RE: Free Will: Fact or Fiction
September 25, 2012 at 4:51 pm
(This post was last modified: September 25, 2012 at 4:53 pm by Ben Davis.)
It's demonstrable that some of our actions are purely chemical/neurological (e.g. fits of uncontrollable rage/falling in love) also that interfering with brain functions can drastically alter 'personality' (e.g. a blow to the head/electric shock therapy). These are strong arguments against the concept of free will as it means that behaviour can be predicted. We realise this, instinctively & regularly, when we make predictions on how people will react based on prior experience of their actions/reactions (e.g. 'knowing' your friends/business stakeholder analyses).
On the other hand, it's demonstrable that people can behave in ways inconsistent with chemical/neurological expectations (e.g. controlling their emotions) also that people have 'recovered' from altered brain functions (e.g. reasserting personality). These are strong arguments in favour of free will because it means that behaviour runs contrary to predictions. We realise this, less commonly than predictability, when our expectations of behaviour are not met (e.g. people 'not being themselves').
I feel that our current understanding of biology & neurochemistry is insufficient to come to any conclusions about behavioural drivers but it's almost definitely true that it's not as simple as free will vs determinism; I think it likely that those terms are drastic oversimplifications of incredibly complex social, psychological & neurological mechanisms, the type of which may be theoretically predictable but probably contain too many variables to be practically so.
In reality, we observe that people are more predictable than not.
On the other hand, it's demonstrable that people can behave in ways inconsistent with chemical/neurological expectations (e.g. controlling their emotions) also that people have 'recovered' from altered brain functions (e.g. reasserting personality). These are strong arguments in favour of free will because it means that behaviour runs contrary to predictions. We realise this, less commonly than predictability, when our expectations of behaviour are not met (e.g. people 'not being themselves').
I feel that our current understanding of biology & neurochemistry is insufficient to come to any conclusions about behavioural drivers but it's almost definitely true that it's not as simple as free will vs determinism; I think it likely that those terms are drastic oversimplifications of incredibly complex social, psychological & neurological mechanisms, the type of which may be theoretically predictable but probably contain too many variables to be practically so.
In reality, we observe that people are more predictable than not.
Sum ergo sum
