On naturalism and consciousness

[Surgenator]

So we are using different definitions of mind. It's funny how you define the mind that only makes sense in your world view, and not in any world view like my definition. No wonder we're arguing in circles.

I find physicalists strangely jealous of the duelist or idealist vocabulary. We already have sufficient words to describe the physicalist model: brain function, interaction, data processing, input/output, etc. Why is it that the physical position so eagerly attempts to make words objective that are specifically intended to talk about the subjectve?

Just to make sure. this is my definition of reality: "the world or the state of things as they actually exist." Please provide yours.

The conformity of an idea with the source of the experiences from which the idea was drawn or inferred.

I can even provide a definition of physical reality to assist you with YOUR model: "Locatable, at least theoretically, in time and space." Want to guess what % of QM particles meet this definition?

This is the reason why we're arguing past each other. We can't even agree on definitions. The rest of the discussion if mostly pointless until we do. I'm not gonna accept your definitions because they're inherently biased. I recommend we use mine.

I'm not sure why your asking me these questions. You already know what I'm going to say. The framework is really represents physical monism. Yes. Yes. And yes.

Okay. So let me ask: is a desk a solid surface, or is it a gazillion particles, each unobservable by the senses, vibrating in 99.99999% space? (with the .00001% probably being pretty generous)

Your lack of understanding QM is showing. First off, the particles are observable by the senses thats why you can see the desk. You obviously don't realize that your senses require a certain threshold of interactions to send a signal to your brain, which a single electron at room temperature doesn't have enough energy to do so. Second, the electrons that orbit the nucleus interact through EM interactions i.e. photons exchanged between electrons. Their interaction length is ~0.1 micrometer which is more than enough to interact between several atoms. The electrons do not actually touch each other.

I noticed that you didn't provide a better answer to my question on falsifiability. I provided the observations that would disprove mine. Where is yours?

You did no such thing. You rolled out a bunch of fanciful baloney which is not coherent in any educated person's experience, and said that if that baloney were found true, you would accept it as evidence.

It's nice that you realize what needs to disprove physical monism is baloney.

You also ignored my reponse by discarding it as not answering your question. So I'll repeat it: you can falsify idealism by showing that physical monism can adequately handle the fact of subjective experience, since my argument for idealism is that it is the simplest view which encompasses all of human experience. If you can do the following, you are the hands-down winner:
-establish criteria which allow one to determine whether a given system does/does not experience qualia
-demonstrate a plausible mechanism for the existence of subjective qualia in an objective physical framework
-include the fact of mind in the mechanical calculus which is supposed to encompass all of reality

I have shown these in earlier post. The fact we were using different definitions may explain your lack of understanding my points. I may have not address your last bullet point, because I cannot figure out what your saying there. Nevertheless, continuing this topic is pointless until we agree on definitions.