Conversion

[Edwardo Piet]

And what is that? And why haven't you told me in that post? What are you concealing that I haven't already addressed?

Because As I've explained - an 'objective mind' is gratuious, it lacks evidence. To believe in it rationally you need evidence; as with anything else. And you haven't presented any.

Objective reality exists seperate to our subjective beliefs about it; we can believe this or not, we can be right or wrong. We don't have to absolutely know it, we don't even need evidence for everything. It is just that evidence is rational by definition - evidence is a reason to believe something is true; a rational belief is based on evidence. So we need it if we are to be rational.

You have failed to provide evidence for an 'objective mind'. Any belief requires evidence for it to be rational.

EvF

[Jon Paul]

Because As I've explained - an 'objective mind' is gratuious, it lacks evidence. To believe in it rationally you need evidence; as with anything else. And you haven't presented any.

I have presented evidence for it, in several arguments that you haven't refuted, including the TAG as it pertains to this discussion, and the other form of transcendental argument I just formulated in my other thread, which argues also from extrinsic evidence a posteriori.

---

where does this leave Noah's flood?

This question, being directed to me, I've answered in the thread which I already made for asking me questions. Here.

[Edwardo Piet]

Because As I've explained - an 'objective mind' is gratuious, it lacks evidence. To believe in it rationally you need evidence; as with anything else. And you haven't presented any.

Sorry but I see semantic arguments. I don't see where you provide extraordinarily concrete evidence for an objective mind, a 'God' actually existing.

EvF

[Jon Paul]

Sorry but I see semantic arguments. I don't see where you provide extraordinarily concrete evidence for an objective mind, a 'God' actually existing.

That an argument is "semantic" can mean many things. For instance, any propositional argument or evidence has semantics, which means the definitions contained in the variables which are only more than semantic insofar as they refer to things outside of themselves. But I am sure you mean now, that my arguments are merely meaningless words, that is, do not express actual propositions about reality and about the differrent targets to which they predicate things. Which is a fallacious tactic of debunking them, that doesn't actually achieve anything without showing why.

How is the transcendental argument, in the several forms I have given it, merely semantic? Do you deny that the things it refers to, such as the conceptual reality of logic, are realities which go beyond the merely semantic definitions of it, and intuitively into our empirical experience of reality, and hence that our viewpoint of this is really one of the things that determines whether we are coherently in accordance with reality in our epistemic affirmation of the world? How is the argument from potentiality/actuality merely semantic? Do you deny the reality and distinction between the potential and the actual?

[Kyuuketsuki]

it means the same thing in this context.

That is your equivocation, but it is not consistent with the orthodox Christian definition of creation. God is not created; and the TAG exactly states that the moral and logical order in the universe transcends the universe, and is uncreated, a part of Gods uncreated being wholly apart from the universe.

English is English and you are a liar when you claim that you and Arcanus said the same thing WRT morality and the TAG argument.

The sense in which God is the source of the logical order of the universe is the ontological sense (that he imposes the order of His being on his Creation, the universe), not in the sense that he creates it ex nihilo (since it already exists in his divine nature), which is the Christian definition of creation.

Yeah right ... and you're a disingenuous creep!

Kyu

[Edwardo Piet]

@ JP

What I am saying is I am yet to see where you provide extraordinarily concrete measurable evidence for a supernatural creator, a God.

And you talk of transcendence, but I am yet no of any evidence of anything that transcends the natural universe, or of anything supernatural of "spiritual" at all.

Finally, I am yet to know of anything non-physical at all, because any idea that is said to be 'not physical' resides physically in the brain or down on paper, what Dawkins and Dennett etc has started to call memes, you can look Memetics up on Wiki if you don't know of it.

So since I am yet to know of nothing non-physical at all, I don't see how anything that transcends the natural of physical is possible.

I am yet to see any evidence for God actually existing, or for anything transcendent, non-physical, spiritual or supernatural at all. So good luck (you'll almost certainly need garganuantly superhuman quantites of it).

EvF

[Ryft]

My apologies for my extended absence. This evening I noticed that one of the threads, in which I wanted to respond to Adrian and EvF, was shut down at some point between then and now so I have missed that opportunity. I got absolutely swamped at work, pulling back-to-back double shifts for a week and a half. When things slowed down enough that I could pay attention to my online affairs, my email inbox and my web site had a ton of messages and issues that needing dealing with. Plus I had fallen way behind on updating the Pete Dominick web site. I have gotten caught up on everything now, but I do apologize for the giant hole my absence left in those conversations.

