Christian theory of metaethics and its TAG: it works, supplying the preconditions necessary for the intelligibility of our experience of morality, and suffers from no substantive violations. Moreover, it is the only one that does, for every other theory proposed ends up failing, either intrinsically or extrinsically (fails to produce a morality consistent with our experience). That is where it derives its strength from.
I know, I know—you do not agree, nor does basically anyone else here. But it can be verified from numerous points throughout this message board that no one here has any substantial experience with the TAG, evidenced most clearly by the crude caricatures or outright misrepresentations of it. So it is hardly surprising that people will not agree with an argument they are fundamentally unfamiliar with.
And this is not any kind of slight against people here, by the way. Most atheistic scholars have not even attempted to confront the TAG, even though it has been around for over half a century (c. 1940s). I have read countless books from a range of atheistic scholars and, where they confront arguments for the existence of God, not once is the TAG ever addressed by any of them. The only attempt by an atheist scholar I am aware of is that by Michael Martin (Harvard University), and his argument has yet to recover from the holes punched in it by John Frame (Princeton, Yale, Westminster Theological Seminary). So given that people here probably read atheist publications (assuming those that read philosophical books), the deafening silence in the literature about the TAG would lead inexorably to their fundamental ignorance about it. And, again, it is no surprise that people will not agree with an argument they are fundamentally unfamiliar with.
(August 11, 2009 at 7:50 pm)Tiberius Wrote: Either the TAG states that God created morality (and is thereby nulled by the fact that there are other explanations), and the argument is based on mere assumption (and is not a proof), or the TAG states that morality is because of God (it is transcendent or whatever), which is again nulled by the same fact and is still based on assumption.
So what you are saying is: (1) Theory X fails as an explanation by the mere existence of a competing Theory Y; (2) Any argument that is based on mere assumptions is not proof of anything. I have to wonder if you are aware of the extraordinary ramifications that such a stance produces, far beyond its self-stultifying consequences. Given the level of intellect you routinely exhibit at this site and your blog, I have to believe you are aware and that this was just a sloppy response to Jon Paul.
(August 11, 2009 at 7:50 pm)Tiberius Wrote: The TAG isn't a proof of anything. One could just as easily say that the FSM or Richard Dawkins is responsible for logic/morality.
Well, yes, making a claim is very easy to do. But then comes that bit about a claim having to withstand critical scrutiny. I do not suppose that grounding logic or moral order in Richard Dawkins—or perhaps cauliflower even, if you like—would last very long at all. But the claim is very easy to make, yes.
(August 11, 2009 at 7:50 pm)Tiberius Wrote: As for the argument itself:
(1) Knowledge is possible (or some other statement pertaining to logic or morality)
(2) If there is no god, knowledge is not possible
(3) Therefore god
Um... just wow. No, that is not the TAG. It does not even qualify as a caricature thereof. Arcanus sticks by that? Puhleeze.
(August 12, 2009 at 7:14 pm)Tiberius Wrote: Yet morality and logic can be explained without a God (as can knowledge), so it ultimately fails to prove anything.
The TAG argues that logic, knowledge, and morality cannot be explained without God. Your rebuttal against the TAG is, "Yes they can." Well for crying out loud, if all it takes to refute an argument is to beg the question, critical thinkers have really been wasting their time, haven't they?
Either that, or proving the failure of the TAG requires more than begging the question.
(August 12, 2009 at 7:14 pm)Tiberius Wrote: How exactly is the Islamic God any different? It is transcendent, omniscient, etc.
Islam grounds moral order in the DCT which, as indicated earlier, is fatally crippled by the Euthyphro dilemma.
(August 12, 2009 at 7:14 pm)Tiberius Wrote: What if I were to dream up a certain God that had all the attributes of the Christian God without being the Christian God?
You are familiar with Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles, yes? If Deity X (DX) has all the attributes of the Christian God (CG), then DX is CG (q.v. if x and y have all the same properties, then x is identical to y). In order for DX to not be CG, it must have at least one attribute that is different from CG (q.v. a putative property which distinguishes them). Furthermore, as indicated earlier, making a claim is very easy to do. You can say moral order is grounded in noodly fields of spaghetti or whatever else tickles your fancy, but then comes the matter of whether or not it actually works.
(August 12, 2009 at 9:21 pm)Eilonnwy Wrote: You say God is omnipotent. Can he create a rock that even he can't lift? Your descriptions of God are, by nature, contradictory.
Sorry, Eilonnwy, a contradiction is not proved by invoking such a basic fallacy—in this case, the Loaded Question fallacy. This rhetorical sophistry is used to limit the respondent's options so that he is forced to accept propositions he is not otherwise committed to, and would disavow if given a reasonable chance to do so (link). The common example used in Philosophy 101 texts is, "Have you stopped beating your spouse?" Both that question and the 'omnipotence paradox' question contain a question-begging presupposition. Consider the answers to the question:
(1) "Yes, God can create a rock which he cannot lift" — this entails that God cannot lift some rock (not omnipotent).
(2) "No, God cannot create a rock which he cannot lift" — entails that God cannot create some rock (not omnipotent).
Since either answer results in God being unable to do something, this reveals that the question is the informal fallacy of Loaded Question containing a presupposition that begs the question.
Man is a rational animal who always loses his temper when
called upon to act in accordance with the dictates of reason.
(Oscar Wilde)
called upon to act in accordance with the dictates of reason.
(Oscar Wilde)
