Do you control what you believe?

[Edwardo Piet]

Figuring out exactly what you mean when you deny libertarian free will is probably the more productive thing to do at this point.

I thought I made it clear what it is that I'm denying. I tried several times, but I'll try again. I'm denying the idea that we can somehow consciously ultimately determine our own conscious motivation. My point is that for that to be true, conscious motivation would require more conscious motivation, and that would have to go on forever (which clearly doesn't happen, there are times in the past when we're not conscious of our motivation(s), before we were born being the obvious example!) leading to an infinite regress of conscious motivation requiring more conscious motivation - and that wouldn't do it either because you'd always need more conscious motivation, so you'd never get there, it would never work. Now to any rational and logical person, when thought through, this entire concept seems totally insane and obviously false, but there are a lot of people who behave as if it's true, as if they really do believe it. I think they are confused, and/or they haven't given the matter much thought - and I also think that lots of people who do deny it often equivocate it with other kinds of "free will" that actually are possible, and so they end up believing in it too anyway. In other words, they commit the equivocation fallacy.

Apparently it comes down to what choices are on the menu we are conscious of, not our ability to decide between options on that menu.

No, it's not a matter of what choices are on the menu, it's a matter of whether or not those choices are "free" in the libertarian sense I've described several times. They are not free in the sense that they're ultimately entirely determined by unconscious motivation. If our choices were not ultimately entirely determined by unconscious motivation, nor were they ultimately entirely undetermined, then we'd - somehow - have libertarian "free will". I don't see how this is possible because either conscious motivation is ultimately entirely determined by unconscious motivation, or it's ultimately entirely not determined by anything, including conscious motivation, and so, ultimately, we can't determine things at all.

It is how our experiences in our unchosen environments up to the point of decision (perhaps with some equally unchosen innate dispositions) which determine the range of choice.

Yes, and our experiences in our unchosen enviroments and innate dispositions are ultimately entirely determined by other things that are part of the universe, as everything is part of the universe. Any possible decision is a possible part of the universe therefore, because everything is part of the universe. Our possible decisions in any possible universe may be determined by other decisions but they are all ultimately entirely determined by unconscious sources that are also part of the universe. We are all ultimately entirely unconsciously determined, or ultimately entirely undetermined.

Not much really seems to be at stake.

Well what's "at stake" is surely a question of what matters, and therefore a moral question, which is off-topic. My point is that we ultimately entirely don't have conscious motivation, that is the "free will" that I'm denying. To digress for just a second on the moral note, I think there is a lot at stake, revenge and supposedly "deserved" retribution as opposed to merely justified punishment is often based upon the idea that people are ultimately responsible, for example - and such as idea is dependent upon the notion of our conscious motivation not being ultimately entirely determined by unconsciousness. The notion of arrogance is also often based upon the fact that people often feel that they are superior to others because they believe that they are ultimately responsible for their good qualities, which once again is dependent upon the notion of conscious motivation not being ultimately entirely determined by unconsciousness. And the same of course applies to people with excessively low self-esteem/excessively high shame - as opposed to just guilt or regret which is based on recognized wrong action and helps correct bad behavior - for the same reasons. I think that revenge, arrogance and excessively low/self-esteem/excessively high shame all do a lot of harm in the world and, since I believe that belief in the libertarian sense of free will often influences this, for reasons given - this is why I think it's morally relevant.

Perhaps you could elaborate if you think I'm missing anything important.

I think denying libertarian free will is clearly logical. That is my fundamental point, and that is the only definition of "free will" that I've made clear that I do deny. I also think that it is the kind of "free will" most worth paying attention to, for the off-topic moral reasons described above.

[...]Personally I have no problem with enforcing societal standards of behavior regardless of whether a person has been properly brought up to respect others. If some individuals don't have pro-social desires then we can at least hope that fear of consequences will have the desired effect.

I'm a consequentialist and I believe that rehabilitation and detainment are not the only necessary methods of justice. I also, for example, think full-on punishment can be justified. But justified punishment is of course not the same as retribution based on whether people "deserve" it. In the sense that it's not about ultimate responsibility, it's about ultimate consequences and relative responsibility often plays a big part in that, since the deliberate intentions of people often affect the consequences. People with bad intentions don't always do bad things, but they are more likely to. People with good intentions don't always do good things, but they are more likely to. People with bad intentions can often do good things, but they're not as likely to as people with good intentions. People with good intentions can often do bad things, but they're not as likely to as people with bad intentions. Ultimately it's about consequences and not intentions, indeed, but the point is that intentions often play a big part in the consequences, despite the fact that they're ultimately not consciously determined at all, and so not ultimately responsible, at all.