I'm of the opinion that many of these conversations about strong atheism and gnostic atheism center around trying to make modern ideas of knowledge and certainty fit into outmoded epistemological concepts. The idea of knowledge requiring "absolute certainty," being a certainty that will endure for all time, simply doesn't apply in science, as science concerns itself with that which hasn't been demonstrated to be false, not with "that which has demonstrated itself to be true (with absolute certainty)." If absolute certainty were a requirement of knowledge, we'd have to retire the word knowledge. It would have no justifiable application in the modern world. So is it possible to have certainty without absolute certainty? Is a proposition in which we have extreme confidence, but not certainty, not also something that we "know" to be true? What does it mean to "know" something — is it a necessary part of knowing that the proposition known be infallible? I don't believe so. I think it's perfectly legitimate to claim that you know something if you are certain, without being absolutely certain.
Is it possible that some of the reluctance to claiming knowledge of things we aren't absolutely certain of is a reluctance to consider one's views as irrational and unjustified as the theist?
I think that's part of it, and that's reinforced by an overly strict definition of knowing and knowledge. Such definitions of knowledge require the proposition claimed to be false to be not simply highly unlikely, but impossible. I don't think that's a useful bar to set for "knowledge," and it harkens back to the epistemology of logical positivism in which "to know" something was to have positive confirmation of it. Contemporary views on knowledge emphasize probability in the face of uncertainty, not absolute certainty.
Just spitballing, but I suspect the emphasis on agnosticism rather than gnosticism may also hinge on the belief that one can make one's views completely veridical and justifiable, the hope that one can construct one's beliefs without faith or arbitrary assumption. To my view, all knowledge rests on assumptions, which, in terms of their justification are completely arbitrary. You can't eliminate assumptions from your beliefs and knowledge, but, I think a naive view of belief and knowledge presupposes that you can, and the presupposition that one could "purify" the foundations of one's belief, may lead one to avoiding propositions and views that do not appear 100% justifiable. The problem is, there are no such beliefs, and to pursue that goal puts one on an endless treadmill of trying to justify one's beliefs in terms of unobtainable certainty.
Is it possible that some of the reluctance to claiming knowledge of things we aren't absolutely certain of is a reluctance to consider one's views as irrational and unjustified as the theist?
I think that's part of it, and that's reinforced by an overly strict definition of knowing and knowledge. Such definitions of knowledge require the proposition claimed to be false to be not simply highly unlikely, but impossible. I don't think that's a useful bar to set for "knowledge," and it harkens back to the epistemology of logical positivism in which "to know" something was to have positive confirmation of it. Contemporary views on knowledge emphasize probability in the face of uncertainty, not absolute certainty.
Just spitballing, but I suspect the emphasis on agnosticism rather than gnosticism may also hinge on the belief that one can make one's views completely veridical and justifiable, the hope that one can construct one's beliefs without faith or arbitrary assumption. To my view, all knowledge rests on assumptions, which, in terms of their justification are completely arbitrary. You can't eliminate assumptions from your beliefs and knowledge, but, I think a naive view of belief and knowledge presupposes that you can, and the presupposition that one could "purify" the foundations of one's belief, may lead one to avoiding propositions and views that do not appear 100% justifiable. The problem is, there are no such beliefs, and to pursue that goal puts one on an endless treadmill of trying to justify one's beliefs in terms of unobtainable certainty.