Do you control what you believe?

[Edwardo Piet]

If we accept the definition of "will" as conscious motivation then we should also accept that there are other sources of volition than willpower on board the totality of oneself.

I will accept that there is both conscious and unconscious motivation, but I can't understand what you mean by there being other sources of volition other than willpower. Wouldn't volition have to come down to a matter of willpower? By volition don't you either mean 'will' or 'free will'? If so "other sources of volition other than willpower" would imply "other sources of 'will' other than willpower" which seems like a flat-out logical contradiction to me. Unless to you willpower is not the same as 'will'?

In so far as will as we've defined it is not the sole master of 'our house', then we must concede that the will is not free.

I presume you mean that's because our conscious motivation is ultimately predetermined by unconscious motivation?

To my mind that doesn't mean will is never free, or can never have its way.

In what sense do you believe it's 'free' then?

Very often we do carry out what plans we have made.

That is rationally undeniable, to deny that would be full-blown fatalism which is, of course, not the same thing as determinism.

The question then becomes, do they satisfy?

What does the satisfaction of our plans have to do with "free will"?

On the other hand, if we conceptualize our conscious minds as a specialized facility whose purpose is to serve the total organism then it is possible to align ones conscious motivation with a more robust conception of self.

Our conscious motivation can come from more conscious motivation you mean? For example, our desires and fears can come from other desires and fears that we have. We influence and control ourselves to an extent. That is undeniable but not what I'm questioning because it's so obviously undeniable, like I said you'd have to be a full-blown fatalist (which isn't rationally justifiable) to deny that. I'm questioning the libertarian sense of "free will" because many people believe in that concept which is at least as ridiculous as the undeniably extreme ridiculousness of sheer fatalism. I obviously don't question the typical sense of "free will" compatible with determinism. I see that as a red herring you see. Although it's obviously important to avoid fatalism, embracing free will is not the only way to avoid it - understanding that determinism doesn't imply fatalism is another and, I would argue, a better way. I think it's a better way because while I don't deny the typical compatibilistic sense of "free will", I think it's a red herring because, while typical, it's less typical than the libertarian sense of "free will" and, also, less morally significant a matter to address. But anyway, that's then getting a bit off-topic because this is about whether we control what we believe. Free will is indeed relevant to that, but which conceptualization of "free will" to embrace and why (and the matter of morality), are irrelevant to that matter.

Our identification with conscious, deliberate motivation need not form our entire self conception.

Yes, our self-conception can, and does, originate from sources outside of our identification with conscious motivation.

When it does, the perception will be that our wills are not free.

Well, the libertarian sense of "free will" cannot exist assuming that is the case.

But my self conception is of something deeper and more inclusive than my conscious motivations.

It originates from unconscious motivation(s), yes.

One of my conscious motivations is to better understand the knowledge and desires operative in me that are not fully conscious. Einstein said the rational mind should be a faithful servant to intuition. Perhaps in willing servitude, freedom is possible.

There's no denying that freedom is possible, the question is whether libertarian free will is possible and my answer is a resounding "No."

I think we have no choice but to accept and work with the fears and desires which we discover inside.

We can influence them. But they are ultimately entirely determined from factors other than ourselves (or to put it another way, our 'selves').

It would be curious if we were able to pick and choose consciously which fears and desires we would embrace.

We can to an extent. But we ultimately have no choice in the matter. It is, ultimately, entirely determined.

The validity of that argument is all assuming philosophical determinism is true of course, if philosophical indeterminism is true, things are probabilistic. But that leads to the nonexistence of libertarian free will too because if the universe is (philosophically) indeterministic, since we're part of the universe, we can't determine our actions either - or in other words we can't 'will' our actions we're just more likely to do some things than others and, not only doesn't free will exist, the will itself is an illusion in that case. We can't logically use the same argument against free will in an indeterministic universe as in a deterministic one, but the conclusion is the same: (libertarian) free will doesn't exist.

If having to contend with fears and desires not of our choosing makes us less free then indeed we are not free.

I don't see how contending with desires that we choose is "free" either, if that choice is not a free one. Meaning that if that choice is ultimately entirely pretermined, how is it free?

But if I consciously desire to discover and embrace the fears and desires which the environment and my greater self have instilled in me, then perhaps I am free.

Not in the libertarian sense that I'm addressing. If your desires and fears are ultimately entirely predetermined, how are they free?

It would not appeal to me to have no desires or fears other than those I arbitrarily choose.

What appeals to you is not really addressing the existence of free will nor is it addressing whether we control what we believe.

[Some middle of the night thoughts probably not as coherently expressed as they could be.]

Well it's half past two in the afternoon for me but, once again, a bit off-topic