(April 5, 2015 at 10:56 am)Rhythm Wrote: In my framework, as in the operation of any demonstrable computational system, yes - the processing takes place in the system that exists and is capable of performing computation, but that has little to do with the next bit about free will, on it's own.
The second option, as elaborated upon, would be some sort of dualism, a mind/body seperation. Even then, I'd still refer to comp mind - that "cponsciousness stuff" is still doing computation somehow...and we have a long list of principles by which that can be achieved in a variety of implementations. The questions regarding the operation of consciousness, to me, are the same regardless of which way we approach it. The only difference between dualism and monism, for me...is that I can accept the burden of proof and arrange for a convincing demonstration of the monist stuff (rather than flap my jaws), and it's demonstrably capable of doing what we call computation regardless of whether or not there is any "other non-stuff" or "other stuff".
While there may be a more elaborate explanation.....I don't seem to need to invoke it in order to explain a wide range of observations. Find me something that needs other stuff, I tell dualists, and I'll have to refer to other stuff to explain it. Until then, meh.
So do I gather then that my #1 is what you would call 'monism' and roughly speaking you'd call yourself a monist? I think then I am also a monist but sometimes dualist ideas slip in to my thinking. So how can you envisage a free will that is not based on computation if you believe in computation? And what is this 'long list of principles...' of how consciousness stuff is computing - that sounds very interesting.
Anyway I've been looking at this forum for about eight hours and I need a bit of a break, so if it's OK I'll catch up with you later
