Monist vs. Dualist Experiment?

[genkaus]

The reason I'm not sure is that there are multiple possibilities , and I do not know which one represents truth. I'm agnostic.

Now, clearly brain function and brain structure are related to the existence and nature of qualia. However, whether it is a property of an organic brain, or of a certain kind of data processing, or something else entirely, is not known to me, and I suspect may not be knowable

Are you similarly "agnostic" about 9/11? Or about the moon-landing? What about healing through prayer?

When, among all the so-called "multiple possibilities", only one explanation has the evidence to back it up while the others are not even intelligible, then saying that not only you don't know, but you cannot know is intellectually dishonest. At the very least, you should accept that while you cannot know, others can.

It depends what you mean by brain function. I refer to the total mechanism of the brain: the release and absorption of neurotransmitters in large numbers, the way in which neurons branch out to form networks of communication, the interaction between chemical properties and the flow of electricity, etc.

Since I don't know which of these mechanisms are required for qualia, then it's not safe just to say that "the machine saw a red traffic light and stopped. Therefore it is experiencing qualia." Maybe it is, and maybe it isn't.

Are any of the mechanisms listed here unique to a biological medium?

But, let's get this straight - you don't know which of these mechanisms is required for qualia because you don't have an explanation for what qualia is. But that is something you claim that you not only don't know, but you cannot know.Which means you can never know which of these mechanisms is required for qualia and thus not know whether or not a machine is experiencing qualia.

So, given that the machine sees a red light and stops, on what basis do you assume that it doesn't experience?

You can define things however you want. But the real question is this-- can you demonstrate that your idea represents reality? You are throwing around a lot of "IS" statements, as though your ideas are foregone conclusions. That is, quite simply, not the case.

Don't make me repeat myself. I've stated at the outset that this is my hypothesis about what qualia is. It fits the evidence we have so far and it jives with the generic view on the subject - but I've never stated it as an established fact.

I think we're back to our stand off, here. I do not accept your definition of qualia, as that word is quite specifically reserved to talk about the subjective experience of an entity, rather than its behaviors. It doesn't matter what a machine says or does, what matters is whether it experiences as I do.

And here we go with straw-manning. I AM talking about the subjective experience of an entity. When I say qualia. I mean the "subjective experience of an entity". When I say "qualia is a specific form of self-referential data-processing", I'm given an explanation about why and how an entity experiences subjectively. When I talk about behavior, I'm talking about actions consequent of the entity experiencing subjectivity. We've been through this before, so there should be no reason for you to "misunderstand".