On naturalism and consciousness

[FallentoReason]

I don't believe consciousness can be explained by way of a naturalistic account. Why? Because I don't think particles have it in them to act in such a way as to recreate what we mean by consciousness i.e. our thoughts, beliefs, attitudes etc.

Let's use an example; my belief that spoons are curved. So to make things easier, let's call this belief p. Now, how can we possibly arrange particles in such a way that they would express p? How could some physical arrangement *ever* describe p? I don't think it's possible to physically arrange particles in such a way that would then inherently possess the belief that other sets of particles - aka spoons - have the property of being curved.

The first thing to note is that what you have is an argument from ignorance. "I can't imagine X, therefore not X." This is a minor point, so let's move on.

I think I'm actually pointing out how something physical can't become something metaphysical. But anyways.

I note that in many discussions, the meat of the argument rests on a specific theory of meaning. You may not think of it as such, but at bottom, this is a theory about how meaning works. In your theory, if I'm not misreading you, thoughts can "inherently" be about other things, but matter can never have this property of being "inherently" about something else. This reminds me a lot of William Lane Craig's argument about objective morality. His point is that the atheist cannot demonstrate objective morality without God. The question that matters though, is can he demonstrate objective morality with God? Likewise with you, I'd ask what you mean when you say thoughts are "inherently" about other things and how that business works, because I think you've assumed it uncritically.

I assume naturalism whenever talking about consciousness in this thread, and thus show the problems I see. So what I mean when I say "thoughts are inherently about other things" I mean that the chemicals in our brain are arranged in such a way as to metaphysically be in relation to other particles in this universe. Naturalism would state that this is the case when I say "I think these nachos are delicious". But I'm saying that when push comes to shove, naturalism can't actually account for how the chemicals in my brain could be arranged in such a way as to represent the thought "I think these nachos are delicious".

Presuming that you're not a Chinese speaker, suppose I teach you the phonemes "qū xiàn." When you think about it, they're not "inherently" about anything. But they translate as curved. What makes these phonemes not inherently "about" curved objects before I teach you its meaning? Once you've been taught their meaning, do they then magically have a new property that the thought of them in your mind is now "inherently about" curved things? In what way are thoughts "inherently about" things.

I think language is another topic altogether, which undeniably is working from the basis that conscious beings give meaning to certain things. We need to take one step back here and try and account for how matter can even make up these conscious beings in the first place.

As for thoughts being "inherently about" things, I thought this was quite intuitive. If my thoughts about this apple being red and round weren't inherently about the apple being red and round, then what even is my thought? It seems like it would be the null set. To my mind, thoughts are nothing *but* inherently about other things.

Your theory of meaning doesn't only have to account for how matter is not inherently about things,

That would be trying to prove a negative. How can I show you that no matter how you arrange atoms, you won't ever form my belief that "these nachos are tasty"?

it must also explain how thought is inherently about things.

Well, like I stated, I thought it was quite intuitive. I mean, "thoughts" are just that: a metaphysical relation between the 'soul' and some aspect of the universe. If they're not that, then I don't know how we as conscious beings would go about business seeing as this is our *only* way of acting upon this universe.

Until you can do that, you're left with the rather unsatisfying "it just is." If that's all the explanation you have, then I'd suggest that all you've done is push the question one step back. Like dualists who assert that souls "just do" have free will, what you've done is little more than beg the question. You've given a respectable sheen to your argument from ignorance; you've distracted your interlocutor from the fact that you lack as much in the theory of meaning department as she does.

If we have shown that consciousness from matter "just isn't", then what's left on the table?

I'll defer on laying out my theory of meaning just yet, other than to say that I think meaning is a property of systems, not isolated parts. So "qū xiàn" isn't inherently about curved objects, its meaning is a consequence of it being embedded in a system; the word itself has no meaning apart from the system. In short, nothing is "inherently" meaningful or inherently "about" something else. That's an illusion.

Like I said, I think language is a different topic altogether.

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Consciousness?

Its an illusion of millions and millions processes of perception and sensory experiences. Brain chemistry. That's all "we" are. Objectively speaking, there is no real "you" or "I", not within the chemical, physical or biological worlds.

It's an illusion that is able to question its own identity?

It sounds like you don't agree with Descarte's famous statement "I think, therefore I am", correct?

But can you point to the area of the brain where you yourself exist, where your 'soul' resides?

Define soul.

It's the thing that is able to self-identify, like when I say "I/me/myself".