(August 8, 2013 at 5:09 am)FifthElement Wrote:

(August 7, 2013 at 11:50 pm)bennyboy Wrote: ... You show me that emergent property, mind, which you say arises out of brains.

Emergence is a very complex subject.

Subatomic particles, for example, are not directly observable but they emerge into visible and measurable structures at macroscopic level

Emergence in the brain is not directly observable (mind, as you call it, conscience or yourself if you will) but what mind emerges from, is ... crazy isn't it ?

Anyways, we have a lot (and I mean A LOT) as humans to learn about emergence, especially the strong one, it is very elusive (even mysterious) phenomenon but certainly not a miracle.

I personaly believe that strong emergence is one of the fundamental properties of matter, we already know that weak one is, my hope is that chaos theory will pave the way in sorting this puzzle out sooner or later

I totally agree, and I'm guessing genkaus and everyone else here will agree on this as well. Supervenience and emergence are among the most important philosophical issues of the day.

My current take on it is that it's position-ambiguous. By that, I mean if you see the universe as a whole, and any division of it as just a conceptual imposition, then there's no way to have a system being "more than the sum of its parts," so to speak, since they were related from the start. But if you look at some regions of the universe as unique objects, as we normally do, then you can say, "There was no brain, now there's a brain, and that brain has caused the emergence of a mind," and from this perspective, it looks as though that emergent property is a bonus-- somehow, there is more to the universe than there was when all that carbon, hydrogen and oxygen was stuck in the ground, the water, and the air.

Too sleepy for paradox. Must watch Friends reruns until normality returns. . .

(August 7, 2013 at 11:50 pm)bennyboy Wrote: I don't reject God and fate, I discard them. I do this because nobodoy here is making a case for either of these (except of course in the OP lol). If anybody wants to make a serious case that gods can set our behavior, in the context of a free will discussion, then we can actually include that in the discussion.

Missed the point again. I was not criticizing your discarding of of the two cases, I was criticizing your limiting your consideration to the three.

(August 7, 2013 at 11:50 pm)bennyboy Wrote: Except all those things DID fall exactly as children of the first 3 categories I mentioned.

Yes - sub-categories - meaning not representing the categories themselves. Are you really not getting the difference?

(August 7, 2013 at 11:50 pm)bennyboy Wrote: My definition is "correct" because the words have always meant what I say they meant. Look to historical discussions of free will, or even to etymology of the words "free" and "will." This is not an arbitrary POSITION, it's just a knowledge of what those two words mean.

This is where you are wrong. Historical discussion of free-will is not limited to free-will vs determinism debate. Free-will is not historically defined as "not determinism" - that definition is only found within the context of that particular debate and not in other historical discussions or the words' etymology.

(August 7, 2013 at 11:50 pm)bennyboy Wrote: That being said, I acknowledge what you're saying: there are many world views, and depending on your world view, words can have various meanings. So, in a physical monist world view, will (if it means anything) means, and can only mean, the faculty of making decisions (based on both that world view and on one's emotional state, for example).

What I'm saying is that I do not accept that the words mind, will, etc. HAVE valid meanings in that kind of monism-- they are just euphemisms for brain function, and are better dropped than clung to.

Unfortunately, neither this view, nor your acceptance is considered applicable by anyone. What other words would you have replaced? Should we no longer talk about the 'self' because within the dualist view, 'self' referred to the spiritual you and there is no such thing within the monist philosophy? Should we stop referring to emotions and from now on, call them "neural activities in particular regions of the brain"?

(August 7, 2013 at 11:50 pm)bennyboy Wrote: Condescension much? If you want to pull out your philosophical pecker and measure it against mine, then there's always 1 vs. 1. Otherwise, let's stick to ideas rather than ad homs.

Its not condescension. I really wish you would study up on the monist position on the Philosophy of Mind. Explaining all the different positions taken by it would take too much time.

(August 7, 2013 at 11:50 pm)bennyboy Wrote: That's exactly what I'm saying.

That's the opposite of what you are saying.

