Sam Harris On Defining Consciousness

[bennyboy]

Here again, as we get to below, the mystery is not, for me, in consciousness.  We see an effect, we see how that effect is achieved.  We understand it well enough -to manipulate that effect-.  We have more than just a plausible explanation of why consciousness, as I'm using the word, exists.  We have a robust understanding of -various- mechanisms for it..... and how they work, how they developed, why they work the way they do, and why they developed the way they did.  This isn't to say we know it all, or enough, or even as much as we'd like..or that understanding how a structure can achieve awareness explains some -other- thing you might be wondering about.

That's fine. You use your definition, I'll use mine. But I'm pretty sure Sam Harris isn't using your definition either. I'll tell you why my label is better than your definition: it serves to differentiate. Your version of "consciousness" is equivalent to "function," to "phsyical interaction," etc. I think it's only been used as you use it in very recent terms, and I see it as an attempt to rob a non-physicalist word of its real meaning.

When in doubt, go to the etymology: it comes from the root "to know." I do not think a machine performing a function "knows," because knowing is. . . wait for it. . . an experience.

Again, I'm not redefining anything, nor is there any reason for me to acknowledge some unique definition - because I'm not using one.  What you're calling "consciousness" seems, to me, to be more like consciousness and self consciousness and sentience and sapience and qualia all lumped together.....in short, the human experience.  Since when did something have to share the human experience in-toto in order to be deemed conscious?

The things I was talking about are definitely the human experience. . . specifically, knowing what it's like to experience things (aka qualia). It is this kind of knowledge that I trace back to the "sci" in "conscious."

I presume that a worm knows what it's like to be a worm. I do not believe that a computer knows what it's like to be a computer.

That I don't see the mystery in qualia that you do might be tied up in what I -don't- demand of that "whatever it is".  If you'll recall our previous conversations, I don't require it to be anything more than the operation of a machine, which we can demonstrate.  I don't demand that it be anything other than processing, which we do have an explanation for.

I don't demand anything. However, I do use "conscious" as a label for something which you do not, and I think my usage is more meaningful than yours. In other words, if I have to debate consciousness using your definition, I will instantly become bored, and leave it to robot engineers to study it. As a living thing, I'm mainly interested in what it's like to be alive, and your definition sheds little light on that, IMO.