On naturalism and consciousness

[bennyboy]

I don't look for arbitrary structures either. I look for very specific structures. Those capable of implementing boolean functions (also, specific) - at the least. "Exchanges of energy" don't necessarily have that capability.

I call them arbitrary because you've chosen to identify particular structures as having mind, and others as not, based on your own ideas, but not necessarily on observable facts about the nature of consciousness. To be fair, I think your particularly arbitrary structure of interest is a very good candidate and one worth considering. But I think mine is, too.

So, you know how I would explain this with regards to my model. How would you explain that? What could give rise to a difference between minimally conscious entities and sentient entities, as we've established them?

In this case, the same thing: increased complexity.

You do not accept any definition which cannot be coined in purely mechanical/physical terms.

Is there a problem with that? I'm looking to explain the unknown by reference to the known.

The problem is that we already know about mind. We are not inferring it from other observations, but from direct experience of it, and none of the other observations we've made about the physical universe integrate well with what we know about mind.

For example, the subjectivity of mind is the only property which we fully accept as real, rather than as a "theory," but which cannot be observed. Even gravity, which is more ubiquitous than mind, is not approached in the same gnostic way in which we approach mind.

Comp Mind doesn't actually state that there is "no qualia" - that nothing's happening. It expects there to be (and it expects it to have the attributes often associated with it). I don't actually know that this is the way our mind comes to be. What I do know is that very material structures exist which can adequately describe any statement we make about it(mind) -and that's unsurprising, we're talking logic after all.

Statement: mind is the subjective experience of data processing.

Demonstrate that any physical structure, including the brain, can be proven to have this property. I don't think it can be done logically or through observation, without any philosophical assumptions.

Also, I think the harshest words about qualia come from Neural Net theories. Those are the guys who have the real tough question of locating a "mind" if their model is an accurate depiction, lol. In vanilla comp mind we still have the option of isolating some specific part of a system and saying, "this is the structure that generates mind". NN or quantum guys go more with "all this -truly- random shit is happening and it's having a very particular effect....."

(lol, I know that's a cartoon version of NN.......before I get roasted by some nerd ..have I linked NAND2tetris yet? )

This is why I think of mind as a transcendent property (looks like nobody will ever venture into that thread lol). Or you could look at it like this: in any system capable of complex enough functioning to supervene mind, no outside observer will be able to identify exactly what part of that complex functioning manifests as conscious experience.

This applies not only to ANNs. Imagine taking a snapshot of 1 second of brain activity-- not fMRI, but every single chemical interaction that happened, and then figuring out where in that mess consciousness was created. Many are confident that mind is "in there" somewhere, but that level of complexity allows for the random supervenience of so many forms that one of those supervened forms may be mind, rather than anything the specific system does.

And yes, I'm talking about transcendence again.