Wikipedia seems to think so [that God created morality] ... If TAG is arguing that God's absolute nature is the source of morals, and [if the TAG] has to presuppose the Christian worldview (which states quite clearly that God created the universe and everything in it), then TAG is equally clearly stating that God created morality.

Saying morality simply is because of God—or is part of God's nature—is the same thing as saying morality was created by God. They are both arguments which say that without God we would have no morality; ergo, for all [intents and] purposes God can be said to be the "creator" of morality in these arguments.

All right, I see where your argument is coming from. However, this is faulty reasoning. Just because the TAG presupposes the God who creates, it does not follow from this that God also created morality. Not everything is a product of God's creative power; some things are a product of his divine nature, such as moral order. The idea that moral order is a product of God's creative power is what the Divine Command Theory (DCT) argues for, which is a rather different beast. The TAG argues for the Christian position that moral order is grounded in the very nature of God and expressed prescriptively in his commands. If moral order is grounded in the very nature of God, then it is eternal in as much as God is—not a contingent thing God created at some point, such as found in the DCT.

Additionally, the DCT is fatally crippled by one of the horns of the Euthyphro dilemma, which Bertrand Russell quite powerfully demonstrated ("If it [morality] is due to God's fiat, then for God himself there is no difference between right and wrong"). The TAG, however, is not only unscathed by it but actually fatally cripples the Euthyphro dilemma itself (by proving it as committing the bifurcation fallacy), which most people neglect to see coming.

The fact still remains that this is a baseless assumption on which the argument rests. And since it is an assumption, it cannot possibly be said to be any kind of proof for the existence of God.

First, the phrase "baseless assumption" here is a redundancy trying to act like a pejorative. The fact of the matter is, at this level of discourse assumptions are baseless by definition, in virtue of being axioms; i.e., they form a comprehensive foundational perspective or starting point in terms of which everything else is interpreted and evaluated. In the final analysis, all arguments are ultimately baseless in this sense, for they all begin with assumptions that by their very nature cannot be proven.

Second, just because a structure is built upon assumptions that cannot be proven that does not, in itself, cut the rug out from underneath it; otherwise every structure built upon assumptions of this nature must be discarded—lest one commits the Special Pleading fallacy. And before anyone is too quick to find that agreeable, remember that a structure known as 'science' is itself founded upon a number of assumptions that cannot be proven (e.g., that the world is real, that the laws of nature are uniform, that inductive inference works, etc.). As Josh Witten at ScientificBlogging.com succinctly framed the matter, "The scientific method is a form of logical argument [formalized system of inquiry]. All logical arguments are based upon assumptions. The argument proceeding from those assumptions cannot be used to prove those assumptions."

Third, the reason we do not discard science and its unprovable assumptions is because those assumptions work, with no substantive violations. And it provides for the intelligibility of our experience of natural phenomenon. That is where it derives its strength from. The same principle applies to the Christian theory of metaethics and its TAG: it works, supplying the preconditions necessary for the intelligibility of our experience of morality, and suffers from no substantive violations. Moreover, it is the only one that does, for every other theory proposed ends up failing, either intrinsically or extrinsically (fails to produce a morality consistent with our experience). That is where it derives its strength from.

I know, I know—you do not agree, nor does basically anyone else here. But it can be verified from numerous points throughout this message board that no one here has any substantial experience with the TAG, evidenced most clearly by the crude caricatures or outright misrepresentations of it. So it is hardly surprising that people will not agree with an argument they are fundamentally unfamiliar with.

And this is not any kind of slight against people here, by the way. Most atheistic scholars have not even attempted to confront the TAG, even though it has been around for over half a century (c. 1940s). I have read countless books from a range of atheistic scholars and, where they confront arguments for the existence of God, not once is the TAG ever addressed by any of them. The only attempt by an atheist scholar I am aware of is that by Michael Martin (Harvard University), and his argument has yet to recover from the holes punched in it by John Frame (Princeton, Yale, Westminster Theological Seminary). So given that people here probably read atheist publications (assuming those that read philosophical books), the deafening silence in the literature about the TAG would lead inexorably to their fundamental ignorance about it. And, again, it is no surprise that people will not agree with an argument they are fundamentally unfamiliar with.