(August 7, 2013 at 11:50 pm)bennyboy Wrote: Noooo. Brain function is measurable. I'm asking you to show me a mind. I'll show you red light, a property which emerges out of collections of particles which themselves have no color. You show me that emergent property, mind, which you say arises out of brains.

This is why I'm asking you to study up on the monist position. According to quite a few of them, brain function is mind. If you are looking at an FMRI with the memory section lighting up or the imagination sector lighting up, what you are seeing is that person's mind.

(August 8, 2013 at 9:56 am)genkaus Wrote: Missed the point again. I was not criticizing your discarding of of the two cases, I was criticizing your limiting your consideration to the three.

Yes - sub-categories - meaning not representing the categories themselves. Are you really not getting the difference?

A: We have to keep dogs off the runway!
B: What about beagles? You didn't say beagles!

Quote:This is where you are wrong. Historical discussion of free-will is not limited to free-will vs determinism debate. Free-will is not historically defined as "not determinism" - that definition is only found within the context of that particular debate and not in other historical discussions or the words' etymology.

I don't want to talk about freedom from swinging doors or exposure to tsetse flies. If you have a definition that is general enough to make interesting conversation, and specific enough to mean something, then bring it. I'm arguing against determinism because in my past experience, the free will argument is normally taken in that context.

Quote:

Quote:What I'm saying is that I do not accept that the words mind, will, etc. HAVE valid meanings in that kind of monism-- they are just euphemisms for brain function, and are better dropped than clung to.

Unfortunately, neither this view, nor your acceptance is considered applicable by anyone. What other words would you have replaced? Should we no longer talk about the 'self' because within the dualist view, 'self' referred to the spiritual you and there is no such thing within the monist philosophy? Should we stop referring to emotions and from now on, call them "neural activities in particular regions of the brain"?

Stop saying spiritual. Nobody's talking about that.

As for the other stuff: yes, absolutely. These are all subjective terms; they are all properties which only one person can interact with directly, and are not suitable for discussions of objective reality, aka science.

Don't want to drop all the feely-touchy language? That's because our actual experience of life ISN'T objective. Sentience isn't brain function, and feelings aren't hormones. Otherwise, we would in fact just look at a body as an organic machine: data in, processing in the brainomatic 2000, behavior out.

Quote:

(August 7, 2013 at 11:50 pm)bennyboy Wrote: Condescension much? If you want to pull out your philosophical pecker and measure it against mine, then there's always 1 vs. 1. Otherwise, let's stick to ideas rather than ad homs.

Its not condescension. I really wish you would study up on the monist position on the Philosophy of Mind. Explaining all the different positions taken by it would take too much time.

On Christian forums, I'm often told the same thing. I just don't "get" God, and I should open my heart and make my own discoveries. Well, I've outlined my argument, and defined the terms as I intend to use them. If you don't like those terms, you have the burden of stating which ones, specifically, represent YOUR position. Waving your hand and hinting that there are other positions one might take is pointless-- of course there are. So take one.

Quote:This is why I'm asking you to study up on the monist position. According to quite a few of them, brain function is mind. If you are looking at an FMRI with the memory section lighting up or the imagination sector lighting up, what you are seeing is that person's mind.

According to ALL physical monists that I've ever met, brain function is mind (or at least the mind is a byproduct of the brain). But it's a bullshit position. Mind is the awareness you have when you open your eyes in the morning, and know what it means to exist. You can say, "When patient X reports experience Y, we monitor increased blood flow in region Z." What you cannot do is prove that this active, speaking brain/body is actually experiencing anything, rather than just seeming to. That's because mind is personal and subjective, not objective; and it's why "brain function" cannot be allowed to be equated to "mind." You can't start a line of inquiry with a definition that so obviously begs the question.

Anyway, I think I already have a mind/matter thread open. This thread about determinism seems likely to get derailed by brain/mind talk, so I recommend moving this discussion there (if you even want to have it).

(August 8, 2013 at 10:42 am)bennyboy Wrote: A: We have to keep dogs off the runway!
B: What about beagles? You didn't say beagles!

