The Brain=Mind Fallacy

[genkaus]

This is a burden of proof challenge. The materialist must justify the reduction.

The materialist has provided the justification. Certain emotions have been mapped and observed as quantifiable physical phenomena occurring inside the mind. Further, it has been shown that by interfering with or altering those physical phenomena, it is possible to alter those qualitative experiences as well (such as with mood altering drugs). This is very strong evidence for the hypothesis that these experiences are reducible to physical phenomena. Your choice to point at gaps in the theory as evidence for pan-psychism is no better than pointing to gaps in evolution as evidence for creationism.

Electro-magnetism is a fundamental force, like gravity, and the weak and strong interactions. It was already present, just manifest in a stronger, more measurable form.

That is a positive claim. Care to meet the burden of proof.

The materialist claim is that something not previously present, qualia, emerges out of thin air under certain conditions. That is the extraordinary claim. Is some kind of qualia already present in a light bulb and that we only become aware of its presence in complex aggregates like brains? If not, where did it come from and when?

No one says it emerges out of thin air. Everyone says it emerges out of complex brain mechanisms. So, no, there is no qualia present in the light bulbs. It comes from the complex neural activity of the brain and exactly when it becomes complex enough to give rise to it is a question we don't know the answer to - yet.

Actually I borrowed the analogy you used elsewhere to present the idea of emergence (sorry, I should have given you a hat tip). Showing that the analogy does not hold shows that emergence is not a viable option for materialism.

I don't think that I've ever used the car parts vs drivability analogy - ever. Further, even if it were a good analogy, proof or disproof by analogy is a fallacy. It can only be used to demonstrate a concept the concept of emergence, not prove or disprove that the concept is applicable in case of consciousness. Therefore, your argument that the analogy is incorrect only shows that the analogy is incorrect.

Thought is a concept a thought is the thing to which the concept applies. The word can be used as both a noun and a verb. You want to confine thought to a function. Functions are indeed descriptions of a process. The job of the materialist is to justify the belief that some physical functions have qualia and while others do not.

Simple enough - Qualia refers to the class of physical functions specific to the complex brain mechanisms which have the effect of giving rise to and/or affecting the consciousness.

Functions, like motor skills, can cease. That is not the issue. Not all brain function are associated with qualia. Many are unconscious. If the ability to experience qualia is a function, then what is the difference between a qualia function and a non-qualia function? Within the materialist paradigm, why is it reasonable to assume that brain states give rise to qualia when only some do and some do not.

That is your smoking gun? The fact that not all brain functions give rise to qualia? You realize that this argument is a fallacy of composition, i.e. assuming that since some of the brain functions are capable of giving rise to qualia, then either all should be of none should be.

Exactly at which point we can differentiate between the two is not known, since the functionality is not completely understood. However, it is reasonable in the materialist paradigm to assume that the some brain states give rise to qualia while others don't, because we have observed a strong correlation and causation between the said brain states and the experience.

You have not shown that it reduces to physical processes although I can accept the idea that if thought is a physical process technological advances may be able to explain it. But there is no place to look. The real error is trying to insert a very real and visceral feature of reality into a paradigm (materialism) that has no place for it.

You contradict yourself. You state that "if thought is a physical process", thereby implying that it is atleast possible, even if you do not consider it probable. Which means that the paradigm (materialism) very much has a place for the real and visceral feature of reality.