Either the TAG states that God created morality (and is thereby nulled by the fact that there are other explanations), and the argument is based on mere assumption (and is not a proof), or the TAG states that morality is because of God (it is transcendent or whatever), which is again nulled by the same fact and is still based on assumption.

So what you are saying is: (1) Theory X fails as an explanation by the mere existence of a competing Theory Y; (2) Any argument that is based on mere assumptions is not proof of anything. I have to wonder if you are aware of the extraordinary ramifications that such a stance produces, far beyond its self-stultifying consequences. Given the level of intellect you routinely exhibit at this site and your blog, I have to believe you are aware and that this was just a sloppy response to Jon Paul.

The TAG isn't a proof of anything. One could just as easily say that the FSM or Richard Dawkins is responsible for logic/morality.

Well, yes, making a claim is very easy to do. But then comes that bit about a claim having to withstand critical scrutiny. I do not suppose that grounding logic or moral order in Richard Dawkins—or perhaps cauliflower even, if you like—would last very long at all. But the claim is very easy to make, yes.

As for the argument itself:

(1) Knowledge is possible (or some other statement pertaining to logic or morality)
(2) If there is no god, knowledge is not possible
(3) Therefore god

Um... just wow. No, that is not the TAG. It does not even qualify as a caricature thereof. Arcanus sticks by that? Puhleeze.

Yet morality and logic can be explained without a God (as can knowledge), so it ultimately fails to prove anything.

The TAG argues that logic, knowledge, and morality cannot be explained without God. Your rebuttal against the TAG is, "Yes they can." Well for crying out loud, if all it takes to refute an argument is to beg the question, critical thinkers have really been wasting their time, haven't they?

Either that, or proving the failure of the TAG requires more than begging the question.

How exactly is the Islamic God any different? It is transcendent, omniscient, etc.

Islam grounds moral order in the DCT which, as indicated earlier, is fatally crippled by the Euthyphro dilemma.

What if I were to dream up a certain God that had all the attributes of the Christian God without being the Christian God?

You are familiar with Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles, yes? If Deity X (DX) has all the attributes of the Christian God (CG), then DX is CG (q.v. if x and y have all the same properties, then x is identical to y). In order for DX to not be CG, it must have at least one attribute that is different from CG (q.v. a putative property which distinguishes them). Furthermore, as indicated earlier, making a claim is very easy to do. You can say moral order is grounded in noodly fields of spaghetti or whatever else tickles your fancy, but then comes the matter of whether or not it actually works.

---

You say God is omnipotent. Can he create a rock that even he can't lift? Your descriptions of God are, by nature, contradictory.

Sorry, Eilonnwy, a contradiction is not proved by invoking such a basic fallacy—in this case, the Loaded Question fallacy. This rhetorical sophistry is used to limit the respondent's options so that he is forced to accept propositions he is not otherwise committed to, and would disavow if given a reasonable chance to do so (link). The common example used in Philosophy 101 texts is, "Have you stopped beating your spouse?" Both that question and the 'omnipotence paradox' question contain a question-begging presupposition. Consider the answers to the question:

(1) "Yes, God can create a rock which he cannot lift" — this entails that God cannot lift some rock (not omnipotent).

(2) "No, God cannot create a rock which he cannot lift" — entails that God cannot create some rock (not omnipotent).

Since either answer results in God being unable to do something, this reveals that the question is the informal fallacy of Loaded Question containing a presupposition that begs the question.

[Tiberius]

All right, I see where your argument is coming from. However, this is faulty reasoning. Just because the TAG presupposes the God who creates, it does not follow from this that God also created morality. Not everything is a product of God's creative power; some things are a product of his divine nature, such as moral order. The idea that moral order is a product of God's creative power is what the Divine Command Theory (DCT) argues for, which is a rather different beast. The TAG argues for the Christian position that moral order is grounded in the very nature of God and expressed prescriptively in his commands. If moral order is grounded in the very nature of God, then it is eternal in as much as God is—not a contingent thing God created at some point, such as found in the DCT.