Okay, so you don't get the difference. This should make it clearer:

A: We have to keep dogs off the runway!
B: Invalid rule. K-9 unit is required to be on the runway.

(August 8, 2013 at 10:42 am)bennyboy Wrote: I don't want to talk about freedom from swinging doors or exposure to tsetse flies. If you have a definition that is general enough to make interesting conversation, and specific enough to mean something, then bring it. I'm arguing against determinism because in my past experience, the free will argument is normally taken in that context.

Here's from the wiki:

Free will is the ability of agents to make choices unconstrained by certain factors. Factors of historical concern have included metaphysical constraints (such as logical, nomological, or theological determinism), physical constraints (such as chains or imprisonment), social constraints (such as threat of punishment or censure, or structural constraints), and mental constraints (such as compulsions or phobias, neurological disorders, or genetic predispositions).

General enough for you?

(August 8, 2013 at 10:42 am)bennyboy Wrote: Stop saying spiritual. Nobody's talking about that.

The dualists are.

(August 8, 2013 at 10:42 am)bennyboy Wrote: As for the other stuff: yes, absolutely. These are all subjective terms; they are all properties which only one person can interact with directly, and are not suitable for discussions of objective reality, aka science.

Don't want to drop all the feely-touchy language? That's because our actual experience of life ISN'T objective. Sentience isn't brain function, and feelings aren't hormones. Otherwise, we would in fact just look at a body as an organic machine: data in, processing in the brainomatic 2000, behavior out.

Good luck convincing monists to accept your argument.

(August 8, 2013 at 10:42 am)bennyboy Wrote: On Christian forums, I'm often told the same thing. I just don't "get" God, and I should open my heart and make my own discoveries. Well, I've outlined my argument, and defined the terms as I intend to use them. If you don't like those terms, you have the burden of stating which ones, specifically, represent YOUR position. Waving your hand and hinting that there are other positions one might take is pointless-- of course there are. So take one.

Few problems with that:

I'm not asking you to open your heart, I'm asking you to open your mind. I'm not hinting at other positions, I'm telling you that there are other positions and I'm telling you where you can find them.

In this discussion, you are criticizing the monist position as invalid without actually understanding what the monist position is. You are outlining your argument using your own definitions (which, btw, is your primary argument against the monist position), without any regard for how those definitions apply to the monist positions.

Go here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_...dy_problem. Figure out what the monist position actually is and then evaluate which criticisms apply to it.

(August 8, 2013 at 10:42 am)bennyboy Wrote: According to ALL physical monists that I've ever met, brain function is mind (or at least the mind is a byproduct of the brain). But it's a bullshit position. Mind is the awareness you have when you open your eyes in the morning, and know what it means to exist. You can say, "When patient X reports experience Y, we monitor increased blood flow in region Z." What you cannot do is prove that this active, speaking brain/body is actually experiencing anything, rather than just seeming to. That's because mind is personal and subjective, not objective; and it's why "brain function" cannot be allowed to be equated to "mind." You can't start a line of inquiry with a definition that so obviously begs the question.

That's what I've been trying to tell you. According to the monist position, you can prove that this active, speaking brain/body is experiencing something. There are quite specific explanations for things like "awareness", "experience" or "consciousness" within the monist position. Explanations which are available for you to study and evaluate. Refusing to do so while criticizing the strawman of that position does no-one any favors.

(August 8, 2013 at 11:52 am)genkaus Wrote: Here's from the wiki:

Free will is the ability of agents to make choices unconstrained by certain factors. Factors of historical concern have included metaphysical constraints (such as logical, nomological, or theological determinism), physical constraints (such as chains or imprisonment), social constraints (such as threat of punishment or censure, or structural constraints), and mental constraints (such as compulsions or phobias, neurological disorders, or genetic predispositions).

General enough for you?

Okay. Now read the next paragraph in that wiki, which talks about the historical point of debate, and compare that with what I said about the history of this debate. Then look at the chart immediately to the right of what you quoted. Look familiar? (remember to comment on that page that they forgot to include "weak emergentism" and all the other very important considerations when making it)

Quote:Good luck convincing monists to accept your argument.

