To Chad: I don't see why you object to seeing the biology of the brain as the ground of the mind's activity. If it turns out to be true that no functioning mental world exists apart from living brains, what difference does that make?
Doesn't it make sense for the mind to build a representation of the world that is 'world-like'? It enables us to consider relationships between objects and subjects in the world in the abstract, to consider the possibility and likelihood of avoiding dangers and exploiting opportunities. We can even use our mental representations to imagine utopian scenarios. The contribution of mental activity to our quality of life is unquestioned. But what difference does it make if our mental life arises biologically?
I'm trying to understand what you see as being at stake if it turns out that mental phenomena exist wholly in minds as a particular aspect of our biology. What do we have to give up under that view?
Doesn't it make sense for the mind to build a representation of the world that is 'world-like'? It enables us to consider relationships between objects and subjects in the world in the abstract, to consider the possibility and likelihood of avoiding dangers and exploiting opportunities. We can even use our mental representations to imagine utopian scenarios. The contribution of mental activity to our quality of life is unquestioned. But what difference does it make if our mental life arises biologically?
I'm trying to understand what you see as being at stake if it turns out that mental phenomena exist wholly in minds as a particular aspect of our biology. What do we have to give up under that view?