I'm not saying that at all. What I am arguing is that there is no difference between saying "God created morality" and "Morality is a product of God's divine nature". Both are a product of an attribute of God; all you are doing is confusing the argument. I could easily say instead of "God created morality", that "Morality is a product of God's creative powers" - it has the same meaning. Thomas Aquinas argued that "God commands things that are good because God himself is good, and a good God can only give good commands". The problem with this is that the only morality that you can say is not "created" by God is God's own morality. Morality itself for humans is the sum of all the commands of God, and is therefore a creation of God. It is clear that the morality by which God works by is not the same as the morality by which we work by, because we can do the exact opposite of God's commands (and thereby do something "bad").

First, the phrase "baseless assumption" here is a redundancy trying to act like a pejorative. The fact of the matter is, at this level of discourse assumptions are baseless by definition, in virtue of being axioms; i.e., they form a comprehensive foundational perspective or starting point in terms of which everything else is interpreted and evaluated. In the final analysis, all arguments are ultimately baseless in this sense, for they all begin with assumptions that by their very nature cannot be proven.

I disagree. Science is based on the assumption that nature is ordered and that by observing it we can learn things from it. This assumption is hardly baseless, since it is based upon our observation of the natural world. We soon realised that there were certain laws that nature abides by (when you drop something, it always falls down, etc) and that these laws did not appear to change. It is plainly obvious that if we lacked this base from which science assumes, it would not work (since every experiment would get a different outcome). It is still an assumption however, because it is not proven.

Second, just because a structure is built upon assumptions that cannot be proven that does not, in itself, cut the rug out from underneath it; otherwise every structure built upon assumptions of this nature must be discarded—lest one commits the Special Pleading fallacy. And before anyone is too quick to find that agreeable, remember that a structure known as 'science' is itself founded upon a number of assumptions that cannot be proven (e.g., that the world is real, that the laws of nature are uniform, that inductive inference works, etc.). As Josh Witten at ScientificBlogging.com succinctly framed the matter, "The scientific method is a form of logical argument [formalized system of inquiry]. All logical arguments are based upon assumptions. The argument proceeding from those assumptions cannot be used to prove those assumptions."

Indeed, but the point is, if you assume something in an argument, the conclusion of the argument cannot be "well, the assumption was correct because everything works out". To take science as an example again, we cannot prove that nature is ordered (the assumption of science) because at the end of the day, we *could* be in some cosmic lab where a superbeing is just changing the results of our tests to make them look ordered.

(I just noticed you made the same argument above, but I like my example )

I'm in full agreement, but the fact is that TAG has a Christian assumption at the beginning, and claims to be able to prove a Christian God. I see this as a fallacy since the entire assumption was one of Christianity to begin with, and to prove the Christian God is to prove the Christian assumption (and as we've said, you cannot do that). This is why I object the TAG argument when you go around claiming it proves the existence of a specific God. It doesn't.

Third, the reason we do not discard science and its unprovable assumptions is because those assumptions work, with no substantive violations. And it provides for the intelligibility of our experience of natural phenomenon. That is where it derives its strength from. The same principle applies to the Christian theory of metaethics and its TAG: it works, supplying the preconditions necessary for the intelligibility of our experience of morality, and suffers from no substantive violations. Moreover, it is the only one that does, for every other theory proposed ends up failing, either intrinsically or extrinsically (fails to produce a morality consistent with our experience). That is where it derives its strength from.

The problem I come across with this one is that morality is observably not static. If morality were, you would have an argument that morality is caused by something like a transcendental God, but it isn't. By having a non-static morality, you can *claim* that God's morality is static and humans are only sinning, but you have no *proof* that our morality is anything other than a developed (and indeed, developing) biological function. This is one of the most vivid problems with TAG; that it says it can explain morality and thereby prove God, but it cannot because there are other valid explanations.

I know, I know—you do not agree, nor does basically anyone else here. But it can be verified from numerous points throughout this message board that no one here has any substantial experience with the TAG, evidenced most clearly by the crude caricatures or outright misrepresentations of it. So it is hardly surprising that people will not agree with an argument they are fundamentally unfamiliar with.

Well perhaps it would be advisable, before you continue, to outline TAG (as you see it), with a full explanation. It might be advisable to put your explanation on the Wikipedia article, to help future generations of atheists to "find" God.