I don't need to. There are things, and minds which perceive them. There's my mind, and the stuff I'm staring at outside the window. One is "me," one seems to be external to me. If they want me to accept that the subjective and objective sides of that perceptual relationship are reducible to a monism, they can go for it.

Quote:In this discussion, you are criticizing the monist position as invalid without actually understanding what the monist position is. You are outlining your argument using your own definitions (which, btw, is your primary argument against the monist position), without any regard for how those definitions apply to the monist positions.

Go here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_...dy_problem. Figure out what the monist position actually is and then evaluate which criticisms apply to it.

Again, if there is a particular monist model which you want to argue for, go for it. I'm happy enough arguing against physical monism in generial: not so much as a contendor for reality, but as a proven (or even provable) champion. I can say though after paging through the main points that I would disagree with some of these theorists that their positions are monist at all, and with others that what they mean by "mind" is really what everyone else who has a mind means by that word.

(August 8, 2013 at 10:42 am)bennyboy Wrote: That's what I've been trying to tell you. According to the monist position, you can prove that this active, speaking brain/body is experiencing something. There are quite specific explanations for things like "awareness", "experience" or "consciousness" within the monist position. Explanations which are available for you to study and evaluate. Refusing to do so while criticizing the strawman of that position does no-one any favors.

I'm not going to study the whole field of current neurology and models of mind to engage in a forum debate. If you think you have one worth examining, then bring it forth; a wave of a hand and a list of 20 models that you want me to independently study isn't necessary, since I'm prepared to argue any physical monist position with a simple challenge: prove that any physical system is ACTUALLY aware in the way that I am (i.e. it doesn't just act as though it is aware), and do so without an operational definition that begs the question. I don't believe it has been done, or can be.

I'll make you a deal-- you link or quote anything you think I need to address, and I'll promise to read it on one condition: I get to quote the same amount of material to you, and you have to promise to read it just as diligently. But again-- I think we should move this argument to a mind/matter thread.

(August 8, 2013 at 2:17 pm)bennyboy Wrote: Okay. Now read the next paragraph in that wiki, which talks about the historical point of debate, and compare that with what I said about the history of this debate. Then look at the chart immediately to the right of what you quoted. Look familiar? (remember to comment on that page that they forgot to include "weak emergentism" and all the other very important considerations when making it)

Already read it. Now you try reading the next to next paragraph which indicates that historically it has been defined without reference to determinism .

(August 8, 2013 at 2:17 pm)bennyboy Wrote: I don't need to. There are things, and minds which perceive them. There's my mind, and the stuff I'm staring at outside the window. One is "me," one seems to be external to me. If they want me to accept that the subjective and objective sides of that perceptual relationship are reducible to a monism, they can go for it.

Do you believe that the subjective side is not reducible to monism?

(August 8, 2013 at 2:17 pm)bennyboy Wrote: Again, if there is a particular monist model which you want to argue for, go for it. I'm happy enough arguing against physical monism in generial. I can say that I would disagree with some of these theorists that their positions are monist at all, and with others that what they mean by "mind" is really what everyone else who has a mind means by that word.

I'm not arguing for a particular monist model, I'm arguing against your apparent understanding of monism. Specifically, your position that concepts such as mind or will are not valid concepts within monism.

(August 8, 2013 at 2:17 pm)bennyboy Wrote: I'm not going to study the whole field of current neurology and models of mind to engage in a forum debate. If you think you have one worth examining, then bring it forth; a wave of a hand and a list of 20 models that you want me to independently study isn't necessary, since I'm prepared to argue any physical monist position with a simple challenge: prove that any physical system is ACTUALLY aware in the way that I am (i.e. it doesn't just act as though it is aware), and do so without an operational definition that begs the question.

I'll make you a deal-- you link or quote anything you think I need to address, and I'll promise to read it on one condition: I get to quote the same amount of material to you, and you have to promise to read it just as diligently.

