Thank you, Whateverist, for posing the question so succinctly. As you mentioned, I may have overreached elsewhere and the title of that thread produced too many tangents.
At this time, readers should understand that references I make to non-physical things, causes, or events, should not be construed as references to gods, the paranormal, or even Platonic forms. For the purpose of this discussion, I refer only to qualities associated with mental phenomena, like qualia and intentionality, as distinct from physical phenomena.
A common opinion among AF members is that these are just different ways of describing the same thing. To me that answer begs the question. By saying that subjective/objective distinctions refer to the same aspect of reality is to presume that one description reduces to the other without leaving any form of knowledge behind. But the objective description in no way coveys any of the qualitative aspects of the subjective experience. So I believe this opinion leaves much to be desired. In short, it does not explain everything that needs to be explained.
Here are some areas where I believe ignoring the relevance of the qualitative experience yields only a partial understanding of reality:
First, the validity of science presupposes kinds of knowledge, qualitative in nature, which cannot be derived solely from observation and inductive reasoning alone. For example, descriptions of physical things and processes are facts, they are not ‘about’ anything until assigned significance by an intelligent agent. Also, physical reality is continuous and seamless such that identification of any particular event as a ‘cause’ to a certain ‘effect’ tacitly assigns necessary teleological properties to the causal chain.
Secondly, reduction of qualitative knowledge to quantifiable knowledge produces category errors that lead to absurd conclusions, like attributing mental properties to simple mechanical operations or denying the existence of felt experience altogether. All talk about ‘emergent properties’ disguises this category error.
Finally, limiting our investigation of the world to only physical things and events precludes finding plausible links between the humanities and the natural sciences.
While this list is far from exhaustive and many examples will be needed to clarify each point, this should at least get the conversation started.
At this time, readers should understand that references I make to non-physical things, causes, or events, should not be construed as references to gods, the paranormal, or even Platonic forms. For the purpose of this discussion, I refer only to qualities associated with mental phenomena, like qualia and intentionality, as distinct from physical phenomena.
A common opinion among AF members is that these are just different ways of describing the same thing. To me that answer begs the question. By saying that subjective/objective distinctions refer to the same aspect of reality is to presume that one description reduces to the other without leaving any form of knowledge behind. But the objective description in no way coveys any of the qualitative aspects of the subjective experience. So I believe this opinion leaves much to be desired. In short, it does not explain everything that needs to be explained.
Here are some areas where I believe ignoring the relevance of the qualitative experience yields only a partial understanding of reality:
First, the validity of science presupposes kinds of knowledge, qualitative in nature, which cannot be derived solely from observation and inductive reasoning alone. For example, descriptions of physical things and processes are facts, they are not ‘about’ anything until assigned significance by an intelligent agent. Also, physical reality is continuous and seamless such that identification of any particular event as a ‘cause’ to a certain ‘effect’ tacitly assigns necessary teleological properties to the causal chain.
Secondly, reduction of qualitative knowledge to quantifiable knowledge produces category errors that lead to absurd conclusions, like attributing mental properties to simple mechanical operations or denying the existence of felt experience altogether. All talk about ‘emergent properties’ disguises this category error.
Finally, limiting our investigation of the world to only physical things and events precludes finding plausible links between the humanities and the natural sciences.
While this list is far from exhaustive and many examples will be needed to clarify each point, this should at least get the conversation started.