RE: Theory number 3.
October 25, 2012 at 3:50 am
(This post was last modified: October 25, 2012 at 3:51 am by Angrboda.)
You equivocate and mix your metaphors in an inutile way. That people have different competencies does not imply that these competencies correspond to distinct "kinds" of knowing.
In addition, some of your examples are flawed. Cognition is a deep and complex subject, not served well by folksy examples or sheer phenomenological Ballzac. It's not clear, but I'm guessing you're not well acquainted with the literature on the subject, much less have conquered recurrent bogeymen. I would start with the following subjects, intelligence, bounded rationality, "trait theory", and memory.
Overall however, the main flaw is you are arguing about what "might" be true (God knowledge) based on something that also "might be" true (that there are different types or ways of knowing). I'm not going to dispute the latter point as I feel buried under the muck there is a grain of truth there, but not enough to justify this leap. Regardless of that premise's soundness, I don't think it's sufficient. Failing shoring these points up, you have a weak analogy, based on weak evidence, supporting an extraordinary hypothesis.
For what it's worth, I wouldn't take the detour into God.
That being said, the foundational problem is lack of a specific and demonstrable understanding of just what knowledge herself is. Lacking that, the rest is just logical dancing. You're waving a finger haphazardly at a moon that may not even be there and expecting a miracle to occur. Go back to basics. Psychology and epistemology.
I had some dim hope to recommend some reading here, but only In The Palaces of Memory comes to mind, and that work is outdated. I would strongly urge you to read Patricia Churchland's Neurophilosophy. It's a bit off your mark, about how to think and how not to think about issues in cognitive science and philosophy of mind. I consider it one of the most important books I've ever read. It's not directly up your alley, but I think you would find it useful.
![[Image: extraordinarywoo-sig.jpg]](https://i.postimg.cc/zf86M5L7/extraordinarywoo-sig.jpg)