Does Atheism Lead to Nihilism?

[Esquilax]

Every sensible body is in some way unique, i.e. particular. The problem arises when you group several particular bodies together and refer to them as each being an example of the same kind.

Honestly, at this point I just think you're being willfully obtuse because someone is disagreeing with you.

In the case of apples, there are Delicious, Granny Smiths, apples with bites taken out, rotten apples, etc. Each person can have their own opinion about what necessary traits constitute an apple. Opinions are subjective.

But all of those examples are unified by the objective fact that they are a fruit, grown from a specific kind of tree, possessing the characteristics of an apple (edible flesh, seeds, stamen, etc etc). That you can add further details and make sub-categories doesn't make the umbrella category subjective... and furthermore, you're actually wrong when you say people can have their own opinions about what the necessary traits of an apple are: if it's my opinion that apples, by necessity, are orange citrus fruits, then I am wrong. I don't simply become right because it's my opinion; we have an understanding about what an apple is, based upon the traits that an apple has. You are, in fact, restricted in how far you can push that collection of traits before you are no longer talking about an apple, which means it isn't subjective.

Besides, you're equivocating: Granny Smiths, rotten apples, and all the other examples you've listed, are still in the category "apple." Are you seriously arguing that it's a tenable position to argue that any of those things aren't an apple, due only to the difference between them and the weird ideal apple template you have in mind?

The problem is more acute when dealing with abstractions, like triangles. Particular examples of triangles include three lines drawn in the sand, a piece of spanakopita, and three offset dots on paper. As sensible bodies they have almost no similarities.

They do have the one similarity that defines a triangle, however; that being that they form a three-pointed two-dimensional shape. You're not actually saying anything of substance here; what, is the problem that different triangles are only united by what makes them triangles, rather than a whole bunch of other irrelevant commonalities?

But the concept of what a triangle is is not a matter of opinion; although it is possible to debate the degree to which particular examples instantiate the kind.

... Because we have defined that particular shape as "triangle."

If scientific knowledge is to be objectively true then people must be able to objectively classify things according to kind. What I am saying is that there is more to it than just applying a name to apparently similar objects. There must already be something essential about all sensible bodies of the same kind in order for them to be objectively considered such.

Which, again, is just an assertion you're making. You're demanding that a problem exists with no justification, and then asserting that only you have the answer to it. It's not something I need to deal with; to any reasonable person, the objective traits of an object in the physical world are sufficient to categorize those objects. Those traits are easily demonstrable; why do you think there needs to be some other magic thing- other than that you say so- to hold all this together?

Drop the assertions, and make with the evidence.

As it applies to ethics, consensus about what to name something is not sufficient grounds for a rational ethical theory. Another culture’s consensus opinion as to what constitutes a moral agent could exclude infidels, Jews, and women.

That's why I've never once used the term "moral agent," in this thread, instead opting for the objectively demonstrable "thinking agent."

In your opinion, people have a moral responsibility to other thinking beings. And I agree. If your criterion for being part of a kind is having a set of similar traits then it is a matter of subjective opinion as which traits constitute a thinking being.

No, because we have knowledge of those traits which constitute thoughts, beings, the act of thinking, etc.

What is the set of traits that constitute a thinking being? Surely we have a moral responsibility toward catatonics who are not currently thinking and the severely retarded or insane who do not think but act purely out of instinct.

It very much depends on the situation.

Infants have no developed rationality. Presumably we have moral responsibilities towards them because they have the potential to eventually become self-aware thinking beings.

There you go.

From my perspective, each of these examples fall within the kind of ‘thinking being’ even if any one of them only manifest it to some degree.

I think I pointed out that occasionally moral considerations can conflict, and that when this happens they must be rationally weighed. It's just a consequence of living in an imperfect world; the fact that there are problems doesn't mean the entire explanation is faulty.