Monist vs. Dualist Experiment?

[genkaus]

You've just defined subjective experience, and you're asking why it isn't objective.

Actually, that's not how subjective experience is defined. Try again.

You're saying that qualia is a brute fact, but interpretation of the CONTENT is not. And yet you are using your interpretation of the content of your qualia to establish that it also exists in others.

Fair enough. Given that my interpretation is based on the brute fact of qualia, it would mean that either I have correctly interpreted which would make it an objective fact or I've made an error in my interpretation. Since my interpretation is that my goal-directed behavior is the result of my capacity for my capacity for subjective experience, saying that its incorrect implies that is not the case. Which means, my subjective experience happens to be incidental and irrelevant and has no actual effect on my behavior - is that the position you are arguing for?

The difference is that in the case of 9/11, we're only talking about planes, not the underlying reality of planes; seeing the image is enough to say, "Look. A plane!" In the case of using behavior to establish qualia, we're not just talking about whether I believe someone "really" smiled or "really" said they enjoyed my waffles or something. We're talking about inferences about what UNDERLIES those behaviors. It's an unlike process.

Wrong. In case of 9/11, we are not - repeat not - talking about the planes or their underlying reality. What we are talking about is the video of 2 planes flying into the tower and the underlying reality of that video. That is what makes this an apt comparison. You are inferring the actuality of 9/11 from that video the same way I am inferring the existence of qualia from behavior. You do not have the direct access to that event and I do not have the access to qualia.

All philosophical assumptions are arbitrary. If you could "validate" them, they wouldn't be assumptions, they'd be facts.

An erroneous assumption that gave rise to many ridiculous philosophies over the years.

Because my doubt that robots are really experiencing the redness of red or any other qualia is the positive assertion, here?

Your denial of their capacity for subjective experience is.

Since I only accept qualia in others based on a philosophical assumption, and since robots are unlike me in many important ways, then I cannot know whether they have qualia or not. I can only go on a hunch that they do not.

Since its "just an assumption", why not assume the opposite?

You tell me. You are the one asserting that wherever certain functions exist, there is necessarily qualia.

And what does that have to do with energy transmutation?

Neurons function. So do neurotransmitters and hormonones. So do atoms and QM particles. So do brain parts. So does the brain. So does the mind. Human beings have all of these layers of function working together. Given both qualia and physical monism, then all these things are known to be sufficient for qualia to be experienced. I would categorize neuronal function as part of brain function, so if there are no neurons, there's no brain, and no brain function.

It is not known that taking any of these layers of function out would still leave us with qualia.

Two things:
1. We don't know yet precisely which function is required or sufficient - but we do know that function at cellular level is insufficient. Thus, my rejection of "atomic qualia".
2. We won't be taking away any of those layers of function without replacing them with equivalent ones.