So what you are saying is: (1) Theory X fails as an explanation by the mere existence of a competing Theory Y; (2) Any argument that is based on mere assumptions is not proof of anything. I have to wonder if you are aware of the extraordinary ramifications that such a stance produces, far beyond its self-stultifying consequences. Given the level of intellect you routinely exhibit at this site and your blog, I have to believe you are aware and that this was just a sloppy response to Jon Paul.

No, I'm not saying that at all. I'm saying it fails as a *proof* because of the existence of other expanations. TAG is a proof (at least the philosophical websites & wikipedia say so, but apparently they are shite according to you) and as such, should be able to counter (successfully) any other claims of morality / knowledge / logic existing through any other means. These explanations exist, and the different between them and TAG (and the reason why they don't cause any "outcry") is because they are not presented as proofs, they are presented as explanations.

So, if TAG is presented as a proof, as the websites out there present it, it is wrong. It is no more a proof than the natural explanations as to why we have a sense of morality, sense of logic, sense of knowledge.

As for the assumptions issue, I stand by it. We've already agreed that assumptions cannot be proven by the conclusion of the argument, so these assumptions are unproven. Given that these assumptions are the prerequisites for the conclusion being valid, if we were to demonstrate how the assumption was wrong, the entire conclusion would be wrong. Ergo, there is no proof. A proof by definition cannot be disproven, and any "proof" based on assumptions can be disproven if the assumptions are disproven.

Again, this is another attack on TAG as a proof. You can have it as a *possible* explanation, but not a proof.

Um... just wow. No, that is not the TAG. It does not even qualify as a caricature thereof. Arcanus sticks by that? Puhleeze.

Well as I suggested before, please explain it.

The TAG argues that logic, knowledge, and morality cannot be explained without God. Your rebuttal against the TAG is, "Yes they can." Well for crying out loud, if all it takes to refute an argument is to beg the question, critical thinkers have really been wasting their time, haven't they?

Either that, or proving the failure of the TAG requires more than begging the question.

My rebuttal of TAG is indeed "yes they can", and each have natural explanations. Morality has an evolutionary history, and scientists think it evolved from our instinct to help us survive as societies. Logica equally has an evolutionary history, being important for our brains to develop (our brains are natural computers and as such have "logic circuits" in neurons). Our perception of logic is a conscious representation of the brain's computations. By knowledge itself, I assume you mean actual existence of knowledge rather than our ability to "know", and this I would argue is simply our perception of reality (which we will assume is real ). Knowledge itself is a human concept to relate to the natural world.

You are familiar with Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles, yes? If Deity X (DX) has all the attributes of the Christian God (CG), then DX is CG (q.v. if x and y have all the same properties, then x is identical to y). In order for DX to not be CG, it must have at least one attribute that is different from CG (q.v. a putative property which distinguishes them). Furthermore, as indicated earlier, making a claim is very easy to do. You can say moral order is grounded in noodly fields of spaghetti or whatever else tickles your fancy, but then comes the matter of whether or not it actually works.

Not true I'm afraid. You switch arguments nicely in the middle (and very well; I almost didn't notice!). You first say that if DX has all the attributes of CG, DX = CG (which is wrong). You then say, if DX and CG have all the same properties, they are equal. This is correct, but entirely different to the first statement, and indeed entirely different to my point.

Consider:

Box X has a hairbrush, a ball, and a playstation 3.
Box Y has a hairbrush, and a ball.

X has all the attributes of Y, but it is not equal to Y, because X has an extra attribute. Your first argument compared one god to another, whereas the second (and valid) argument compared both gods to each other.

A god can have all the attributes of the Christian God, and then go further (as the mighty FSM does). Obvious joking aside, my point still stands; your logic concerning indiscernibles only works when both objects are compared to one another and both have the same attributes. However I never said this.

Btw, nice to have you back

[Ryft]

Btw, nice to have you back

It's nice to be back, Adrian. I had really missed relaxing here.

What I am arguing is that there is no difference between saying "God created morality" and "morality is a product of God's divine nature." Both are a product of an attribute of God.

