Rosenberg's Argument Against Beliefs

[Angrboda]

In addition to other problems, this reduces to a proof by definition. If we define beliefs the way the author does, then no beliefs exist. Well, so what? I'm perfectly willing to accept that beliefs as the author defines them do not exist. That's not saying the same thing as that beliefs qua beliefs do not exist.

In addition to an implied reductio ad absurdum and equivocation, the author relies on what Dennett calls "an intuition pump." The argument relies on enhancing our perception of an intuition to the point that the intuition becomes sufficiently compelling to carry the burden of persuading us that some proposition which is implied by the contents of that intuition is true. In this case, the intuition that beliefs are "about" something is the intuition that is used. However, by admission, the author claims that he can't define it in terms of brain states. Again, so what? Are we to accept that he's trying to persuade us by way of an argument from ignorance, that because he can't do it, it can't be done? I doubt that. More to the point, I think you, Chad, are trying to persuade us by using an implied reductio ad absurdum, that beliefs obviously are "about" something, therefore the conclusion is absurd. However, since the reductio depends on accepting the truth of the intuition about beliefs, and not an explicit fact, it falls because what "aboutness" or intentionality means is never defined except perhaps by reference to the intuition. As an argument based on the truth of an intuition, the reductio is an irrational argument and any implied conclusions about the relationship between brain states and beliefs becomes a non sequitur.

There's a lot going wrong here, but it fails readily by referring to something that, by the author's own admission, he can't define materially. Which, in your hands, Chad, I suspect leads to the conclusion that non-material processes are at work. However, as noted, in addition to relying on the truth of an intuition, this is an argument from ignorance and thus fails accordingly. (Even if I granted the rest, the equivocation in premise 5 renders the syllogism invalid.)

(I wasn't going to contribute because this is one of those cases that prompted comments like Wolfgang Pauli's about something being so flawed that not only was it not right, it wasn't even wrong. I guess I'm feeling weak this morning. I will note for your benefit Chad that this appears to be another case in which you rely uncritically upon the mind's own testimony about its contents; if we are arguing about something outside of the mind, it's perfectly valid to rely on inter-subjective validity to carry the burden of proof; if what is at issue is the nature of the mind, we can't rely on the mind itself to settle the question of that nature, no matter how many times you try, nor how vehemently you insist that doing so is not special pleading or circular logic. It is.)

(ETA: I will also note that this is another case where you are playing both ends against the middle. If it is indeed the case that intentionality cannot be defined naturalistically, then premise 4/5 can never be made a rational fact; it will forever elude naturalistic definition and therefore the lynchpin itself can never form the basis of a logical, rational argument. Where exactly were you expecting to go with this, Chad?)