Monist vs. Dualist Experiment?

[genkaus]

First, please don't use the words "intellectually dishonest." They are overused, and assumed by all parties. Everyone in a debate thinks this at some point: "Either this guy is stupid, or he's deliberately refusing to accept my obviously-true idea." However, saying it isn't a very good debate tactic-- it's a much better way to have people lose interest in debating you.

Your intellectual dishonesty isn't about being stupid or disagreeing with me - its about the inconsistent application of your own ideas about knowledge. Because you can't directly observe the subjective experience of another person, you claim that the existence of qualia and the nature of its existence in others is unknown and unknowable and yet, where other not-directly-observable phenomena are concerned, you regard them as both knowable and known. So, I don't care if the words "intellectually dishonest" are overused or if you don't like it, if I see it happening, I'll call you on it.

Second, all the things you mentioned are directly observable. I don't have to make philosophical assumptions about other people's subjective awareness to know that planes crashed into buildings, or to figure out that people who pray are no better off than people who don't.

No, they're not. Not unless you were in New-York on 9/11 or on the moon at landing or with the person who prays. You are making the philosophical assumption that material evidence is a valid method for gaining knowledge about those things and you are rejecting the the same philosophical assumption when it comes to other people's subjective awareness.

Finally, with regard to qualia, here's what I know:
I experience qualia.
I have a brain.
The brain functions in certain ways (self-referential thinking etc.)
When I'm not experiencing qualia, my brain isn't functioning in those ways (I'm assuming based on second-hand observations, here).

Given this, your idea that brain function is qualia is a reasonable theory to try. However, it's not exclusive. There are in fact several plausible ideas to consider:

1) ONLY gross functions are necessary for qualia (i.e. input->black box-> output is sufficient, and the specific mechanism doesn't matter so long as it involves both self-reference and environmental awareness). This is your idea, I think.
2) The gross functions AND the specific physiology of an organic brain are necessary for qualia (i.e. qualia can supervene on the function of neurons, but not on that of other structures)

These two possibilities are not alternative to my explanation. In both cases qualia is brain function, just in latter case, that function becomes inherent to physiology. Further, here is where the evidence train stops. The evidence we currently have for subjective experiences, supports one of these two possibilities.

3) Qualia are associated with all configurations of matter and energy, i.e. they are not supervenient on either specific physical configurations nor specific kinds of data processing-- but the FORMS we appreciate and take interest in require an interaction of a great number of these "qualia particles." This conforms well to physics, where individual particles are highly elusive to us, but the courser forms they take on (like billiard balls or stars) have a collective meaning to us.

That's not plausible at all. Quale are mental phenomena, i.e. they require a mind in order to exist and mind does not exist in all configurations of matter and energy.

And these are all just physical monist explanations. Add in solipsism, idealism, dualism, and other inescapable philosophical possibilities, and agnosticism is looking pretty good.

And evolution is just the scientific explanation. Add in Biblical creationism, Vedic creationism and Raelianism and suddenly, agnosticism is looking pretty good.

Both position have the same failing - only one of the so called "philosophical possibilities" have any evidence for it.

Yes. Neurotransmitters and neurons are both limited to a biological medium.

You mean their function cannot be replicated using non-organic media?

As I explained, I start with my self, and extend the likelihood of qualia to other people, to other mammals, and to other animals, because we share not only some similar behaviors (like expression of emotion), but also the mechanism of the brain. On the most fundamental level, everything I accept to have qualia is at least living.

Now, if you made artificial DNA (maybe we will be able to model DNA in a computer one day and "print" it), and managed to produce something mechanically identical to a simple organism, then I'd really have to wonder if it experienced qulia. I think I'd probably give it the benefit of the doubt.

This is where your assumptions about "knowledge" get in the way. Here, where you should have concluded reasonable knowledge, instead, you end up on an assumption.

Your argument:
P1: I have direct access to my own experience but not to anyone else's.
C1: Therefore, I can only know that I am capable of experiencing qualia, but not anyone else.
P2: Others have similar physiological structure to mine, display similar behavior, similar emotions and so on.
C2: Given C1, I cannot know that they experience, but given P2, I can assume they do.

The problem here is C1. An examination of your own psyche should reveal to you that a lot of your behaviors - specifically, developing desires and acting on them - require your subjective experience. These can, therefore, be regarded as evidence for the existence of qualia and if others display similar behavior then their being capable of subjective experience is not an assumption but a conclusion based on evidence.

You still haven't explained how you can test your hypothesis, rather than just assuming it.

I have explained it - not only in the very first post but in the other threads where we discussed this topic as well.

So far, there's only a false syllogism:
-Wherever there's qualia, certain kinds of data processing are found. Therefore, wherever those kinds of data processing are found, there's necessarily qualia.
-Wherever there's a dog, a tail can be found. Therefore wherever a tail can be found, there's necessarily a dog.

Another strawman - you are missing the crucial middle step.