Except there is a significant difference. The problem, as I see it, resides in the term "created" and the sense it has of causing P to come into being or to bring P about—that is, its implication of a contingent state of affairs (i.e., could have been otherwise). Such a meaning is consistent with the divine command theory of ethics (DCT) but it simply cannot square with the divine nature theory of ethics (DNT) of Christian theism. It ebbs and flows from contradiction to fallacy. Consider: If P is eternal and immutable, then P was not caused by some S to come into being, or brought about by some S. Ergo, trying to use the word "created" to describe P either flies in the face of the very definition of the word (produces a contradiction) or flies in the face of what is actually asserted about P (produces a fallacy). The word "created" is just too problematic on this issue. (Although, as I said, it works fine for DCT.) And the problems are exacerbated as we explore your argument further.

For example, they emphatically are not both "a product of an attribute of God." The DNT is identified with the very nature of God, which is much more than any one attribute. The DCT, on the other hand, certainly can be described as a product of an attribute of God, viz. omnipotence or his creative powers. You said that "God created morality" has the same meaning as "morality is a product of God's creative powers." That is true only if given the DCT. God's creative powers is referenced under the attribute of omnipotence, so actually "God created morality" has the same meaning as "morality is a product of God's omnipotence," the power of divine fiat—which is the case only under the DCT, a theory that is not at any rate the subject of our discussion.

"Morality itself for humans is the sum of all the commands of God," you said, "and is therefore a creation of God." That is what the DCT argues for, Adrian. That is decidedly a different beast. Under the DNT, morality in itself for humans is (not the sum of his commands but) the sum of his nature, which is not the same thing as an act or an attribute. The word "created" simply cannot find any foothold in the DNT because under this theory morality is not identified with (i) an act of God, e.g., commands, nor (ii) an attribute of God, e.g., omnipotence or his creative powers. It is identified with the nature of God, which on the one hand is eternal and immutable, etc., and on the other hand is not the same thing as an act of God or an attribute of God.

I disagree. Science is based on the assumption that nature is ordered ...

Well no, sorry. That nature is ordered is not something assumed (a priori), it is something observed (a posteriori). Although science does progress from antecedent results, it is not based on those results in the axiomatic sense that I was referring to. Some of the unprovable assumptions that science is based on in the axiomatic sense being discussed were listed; e.g., science operates under the assumption that the laws of nature are uniform, but it cannot use those assumptions to prove the assumptions; as you recognized, that would be viciously circular. That is precisely why such assumptions are "baseless" or unprovable axioms.

But, as I said, just because a structure is built upon assumptions that cannot be proven, that does not in itself cut the rug out from underneath it (otherwise every structure built upon unprovable assumptions must be discarded, lest one commits the Special Pleading fallacy). And, thankfully, you agreed.

The point is that, if you assume something in an argument, the conclusion of the argument cannot be, "Well, the assumption was correct because everything works out."

That is by definition an a posteriori argument, Adrian. But the TAG is an a priori argument. It does not argue that P happens to work well with Q by an a posteriori evaluation. It is an a priori argument that in order for Q to be the case (e.g., human experience is intelligible) P must be the case; in other words, that P is the precondition necessary for Q to be the case. An a priori argument (analytic) by definition is not an a posteriori evaluation (empirical). If some assumption P is shown to be necessary in order for some case Q (which describes a real human experience), then one is justified in holding that P—and by "necessary" it is meant that every ¬P assumption fails to account for some case Q; i.e., the impossibility of the contrary.

I'm in full agreement. But the fact is, the TAG has a Christian assumption at the beginning and claims to be able to prove a Christian God. I see this as a fallacy, since the entire assumption was one of Christianity to begin with ...

First, as Cornelius Van Til noted, "all reasoning is, in the nature of the case, circular reasoning. The starting point, the method, and the conclusion are always involved in one another." For example, one who believes that human reason is the final arbiter of truth ultimately proves his point by appealing to human reason. Likewise an empiricist proves his case by appealing to empiricism. Similarly for a subjectivist, a Muslim, a Buddhist, or whoever. No one should be surprised, then, that the proof for Christian theism appeals to Christian assumptions as the ultimate criterion.

Second, the TAG proves the Christian God not by arguing to God, as a conclusion to be reached, but from God, as a presupposition necessary for any conclusion to be reached.

The problem I come across with this one [the DNT] is that morality is observably not static.

