Monist vs. Dualist Experiment?

[genkaus]

Overdetermination, epiphenominalism, and evolutionary impotence for a start.

Post-hoc rationalizations do not count as philosophical reasons. Given that the causation of qualia has not been determined yet, your determination that it is over-determined has no basis other than presumption of dualism. Similarly, epiphenomenalism is not a position uniquely representative of monism - therefore cannot be regarded as a reason for its rejection, even if you had valid reasons to reject epiphenomenalism itself. And what does "evolutionary impotence" even mean?

I'm not looking to debate the adequacy of my analogy. I'm looking for an experiement.

You were given one. Read the rest.

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Let's assume, since we're talking about dualism, that the existence of a physical universe is taken as given, and we're trying to decide if there's also a mental component to the universe independent of the physical. Now, let's look at the supposed timing of qualia as they are experienced, and the brain functions that "cause" them.

If the qualia precede the brain functions, the qualia may cause them but not vice versa.
If the brain functions precede the qualia, the brain functions may cause them but not vice versa.
If they are simultaneous, then there's no causal relationship: they are different properties of the same thing, or are caused by different properties of the same thing.

To a certain degree, it's a chicken-and-egg game. Clearly, some qualia are preceded by some brain function and vice versa. Due to brain function, I wake up and begin sensing my environment. Due to my experience of stressed feelings, I make a choice to meditate, and my brain function is modified. But the one issue that breaks that causal chain is sleep. Since brain function continues during sleep, but the experience of qualia does not, then it seems probably that it is the brain function which allows qualia, rather than the qualia which establish brain function.

HOWEVER there's a problem: by definition, if brain function always precedes qualia, then they are not the same. At the exact moment of experience, at least part of the brain function must be identical to the experience. To do an experiment to establish this, you'd have to prove that my experience of a red apple and the brain function of my experience of a red apple are EXACTLY simultaneous. However, in science, you only have precise access to brain function-- so you cannot establish simultaneity without begging the question (i.e. just saying that one is the other, without actually proving it)

Perhaps some kind of interference technique, like that used to determine the speed of light, might one day be used: use electricity to directly stimulate specific nerve systems, while also showing light to a person's eyes, etc. and precisely measuring the rate at which signals propagate through the brain. For example, if you know the exact time it takes the brain to process "blue," and then you artificially stimulate a neural system that makes the subject experience "red," the subject may be able to subjectively report something about their color perception that is useful: "The last color I saw was definitely red" or "the red seemed to fade more quickly than the blue" or whatever.

Right now, that's so far out of the possible that it's basically sci-fi speculation, but I can imagine experiments that would provide useful results while maintaining the need to study qualia (i.e. by interfacing directly with the subjective reports of the subject rather than making assumptions about measurements taken of the brain alone) independently of brain function.

A few points you might want to be careful about:

1. Given your three possibilities - brain function precedes qualia, qualia, precedes brain function or they are simultaneous - you've, at the outset, defined them as distinct entities with different natures. Given that, your statement "At the exact moment of experience, at least part of the brain function must be identical to the experience" becomes nonsensical.

2. Don't confuse causal precedence with temporal precedence. For example, the speed of my car is caused by how fast the wheels are spinning. But both events are temporally simultaneous, even though causally, one precedes the other. Which is why, qualia and brain functions being temporally simultaneous does not imply anything regarding their causal relation.