On naturalism and consciousness

[Whateverist]

…Declarations based on interpretations of subjective experience are not automatically valid…the only thing that can be assumed to be valid is the phenomenology of the experience, not its interpretation.

Here I am making a distinction between knowledge and true belief as it relates to speculative ideas for which no one can offer any justification .

Suppose you believe in deceived by a demon, a brain in a vat, the dream of a sleeping god, or something else of that nature. None of these can serve as the basis for knowledge since nothing about them can be confirmed by either logic or inductive inquiry, or as I like to say reason applied to experience. That is just the human condition. However, the lack of omniscience is not reason to believe that no knowledge is possible. Those who think about these things either recognize first principles of reason (like the law of non-contradiction) or fall into self-refuting absurdity. As it specifically relates to philosophy of mind, there are some problems, like the problem of other minds that cannot be properly known since it is amenable to neither deduction nor direct experience.

Those people who do not have a prior commitment to ontological naturalism find the results of contemporary psi research compelling. If a machine were able to produce psi effects of equal magnitude to that of humans I would consider that as satisfactory evidence that they are indeed conscious.

I just see no reason to overstate my case. Why claim knowledge when really I know damn well that it is I interpreting the experience? I'm not infallible and don't require any special status for what I believe. I won't call it knowledge-like, even though is is what I believe. In fact, everything I believe about the mind, the soul and the nature of personal identity can be prefaced with "it is as though.." without any sense of loss on my part.

So it seems you require a more certain stance toward what you believe than I do about what I believe. I wonder what you think about that. Could you imagine holding your personal belief about subjective experience in a provisional way? Are you sure anyone is entitled to such certainty?