Modal logic of possibly necessarily, then necessarily is actually just a way to state if something can possibly be necessarily in all possible worlds, then it exists necessarily in the actual world as well must exist in all possible worlds.
What you have to keep in mind, to shown to be possibly necessarily in all possible worlds, you have to first prove it is so in this world, and must be so in all worlds. Now that kind of sounds a waste of time, but the modal logic was meant just to show that in logic these statements are equal, and the more you think about it, the more you realize they are.
Now the argument with God is that it's being said to be a necessary truth. Like for example, the angles in a triangle adding up to 180 is a necessary truth in all worlds. We know this because it's possible in all possible worlds, and it's necessary truth in each possible world.
There are somethings that aren't necessarily so in all possible worlds, like, a decision I make.
Also properties that are changeable and could be different would not be a necessary possible thing in all possible worlds.
If God is defined to be a necessary being, then it would follow all his properties are such that they aren't changeable and also are necessary characteristics. This is already narrows the possibility of a necessary being to one. It can't have one colour over another, or one shape over another, because those aren't necessary. It's qualities rather must be necessary qualities.
Does this argument really prove God? I don't think so personally. Because it seems with every other necessary thing, we first know of it being true in this world, before we say it's true in all possible worlds. This one is trying to reverse the step, and showing that it being possible in all possible worlds, it would be so in this world. But what you have to show is that it would be so in every possible world, not that it's only possible so in every possible world. Or otherwise, it's not possibly necessarily, but possibly that, which is a different premise.
What you have to keep in mind, to shown to be possibly necessarily in all possible worlds, you have to first prove it is so in this world, and must be so in all worlds. Now that kind of sounds a waste of time, but the modal logic was meant just to show that in logic these statements are equal, and the more you think about it, the more you realize they are.
Now the argument with God is that it's being said to be a necessary truth. Like for example, the angles in a triangle adding up to 180 is a necessary truth in all worlds. We know this because it's possible in all possible worlds, and it's necessary truth in each possible world.
There are somethings that aren't necessarily so in all possible worlds, like, a decision I make.
Also properties that are changeable and could be different would not be a necessary possible thing in all possible worlds.
If God is defined to be a necessary being, then it would follow all his properties are such that they aren't changeable and also are necessary characteristics. This is already narrows the possibility of a necessary being to one. It can't have one colour over another, or one shape over another, because those aren't necessary. It's qualities rather must be necessary qualities.
Does this argument really prove God? I don't think so personally. Because it seems with every other necessary thing, we first know of it being true in this world, before we say it's true in all possible worlds. This one is trying to reverse the step, and showing that it being possible in all possible worlds, it would be so in this world. But what you have to show is that it would be so in every possible world, not that it's only possible so in every possible world. Or otherwise, it's not possibly necessarily, but possibly that, which is a different premise.
