On naturalism and consciousness

[dissily mordentroge]

Often discussions on fora delving into deep waters such as those we swim in here sink into tit for tat criticism of posters methodology and logic rather than any mutual effort to approach the truth. Possibly a hangover from being exposed to the absurdities of socratic dialogue?

Anyhow, I want to take a different approach for now to the tedious question of brain and mind differentiation. Someone here ( sorry I've forgotten who and am too lazy to read through all the posts) approached the central question by drawing an analogy between human consciousness and the proposal we can create 'life' inside computers or use digital logic processes as an analogue for 'mind' . I'll call it 'cyberlife' for want of a better term.
It would appear a claim is being made that life and mind are not just an attributes of carbon based matter. I can concede that it may eventually be possible to simulate life and mind with a computer, without conceding that life &/or mind would necessarily have been literally created. The problem with so called 'life' inside a computer system is that such a formalistic account gives us no principle of individuation: when do we have one rather than two such creatures?- when we have one rather than two formulae (algorithms?) so that the creature is the formula? Usually, we count creatures according to the bits of matter involved. This is, of course, a standard philosophical objection to such a picture of 'life inside a computer' If we connot individuate such creatures or locate them in the real world, then we connot attribute the to them real needs, emotions and self awareness, which it would seem we would have to be able to do if we were to take cyberlife seriously as life and use it an any argument attempting to shed light onto claims of brain/mind differentiation in humans.