RE: Questions on the Kalam Cosmological argument
July 26, 2013 at 9:22 am
(This post was last modified: July 26, 2013 at 9:25 am by MindForgedManacle.)
(July 26, 2013 at 5:55 am)Consilius Wrote: To be 'spaceless' is to exist unhindered by space.
To be 'timeless' is to exist unhindered by time. That is the reason that a timeless thing cannot change in nature (a better term for 'changeless' here is 'immutable').
Again, that is incoherent. My point was that existence in any coherent sense would imply spatial occupance. If something exists 'spacelessly', then you're not making sense, since that is indistinguishable from not existing. And Craig is a nominalist, so he can't point to Platonism.
Quote:The actions of the thing being mentioned are spoken of as perceived by people. For instance, the God of the Bible would not have waited to part the Red Sea, but the Israelites of the Exodus would have seen Him perform the action around 2000 B.C.
Er, no. If a being is timeless (and therefore immutable), it cannot do anything, much less with intention. To say that it could would be to say that God could act such that things that didn't exist would be affected, which inescapably draws in a temporal framework.
Or more clearly, God can act even though acting necessitates distinct temporal moments to differentiate and allow them.
Quote:The inventor of the hammer made his tool without using a hammer, because he didn't need one.
The forces that made planet Earth did not have Earth when they made it, because planet Earth didn't exist yet. They did not need planet Earth to make planet Earth, and they did not need planet Earth to exist.
My mother didn't need my infant body to use to give birth to me with. Mostly because that would be disgusting.
A God wouldn't need flowers, people, the Sun, the Milky Way, space, or time to put these things into being.
Thank you.
I'd thank you as well, for completely missing the point. My point was that such is NOT a universal principle, hence my human argument. In other words, the creator of something has no necessity of being the opposite of its creations.
Your examples are fundamentally flawed here. Craig and co. explicitly state that since the KCA establishes that God created time, space, matter and energy, he therefore is not of those things. But the pre-Earth materials and hammer-making materials share most of their properties, and are not the opposite.
And given my objections to the coherence of a non-spatiotemporal 'existence', I think it holds.