But again-- I think we should move this argument to a mind/matter thread.

You seem to be forgetting what this debate is about. We are not discussing which physical monist position most accurately describes reality. We are not talking about their individual pros and cons. What we are talking about is the validity of concepts like "mind", "self", "will" etc. within the monistic context.

You started this discussion by saying that those concepts are nonsensical within the monistic context. You accept that words can have different meanings within different worldviews and yet you reject the idea that words such as "self" or "will" can have valid meanings within the monistic worldview, without so much as understanding what meaning they take within the monistic context.

You are not required to study the whole fields of neurology and the model of mind - simply the part where they explain what they mean by "mind" or "will" or "self". And if you have any relevant information about why none of those meanings are valid then I'd be happy to consider those links from you.

So, go ahead. Show me that you understand what monist worldviews mean when they say "mind" or "will" and prove to me - using external links, if you must - why those definitions are invalid and/or nonsensical.

Genakus,

I am saying that any definition of Libertarianism that implies that chance can be "free-will" is useless and one's that claim "free-will" without chance is contradictory.

I am not close minded, I stated what I believe to be the issue, in my opinion. If you believe I am not entitled that opinion without being close minded, then you are close minded, in my opinion.

"Free will" has a large effect on what our moral responsibility ultimately is.

Either we are ultimately entirely determined or NOT.

The "NOT" part demonstrates a true dichotomy when combined with the "ultimately" part filtering out us being partly determined and partly undetermined.

The point is, in either case we are not free in the ridiculous way that many laypeople believe; such ridiculous ways, like religion, can case harm. People believing that people are more responsible that they are, for example.

(August 8, 2013 at 5:08 pm)HalcyonicTrust Wrote: Genakus,

Why does everyone keep spelling my name wrong?

(August 8, 2013 at 5:08 pm)HalcyonicTrust Wrote: I am saying that any definition of Libertarianism that implies that chance can be "free-will" is useless and one's that claim "free-will" without chance is contradictory.

I am not close minded, I stated what I believe to be the issue, in my opinion. If you believe I am not entitled that opinion without being close minded, then you are close minded, in my opinion.

You are entitled to your opinion. What you are not entitled to is assuming your opinion is a fact and arguing from that assumption.

Libertarians don't see "chance as free-will" definition as useless and other libertarians don't regard "free-will without chance" as contradictory. Neither is an established position, but if you enter a debate which presumes libertarian definition then trying to interject another definition makes for an invalid argument.

(August 8, 2013 at 5:08 pm)HalcyonicTrust Wrote: "Free will" has a large effect on what our moral responsibility ultimately is.

It does. But moral responsibility is defined simultaneously with free-will.

(August 8, 2013 at 5:08 pm)HalcyonicTrust Wrote: Either we are ultimately entirely determined or NOT.

The "NOT" part demonstrates a true dichotomy when combined with the "ultimately" part filtering out us being partly determined and partly undetermined.

Just out of curiosity, how do you think your arguments apply to a dualist worldview?

(August 8, 2013 at 2:49 pm)genkaus Wrote: Do you believe that the subjective side is not reducible to monism?

Personally, if I had the job of choosing only a monism, I'd go with some kind of idealism. I already know that I can perceive objects with only my mind, in the form of dreams, and I can conceive of a great mind which also contains the rules of physics.

But you should stop saying monism. My position is that a PHYSICAL monism is incompatible with any sensible definition of mind, or of free will.

Quote:I'm not arguing for a particular monist model, I'm arguing against your apparent understanding of monism. Specifically, your position that concepts such as mind or will are not valid concepts within monism.

PHYSICAL monism. I'm starting to feel suspicious that you're trying to set me up with a strawman.

Quote:You are not required to study the whole fields of neurology and the model of mind - simply the part where they explain what they mean by "mind" or "will" or "self". And if you have any relevant information about why none of those meanings are valid then I'd be happy to consider those links from you.

So, go ahead. Show me that you understand what monist worldviews mean when they say "mind" or "will" and prove to me - using external links, if you must - why those definitions are invalid and/or nonsensical.

