Objective Morality, Anyone?

[MindForgedManacle]

Hume said we cannot derive an ought from an is. But he was wrong because we all do. That's where morality enters. Since there is presumably an objective reality that we are all a part of, our subjective perceptions are likely to agree about many of the basic principles in which morality is grounded.

That's not actually true. Hume said that you cannot MOVE purely from an is to an ought. Hume's fact-value distinction basically boils down, not to making the path from is'es and oughts unbridgeable, but to the fact that you have to give an argument for how one is to do so.

For example:

"If you want to win the 100 meter dash, you ought to run the fastest."

There, I crossed the fact-value gap via goal-directedness.

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Now, I think some of you are just going the wrong route here in ttying to rebutt moral realism (that's what it's called, God Dammit! :p ).

Firstly, things can be what you might call contingently objective. Mathematics (and truth and logic, etc.) only exist in the minds of beings capable of apprehending them (unless you're a mathematical Platonist, which is a whole other can 'o worms). Hence, mathematics is only true if their are sufficiently advanced conscious minds in existence. And yet, mathematics is necessarily true, but only if such a class of agent exists. But are you really going to respond that "Oh well then maths are subjective." That self-evidently will not do at all.

And the same goes for logic. There are scores of logical systems, all of which are contingent on the existence of sufficiently advanced conscious agents. Further, these numerous logics ALL take on different axioms and inference rules, namely because they have different aims. Hence, one must choose the logical system one is going to work with based on what one subjectively thinks will be the most apt one for the task. Paraconsistent logics reject the law of non-contradiction, but classical logic does not. Does that make LOGIC subjective?

Perhaps you guys are seeing the problem with that kind of critique y'all are giving.


Now, how would a consequentialist like myself, who leans towards moral realism, sketch out an objective moral framework? Essentially, to ground morality in some verifiable fact in the world. In this case, the prevention and/or minimization of pain and suffering in conscious creatures and the promotion of physical, mental and social well-being to the extent reasonably possible. That conscious creatures experience pain and suffering is, I daresay, not in dispute? And given that, clearly I've selected the aforementioned approach as a sort of moral axiom, muchin the same way that logics and mathematics have their own systemic axioms. Hence, so long as I'm consistent with my axioms I see no problem in saying that certain behavoirs are - to put it in a way I find a bit stupid, yet regardless - objectively moral. Now if you ask something like "Why should I accept your moral axiom and system?", my response should be evident: If you see it as the approach apt to the task of having a consistent and useful moral framework.


QED (until Rasetsu or Genkaus show up and wreck my shit).