On naturalism and consciousness

[bennyboy]

I'll give you the physical monism answer so that you might have a better idea of what I'm asking. Physical monism can be falsified if there is an observations that cannot be linked back to physical processes. Good examples would be: telekinesis, telepathy, or any other physic powers. Also, mind over matter phenomena like a hologram existing outside of the holodeck as depicted on a Star Trek episode.

The existence of a mind is not such an example, because we have never seen a mind existing outside of a physical brain.

A physical brain? I wonder why you felt the need to qualify the word "brain" in this way?

You and Ben Davis seem insistent on equating idealism with a refusal to accept that the brain is a real thing. However, I've had some experience with the brain via textbooks and neuropsychology classes, as well as seeing brains in TV documentaries. The brain is a coherent part of my experience, as much as it is of yours. What you haven't asked, and should have, is this: is the framework in which the brain resides really a physical monism, or is this view of things a symbolic representation? Do the neurons in the brain exist as more than an idea? How about the atoms? How about the QM particles?

What's the difference between a gazillion QM particles vibrating in space and a brain? I'll tell you-- it's a concept imposed on collections of particles by a mind which experiences life symbolically. Without a mind to make that categorization, there's no such thing as a brain.

P.S. My definition of the mind is 'the faculty of consciousness and thought.' Please inform me if this definition is unsatisfactory for some reason. Otherwise, I will assume we are using this definition.

Mind: the subjective experience of the interaction of ideas and percepts.