Get real. There are thousands of models of the mind, and there may be as many definitions of will. This was originally your point, I believe.

I'm saying I believe I can reduce ALL physical monisms down to a simple test: I want you to produce ONE (1) example of a physical monism which both:
1) can prove that any physical system ACTUALLY experiences, as I do when I open my eyes in the morning
2) doesn't define mind in operational terms that beg the quesiton

If (1) fails, the theory is insufficient; if (2) fails, then nothing has been learned except that the redefiner wants to avoid the philosophical issues of dualism.

I believe all physical monist positions will fail both tests. But I'm not going to play the shell game where I refute one physical monist idea, and you say, "Yeah but what about the other 99, and others you don't know about, and that maybe haven't been invented yet?" Unless you have a model that passes my test, then none of the definitions used in those models is acceptable.

(August 8, 2013 at 7:54 pm)bennyboy Wrote: Personally, if I had the job of choosing only a monism, I'd go with some kind of idealism. I already know that I can perceive objects with only my mind, in the form of dreams, and I can conceive of a great mind which also contains the rules of physics.

Ok.

(August 8, 2013 at 7:54 pm)bennyboy Wrote: But you should stop saying monism. My position is that a PHYSICAL monism is incompatible with any sensible definition of mind, or of free will.

PHYSICAL monism. I'm starting to feel suspicious that you're trying to set me up with a strawman.

I'm simply choosing convenience over accuracy. Within the context of this argument, when I say monism, I mean physical monism. Feel free to quote me on this anytime you feel like I'm building a strawman.

(August 8, 2013 at 7:54 pm)bennyboy Wrote: Get real. There are thousands of models of the mind, and there may be as many definitions of will. This was originally your point, I believe.

I'm saying I believe I can reduce ALL physical monisms down to a simple test: I want you to produce ONE (1) example of a physical monism which both:
1) can prove that any physical system ACTUALLY experiences, as I do when I open my eyes in the morning
2) doesn't define mind in operational terms that beg the quesiton

If (1) fails, the theory is insufficient; if (2) fails, then nothing has been learned except that the redefiner wants to avoid the philosophical issues of dualism.

I believe all physical monist positions will fail both tests. But I'm not going to play the shell game where I refute one physical monist idea, and you say, "Yeah but what about the other 99, and others you don't know about, and that maybe haven't been invented yet?" Unless you have a model that passes my test, then none of the definitions used in those models is acceptable.

Yes, I got what you believe 5 posts ago. And what I'm saying is that if you took the time to actually read and understand even a few of the physical monist positions, you'd understand why your so called "simple test" is an egregious example of begging the question and why it is not applicable to any of the physical monist positions. The point of you studying the monist positions is not for you to refute each and everyone of them but to understand what you are arguing against and therefore why your current arguments are inapplicable.

The reason why your test itself is invalid is as follows:

Your first requirement is that the monist position should prove that any physical system actually experiences the way you do when you wake up in the morning. However, the basic premise of physical monism is that everything is a physical system - including you, me and the rest of the humanity. Which means, you yourself are the example of a physical system that experiences the way you do. Which is why this argument is
a non-starter. The only way to counter this argument is by the assumption that "you" are more than a physical system. Which is basically disagreeing with premise of physical monism, i.e. assuming that "not everything is a physical system" and using that assumption to "disprove" physical monism.

Similarly, your second criteria assumes that the dualist definition of mind or free-will is the "correct" definition and therefore, any operational definition of mind is equivalent to begging the question. But, this assumption is incorrect, which you'd realize if you actually took time to study the different views on the philosophy of mind. The most comprehensive and generic definitions of "mind" or "will" are philosophically neutral - they do not imply or favor a particular worldview such as dualism or monism. They are as applicable within monist context as they are within dualist one, though with quite different implications. However, the change in implications does not mean that the particular monist philosopher is redefining the word to avoid philosophical issues. And this is something you'd realize if you actually tried to understand how the word is used within different physicalist viewpoints.