(August 8, 2013 at 2:17 pm)bennyboy Wrote: Okay. Now read the next paragraph in that wiki, which talks about the historical point of debate, and compare that with what I said about the history of this debate. Then look at the chart immediately to the right of what you quoted. Look familiar?(remember to comment on that page that they forgot to include "weak emergentism" and all the other very important considerations when making it)
Already read it. Now you try reading the next to next paragraph which indicates that historically it has been defined without reference to determinism .
(August 8, 2013 at 2:17 pm)bennyboy Wrote: I don't need to. There are things, and minds which perceive them. There's my mind, and the stuff I'm staring at outside the window. One is "me," one seems to be external to me. If they want me to accept that the subjective and objective sides of that perceptual relationship are reducible to a monism, they can go for it.
Do you believe that the subjective side is not reducible to monism?
(August 8, 2013 at 2:17 pm)bennyboy Wrote: Again, if there is a particular monist model which you want to argue for, go for it. I'm happy enough arguing against physical monism in generial. I can say that I would disagree with some of these theorists that their positions are monist at all, and with others that what they mean by "mind" is really what everyone else who has a mind means by that word.
I'm not arguing for a particular monist model, I'm arguing against your apparent understanding of monism. Specifically, your position that concepts such as mind or will are not valid concepts within monism.
(August 8, 2013 at 2:17 pm)bennyboy Wrote: I'm not going to study the whole field of current neurology and models of mind to engage in a forum debate. If you think you have one worth examining, then bring it forth; a wave of a hand and a list of 20 models that you want me to independently study isn't necessary, since I'm prepared to argue any physical monist position with a simple challenge: prove that any physical system is ACTUALLY aware in the way that I am (i.e. it doesn't just act as though it is aware), and do so without an operational definition that begs the question.
I'll make you a deal-- you link or quote anything you think I need to address, and I'll promise to read it on one condition: I get to quote the same amount of material to you, and you have to promise to read it just as diligently.
But again-- I think we should move this argument to a mind/matter thread.
You seem to be forgetting what this debate is about. We are not discussing which physical monist position most accurately describes reality. We are not talking about their individual pros and cons. What we are talking about is the validity of concepts like "mind", "self", "will" etc. within the monistic context.
You started this discussion by saying that those concepts are nonsensical within the monistic context. You accept that words can have different meanings within different worldviews and yet you reject the idea that words such as "self" or "will" can have valid meanings within the monistic worldview, without so much as understanding what meaning they take within the monistic context.
You are not required to study the whole fields of neurology and the model of mind - simply the part where they explain what they mean by "mind" or "will" or "self". And if you have any relevant information about why none of those meanings are valid then I'd be happy to consider those links from you.
So, go ahead. Show me that you understand what monist worldviews mean when they say "mind" or "will" and prove to me - using external links, if you must - why those definitions are invalid and/or nonsensical.
