Woah, deja-vu. I've a feeling that I've had this discussion with Chad before.
Okay, let's start at the beginning.
Basically, the argument that nihilism is the logical extreme of atheism relies on a logical fallacy called Denying the antecedent:
If P, then Q.
Not P.
Therefore, not Q.
Here:
If god, then life is has objective meaning, purpose, or intrinsic value.
Not god. (atheism)
Therefore, life is has no objective meaning, purpose, or intrinsic value.
The only way this argument can be considered logical if one can establish that god can one and only reason for life having objective meaning, purpose or value. A tall order, given that god hasn't even been established as a sufficient reason for those things.
Second problem:
Judging by the wiki-article, nihilism seems to be an umbrella term comprising of many different outlooks. This leads to a common misconception and a fallacy of equivocation equivalent to saying "nihilists believe in nothing". However, I may be an existential nihilist without being a moral nihilist. I may be an existential and moral nihilist without being an ontological or epistemological nihilist. Or I may be all of them without developing the "general mood of despair".
Simply put, saying atheism leads to nihilism isn't sufficient - you have to explain which specific form of nihilism is supposed to the logical extreme of atheism. Then you have to explain why it is "logical" and not just an "extreme".
Third problem:
This is the issue with the wiki-article itself. Certain words, and therefore, concepts, used interchangeably. Concepts like "objective", "intrinsic", "inherent" and "necessary" are treated as all but same. They are not.
For example - I'm definitely not an ontological or epistemological nihilist.
But, I don't think life has an intrinsic value or an objective meaning. However, it I think life does have an objective value and objective purpose and subjective meaning. I don't regard morality as inherent, but I do regard it as objective and abstractly contrived. I don't recognize any necessary laws or rules (other than physical laws, that is), but I don't perceive pointlessness because I recognize objective and inherent laws and rules. So, what kind of nihilist would that make me if I fit the terms of the definition but not the essence of it?
Okay, let's start at the beginning.
Basically, the argument that nihilism is the logical extreme of atheism relies on a logical fallacy called Denying the antecedent:
If P, then Q.
Not P.
Therefore, not Q.
Here:
If god, then life is has objective meaning, purpose, or intrinsic value.
Not god. (atheism)
Therefore, life is has no objective meaning, purpose, or intrinsic value.
The only way this argument can be considered logical if one can establish that god can one and only reason for life having objective meaning, purpose or value. A tall order, given that god hasn't even been established as a sufficient reason for those things.
Second problem:
Judging by the wiki-article, nihilism seems to be an umbrella term comprising of many different outlooks. This leads to a common misconception and a fallacy of equivocation equivalent to saying "nihilists believe in nothing". However, I may be an existential nihilist without being a moral nihilist. I may be an existential and moral nihilist without being an ontological or epistemological nihilist. Or I may be all of them without developing the "general mood of despair".
Simply put, saying atheism leads to nihilism isn't sufficient - you have to explain which specific form of nihilism is supposed to the logical extreme of atheism. Then you have to explain why it is "logical" and not just an "extreme".
Third problem:
This is the issue with the wiki-article itself. Certain words, and therefore, concepts, used interchangeably. Concepts like "objective", "intrinsic", "inherent" and "necessary" are treated as all but same. They are not.
For example - I'm definitely not an ontological or epistemological nihilist.
But, I don't think life has an intrinsic value or an objective meaning. However, it I think life does have an objective value and objective purpose and subjective meaning. I don't regard morality as inherent, but I do regard it as objective and abstractly contrived. I don't recognize any necessary laws or rules (other than physical laws, that is), but I don't perceive pointlessness because I recognize objective and inherent laws and rules. So, what kind of nihilist would that make me if I fit the terms of the definition but not the essence of it?