That holds only if cultural relativism is a true account of morality qua morality, which is decidedly not what the TAG argues. As I had said before, begging the question is not a valid criticism but a fallacy; it is faulty reasoning to think one view can be refuted by simply assuming the truth of another view.

[Perhaps you could] outline TAG as you see it, with a full explanation. It might be advisable to put your explanation on the Wikipedia article, to help future generations of atheists to "find" God.

First, I have indeed been outlining the TAG as I see it. Second, see here for a full explanation. Third, I am not invested in trying to help atheists generally to find God. As some at this site have said, even if God were proven to be true they would still refuse to obey him or have anything to do with him. If you may recall from my introduction thread, I am not here to convert atheist members to Christianity; although my private message box, as I had said, is wide open to anyone who is genuinely seeking, I am otherwise here just to engage in critical debate and discussion—or perhaps more pointedly, to test whether Christian arguments stand up under (valid and coherent) scrutiny.

[As a proof for God, the TAG] should be able to counter, successfully, any other claims of morality/knowledge/logic existing through any other means. These explanations exist, and the difference between them and the TAG—and the reason why they don't cause any 'outcry'—is because they are not presented as proofs, they are presented as explanations.

1. The TAG does successfully counter other claims. (This does not include, however, those who try to refute a view by assuming the truth of a competing view, because such a tactic is logically invalid and does not require being countered.)

2. These other claims or explanations are not presented as proofs... of?

Given that these [unprovable] assumptions are the prerequisites for the conclusion being valid, if we were to demonstrate how the assumption was wrong then the entire conclusion would be wrong. Ergo, there is no proof. A proof by definition cannot be disproven, and any "proof" based on assumptions can be disproven if the assumptions are disproven.

Right. But begging the question does not qualify as a disproof of anything. It is a logical fallacy, Adrian. One does not disprove X by assuming the truth of Y. One disproves X by disproving X, either under its own terms or by proving the truth of ¬X (proving, not assuming or stating).

The TAG argues that logic, knowledge, and morality cannot be explained without God. Your rebuttal against the TAG is, "Yes they can." Well for crying out loud, if all it takes to refute an argument is to beg the question, critical thinkers have really been wasting their time, haven't they? (Either that, or proving the failure of the TAG requires more than begging the question.)

My rebuttal of TAG is indeed "yes they can" ... Morality has an evolutionary history, and scientists think ...

First, "yes they can" is not a rebuttal but a fallacy; X is not refuted by simply assuming the truth of Y. Second, describing the details of a competing view does not a refutation make; X is not shown to fail by the mere existence of Y.

Box X has a hairbrush, a ball, and a Playstation 3.
Box Y has a hairbrush, and a ball.

X has all the attributes of Y, but it is not equal to Y because X has an extra attribute.

My apologies for not being as explicitly precise as I could be. I thought my parenthetical remarks were being precise in describing my point, but evidently you were able to think I was presenting two different points simultaneously. It was one and the same point. It is interesting that it takes one tiny phrase to be more precise:

If Deity X (DX) has all the attributes of the Christian God (CG) and vice-versa, then DX is CG (q.v. if x and y have all the same properties, then x is identical to y). In order for DX to not be CG, it must have at least one attribute that is different from CG (q.v. a putative property which distinguishes them). Furthermore, as indicated earlier, making a claim is very easy to do. You can say moral order is grounded in noodly fields of spaghetti or whatever else tickles your fancy, but then comes the matter of whether or not it actually works.

Again, I thought my parenthetical remarks made that clarification. My apologies.

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Edits: Added the clause "and by 'necessary' it is meant that every ¬P assumption fails to account for some case Q; i.e., the impossibility of the contrary."

[s.gal83]

Since I've been on this forum I've read and been involved in several arguments about the nature and existence of god. This makes me wonder if there has ever been a genuine conversion on this site. It further gets me thinking about why we believe what we believe and what it would take to switch.

What would it take to convince a theist that they are wrong?

What would it take to convince an atheist that they are wrong?

Rhizo

I believe in God, but in my belief, God is not moral. In fact, he is a sadist.
I always have this belief since young and have seen some miracles in my life. I don't think I can be convinced I am wrong, though I hope so. It is not good to live in a world where you believe in an immoral God.