GENKAUS
First, there is a problem with concluding that intelligent behavior is always a sign of actual intelligence. Not long ago, the ability to play chess was considered intelligent behavior. Today, very few people would consider any chess program intelligent, particularly one based on brute force. Then we have the Turing test. Some early testers were fooled by simple programs like EllaZ, made with only 200 lines of BASIC. Determining if something is actually intelligent or merely simulating intelligence is a judgment call based on very vague criteria. If you maintain that a clever brute force program can be conscious, then we are at a standstill. Your speculation counterbalances my incredulity.
But even if you decide that a machine is actually intelligent, concluding that its intelligence is accompanied by qualia is even more speculative. A system whose function it is to perform symbolic operations to produces other symbols does not require qualia, no matter how beautifully it dances and spins. You have no reason to suppose that it would. While it is true that humans, calculators, and abacuses can all perform symbolic operations, they clearly do so in a vastly different ways. Those differences are sufficient for doubting whether the mere ability to manipulate data qualifies as the criteria for whether a physical system experiences qualia.
You seem unwilling to distinguish between signs (the outward form of a text or image) and their significance (the meaning, or content, of a text or image). For example, the English word ‘dog’ has the same meaning as ‘le chien’ does in French.
A machine code, like EllaZ, is capable of manipulating symbols according to English syntax and spelling without any understanding of what those symbols signify. Without readers to interpret the results, symbols have no meaningful content.
You also seem to think that one machine process can serve as the “reader” for another machine process. That position, if it is one you hold, pushes the problem back without solving anything. You have no point where you can inject meaning into the system. For example, if you write the word “red” on a piece of paper, it has no meaning to a person that only understands French. Redness is not in the text. Likewise meaning is not IN the symbols that go into or come out of a machine.
Finally, consider the difference between an artist and a digital camera connected to a color printer. A camera can take data from the visual field, translate it into a set of instructions send it to the printer for reproduction, and thereby making a colored piece of paper simulating the view. This set-up can do so completely without any understanding. But when an artist does nearly the same thing with artistic media, he/she works with a content rich impression to produce a meaningful product, even though the reasoning and bodily processes that allow the artist to create happen just below the conscious awareness of the artist. In terms of input and output, the camera/printer is functionally equivalent to the artist. Again, if you maintain that outward behavior can be taken as an indication consciousness, then we are at a standstill. Your speculation counterbalances my incredulity.
First, there is a problem with concluding that intelligent behavior is always a sign of actual intelligence. Not long ago, the ability to play chess was considered intelligent behavior. Today, very few people would consider any chess program intelligent, particularly one based on brute force. Then we have the Turing test. Some early testers were fooled by simple programs like EllaZ, made with only 200 lines of BASIC. Determining if something is actually intelligent or merely simulating intelligence is a judgment call based on very vague criteria. If you maintain that a clever brute force program can be conscious, then we are at a standstill. Your speculation counterbalances my incredulity.
But even if you decide that a machine is actually intelligent, concluding that its intelligence is accompanied by qualia is even more speculative. A system whose function it is to perform symbolic operations to produces other symbols does not require qualia, no matter how beautifully it dances and spins. You have no reason to suppose that it would. While it is true that humans, calculators, and abacuses can all perform symbolic operations, they clearly do so in a vastly different ways. Those differences are sufficient for doubting whether the mere ability to manipulate data qualifies as the criteria for whether a physical system experiences qualia.
You seem unwilling to distinguish between signs (the outward form of a text or image) and their significance (the meaning, or content, of a text or image). For example, the English word ‘dog’ has the same meaning as ‘le chien’ does in French.
A machine code, like EllaZ, is capable of manipulating symbols according to English syntax and spelling without any understanding of what those symbols signify. Without readers to interpret the results, symbols have no meaningful content.
You also seem to think that one machine process can serve as the “reader” for another machine process. That position, if it is one you hold, pushes the problem back without solving anything. You have no point where you can inject meaning into the system. For example, if you write the word “red” on a piece of paper, it has no meaning to a person that only understands French. Redness is not in the text. Likewise meaning is not IN the symbols that go into or come out of a machine.
Finally, consider the difference between an artist and a digital camera connected to a color printer. A camera can take data from the visual field, translate it into a set of instructions send it to the printer for reproduction, and thereby making a colored piece of paper simulating the view. This set-up can do so completely without any understanding. But when an artist does nearly the same thing with artistic media, he/she works with a content rich impression to produce a meaningful product, even though the reasoning and bodily processes that allow the artist to create happen just below the conscious awareness of the artist. In terms of input and output, the camera/printer is functionally equivalent to the artist. Again, if you maintain that outward behavior can be taken as an indication consciousness, then we are at a standstill. Your speculation counterbalances my incredulity.
