Ethics

[Mudhammam]

You are begging the question with that.  You are assuming that they are not matters of fact, but have given no evidence for that claim.  However common it may be to believe what you believe, that isn't evidence that you are correct.

So, you think that if I make a claim to fact, the burden is on you to disprove it? You seem to be speaking under the presumption that Bentham had special authority to simply assert a definition of "greatest good" that everyone who disagrees with utilitarianism is not qualified to simply dismiss.

Where is your proof, for example, that Bentham is wrong?

Proof for a definition that is not demonstrative? How does that work?

Again, you are begging the question.  Someone like Bentham would tell you that the truth or falsehood of the claim "health and wealth are the greatest goods" is not dependent upon anyone's assessment.  Bentham would say that the truth or falsehood of it is determined by whether it leads to the greatest happiness for the greatest number or not.  It makes no difference what anyone's personal opinion is about it, according to Bentham.

You mean, rather, that it makes no difference what anyone's personal opinion about it is, except for Bentham's. All you've done is replace one fiat assertion ("Health and wealth are...") with another ("If it leads to the greatest happiness..."). This is the problem with objectivist theories that I outlined in the OP. It would seem as though they are the ones actually begging the question.

There have been many philosophers who have written on ethics and have thought that they have given the right answer.  And many have thought that they have given sufficient reasons why others should agree with them.  Dismissing them offhand is not a proof that they are wrong; it is just begging the question.

The same is easily said against anyone who defines "the right answer" according to their own preference. All this is, is definition on the basis of personal appeal, whereas with objective facts, we discover principles and relationships through the demonstration of definitions derived from external forces. I'm not saying one cannot perceive events that lead to happiness for the greatest number and measure an ethical theory by such a definition, I'm suggesting that you can't demonstrate this to be a more valid description of goodness than any other.

I do not know if it entered your mind or not, but, not only has it certainly has entered the mind of someone in this thread, it is a common thing for religionists to claim that it is only through religion that there can be an objective morality, and many atheists who reject an objective morality seem to accept that claim.  So I may be being pro-active in your case, but we are not the only ones in this thread, so it is worth mentioning for the benefit of others who might be reading this.

For the benefit of others who might be reading this:

To be clear, whether there is an objective morality or not is entirely independent of whether or not there is a god.  The only kind of morality for which god would be important would be one in which morality depends on god, as, for example, in the divine command theory, in which a thing is good if god commands it, and bad if god commands one not to do it.  It may be called the "bully theory of morality" or the "might makes right theory of morality," as one does what god says because god will get you if you don't.  For more on that theory, see:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Divine_command_theory

But most ethical theories do not depend on there being a god at all, and most are not incompatible with there being a god (e.g., utilitarianism, Kantianism, etc.).

The only difference, as I see it, between placing "objective morality" in a standard imposed by god rather than man, is that god would presumably have access to relevant facts not available to people. I don't see how objectivity is acquired or justified.